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Abstract
A large number of criminological theories predict a link between crime and 
the labour market. This thesis takes predictions from those theories and tests them 
empirically. Using a large range of data and quantitative techniques, this work 
considers which factors are most associated with crime, while at the same time 
addressing issues of methodology and interpretation.
The thesis consists of seven Chapters. The first introduces the issues 
surrounding crime and the labour market, describes the theories which inform the 
research and discuss the existing empirical work in the area. Sections also describe the 
data and methodological debates of concern in this field.
The empirical analysis, which forms the body of the thesis, follows from this 
introduction in five inter-related Chapters. The first two deal with establishing which 
variables are most associated with crime, which data are most useful and which 
methodological techniques are most appropriate. They cover cross-sectional analysis, 
as well as area level longitudinal data at police force area level and Local Authority 
level over time. The results point to clear methodological advantages of using area 
level data and find the most robust correlate of crime to be low wages.
The following Chapter uses these findings to frame an analysis of police force 
area level data in England and Wales. It examines the effect on crime of a substantial 
pay increase awarded to low wage workers with the introduction of the National 
Minimum Wage into the UK labour market in April 1999. By comparing crime rates 
in areas before and after the introduction of the Minimum Wage, it finds that crime 
fell (in relative terms) in areas where the introduction of the Minimum Wage had the 
greatest impact.
Having consistently found the labour market, and in particular low wages, to 
be linked to crime, the final two empirical Chapters address issues of gender and age, 
two of the most important demographic determinants of crime. The first examines the 
effect of increasing female labour force participation on crime, and finds that rising 
female employment is positively associated with crimes done by males. Results 
indicate that this is because increasing female labour supply forces male wages down. 
Particularly affected are the wages of the low skilled males who are already low paid 
and are more likely to be on the margins of crime. The second of these Chapters 
focuses on youth crime and finds that, although labour market variables matter, other 
variables such as education, truancy and parental involvement with the police matter 
more.
The final Chapter draws the material together, offers concluding comments, 
places the findings within a policy context and offers suggestions for future research.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Understanding why crime occurs and how it varies over time and space is a 
critical public policy question. Expenditure on the criminal justice system in Britain is 
now the fourth highest category of public expenditure (following health, education 
and defence) and many commentators have expressed concerns about how crime tears 
into the social fabric, producing many undesirable outcomes that may persist through 
time and that often spill over to other aspects of society.
It should be acknowledged at the outset that examining why crime occurs is no 
simple task. In the past a wide range of factors were held responsible for crime 
including the Devil (Williams 2001), retarded evolution (Lombroso 1895), particular 
body types (Kretschmer 1922), feeble mindedness (Goddard 1921) and hereditary 
defectiveness (Goring 1913).
While explanations of crime have come a long way since this type of research, 
identifying the causes of crime remains a complicated task. Although the research in 
this thesis attempts to explain variations in crime by reference to the labour market in 
all reality crime is likely to be the outcome of a number of complex and interrelated 
factors, some to do with biology, some psychological factors, some to do with society, 
others the law, others to do with factors that no-one has even thought of yet or that we 
have no way of measuring. Thus, it is likely that factors such as these all contribute to 
motivation, opportunity, propensity toward and discouragement from crime, the result 
of which are criminal outcomes.
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This introduction to the thesis begins by considering criminological and 
sociological theories of why people commit crime. The discussion is specifically 
focused upon informing ways in which crime and the labour market are connected, 
and on which theories are better suited to offer empirical tests of the importance of 
any such connection.1
1.2 Theoretical Underpinnings
1.2.1 Predictive Power
Theoretical predictions form the basis of much empirical work. They inform the 
way we as researchers think of issues, formulate research questions and construct 
empirical models.
“because they make statements about the relationship between observable 
phenomena, a key characteristic o f scientific theories is that they can be 
falsified. The process o f attempting to falsify a scientific theory involves 
systematically observing the relationship described in the theory and then 
comparing those observations to arguments o f  the theory itself This 
process is called research: That is the assertions o f the theory are tested 
against the observed world facts. ”
Void and Bernard, 1998, p2-3.
In line with the above quote, predictions from criminological theory form the
foundations of this research project, against which first order principles concerning
the relationship between crime and the labour market can be tested. Although each
1 As will be seen some theories are more applicable to certain crimes, some to certain groups, some at 
specific periods in peoples lives. These will be discussed in more detail as they arise throughout the 
Chapters o f this thesis.
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empirical Chapter of this thesis discusses the particular theories which inform that 
specific piece of work, an introduction to the relevant criminological theories which 
generally offer predictive power in the context of this thesis are given below. 
However, it should be recognised at the outset that this thesis is an empirical analysis 
of the relationship between crime and the labour market. It draws heavily on and 
utilises a quantitative methodological approach. While it is firmly grounded in an 
appreciation of relevant theoretical issues, it makes no claims to be a theoretical 
treatise. Instead (and by necessity as this is a quantitative thesis), the focus is placed 
upon how theories can offer testable predictions of how crime and the labour market 
may be connected. Thus, the predictive powers of theories discussed below can be 
viewed as empirically relevant extracts drawn from a number of theories which are 
able to offer predictive power for framing and designing the empirical work contained 
in the thesis.2
1.2.2 Positivism
As a quantitative study, this work relies more heavily on positivist 
criminological theory. Although nowadays largely used as a term of criticism, 
originally positivism in this field referred to work that sought to identify the causes of 
crime (Void and Bernard 1998). While thought by some to be too deterministic, a 
great deal of empirical research within the field of criminology (both qualitative and 
quantitative) attempts, at least to some extent, to shed light on the causes of crime. 
This work is no exception. Given the caveat of the likely impossibility of identifying 
all the wide-ranging, multi-causal factors associated with crime (discussed above),
2 For a much more detailed discussion of the complexities o f criminological theories see Downes and 
Rock (1998).
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this research attempts to explain some of the variation in crime in terms of variations 
in labour market factors.
The contribution of positivism to this research does not stop here. Although 
remembered for work that located crime in terms of human biology (Lombroso 1895), 
the greatest contributions made by positivism are evident in the work of authors such 
as Guerry (1831) and Quetelet (1842) who used statistics in an attempt to explain 
crime in terms of social causes. For example, these authors argued that crime is 
associated with poverty, unemployment, inequality, age and gender. These are factors, 
which still form the basis of many empirical models of crime today, including those 
presented in this thesis.
1.2.3 Anomie/Strain
For Durkheim (1933, 1938) the relationship between crime and factors such as 
inequality and poverty was the result of a breakdown of social norms which 
accompanied the modernisation of society (Void and Bernard 1986). Thus, as society 
became more advanced, economic development increased the availability of material 
goods and their cultural priority (Downes and Rock 1998) which created insatiable 
desires. These desires lead to a break down of regulations and rules and an 
undermining of confidence in the social structure which encouraged crime.
This can be elaborated with reference to Merton’s strain theory (1938), an
adaptation of Durkheim’s anomie theory for the situation in the US. For Merton
anomie was not just associated with the specific instance when desires became
insatiable but it was endemic in industrial capitalism (Downes and Rock 1998). Thus,
he showed how a breakdown of norms could occur in relatively stable economic
conditions, which he referred to as ‘social structural strain’ (Merton 1938).
3 However, this work does not see labour market factors as the only ones relevant for explaining crime. 
There are other factors such as those relevant to human biology or psychology or the workings o f the 
criminal justice system which are also likely to be important.
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In societies such as the US, and indeed the UK, which encourage economic 
success individuals are encouraged to achieve certain goals such as securing 
employment, earning money, providing for one’s self and one’s family, but also 
achieving the heights of material success.4 Because countries such as the US and the 
UK (at least in theory) are based on the idea of meritocracy individuals are told they 
all have equal access to these goals. When individuals who have weak labour market 
positions such as the low paid or unemployed cannot achieve these goals, this causes 
strain. In other words, there is a mismatch between the culturally accepted goals and 
the ability of some individuals to achieve them. This is reflected in the winner/loser 
culture described by James (1995) and in Young’s (1999) uneven race track of 
meritocracy.
Merton (1938) created a typology of the relationship between what he referred 
to as goals and means:
• Conformity: Where individuals have the means to achieve their goals in law
abiding ways.
• Innovation: Where individuals do not have the means to achieve goals
legally, so resort to reach goals in illegal ways.
• Ritualism: Goals cannot be reached legally so individuals reappraise their
aspirations downwards and become bogged down in routine.
• Retreatism: Goals cannot be reached so individuals turn their back on the
society which encourage these goals.
• Rebellion: Individuals who cannot reach society’s goals create new goals
and new means.
4 The importance o f achieving these ends is enforced through the media and advertising.
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In this way the disjunction between goals and means, which will be most acute 
for those with weak labour market positions, is associated with various types of crime. 
Those who innovate may resort to crimes such as property crimes, drug dealing or 
prostitution to achieve material success. Those who retreat may become homeless, 
beggars, alcoholics or drug addicts. Those who rebel may adopt new goals which 
bring them into conflict with the law (such as the anti-capitalist protestors who are 
involved in violent demonstrations).
1.2.4 Culture and Subculture
Merton’s idea of rebellion is closely related to theories of subculture, seen in 
the work of Cohen (1955), Mays (1954) and Miller (1958). These theories also offer 
predictions for the relationship between crime and the labour market. For Cohen, 
young working class boys unable to achieve status elsewhere (either through the 
status of their parents, or through academic or sporting excellence) often turn to crime 
in order to gain status and the respect they seek from other youngsters. Usually this 
involves working class boys joining gangs, which have their own culture and set of 
ascribed values that are distinct from the dominant middle class culture. In this way, 
such boys adhere to a ‘sub-culture’ which rewards certain behaviours such as 
aggressiveness, fighting and vandalism, as a reaction against their failure to achieve 
the status in the way prescribed by the dominant middle class values (Cohen 1955).
Cloward and Ohlin (1960) elaborated on these ideas in their theory of 
differential opportunity structure. They argue that crime results from blocked 
legitimate opportunities, but that the type of crime may reflect differential access to 
illegitimate opportunities. Thus, for Cloward and Ohlin (1960) three different types of 
subculture exist:
18
• Criminal: Where opportunities for property crimes exist, often as a result of 
the existence of adult criminal networks in the area, youths are involved in 
utilitarian forms of robbery and theft.
• Conflict: Where neither the legitimate nor criminal roles exist, youths turn to 
fighting.
• Retreatist: Youths who are ‘double failures’, having failed in both the 
legitimate and criminal spheres, resort to drug-taking and hustling.
Unlike Cohen and Cloward and Ohlin, other subcultural theorists see lower 
class subculture not as a product of rebellion against middle class values, but as a 
result of the way the working classes have adapted to life at the bottom of the social 
structure. Thus, for Mays (1954) and Miller (1958) working class culture rewards 
attributes such as physical toughness, street sense and excitement. In terms of wider 
society, this often brings the working classes into conflict with the law.
For Downes (1966) ‘delinquency was a fact of life not a way of life’ (Downes 
and Rock 1998). In his study of boys in the East End of London, Downes found that 
the youths were intermittently involved in a range of delinquent acts ranging from 
fighting to theft and vandalism. These acts were motivated by a desire for a 
momentary release from the boredom of their position in society, rather than as an 
outcome arising from a wider working class culture or an organised rebellion against 
middle class values.
1.2.5 Drift
Matza and Sykes (1961) and Matza (1964) argued against the idea that 
delinquents hold different values from non-delinquents. Instead, delinquents are not 
committed to criminal ways, but simply ‘drift’ into crime and out o f crime, influenced 
by a variety of factors such as motivation, peer pressure and opportunity. Drift into
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crime occurs as a result of neutralisation, the justifications given before the act, or 
excuses made after the act, for delinquent behaviour. Such excuses or rationalisations 
come under five broad headings:
• Denial of responsibility: Crime was the result of an accident, or because of a
bad childhood -  ‘I didn’t mean to do it, it just happened’.
• Denial of Injury: The crime did not cause injury. No-one was hurt; the
victims were insured.
• Denial of the victim: The victim was deserving of injury in some way or no
victim exists.
• Condemnation of the condemners: Those who condemn are themselves 
venal. Or, the delinquent is victimised in some way - being targeted by corrupt 
police, for example.
• Appeal to higher loyalties: The crime was carried out for a group or gang, 
loyalties to whom override loyalties to wider society at that particular time.
1.2.6 Differential Association
To some extent, both theories of strain and subcultures depend on learning - 
that is learning the norms and values associated with culture. The concept of learning 
norms and behaviours, particularly in relation to crime, is further explored in 
differential association theory (Sutherland 1924). This theory asserts that criminal 
values and behaviour such as criminal motivation, attitudes and techniques of crime 
are learnt through interactions with others. It is likely that those with weaker labour 
market positions will not only have more time on their hands with which to interact 
with others, but they are also more likely to come into contact with a greater number 
of people from whom they can learn criminal values and behaviours. The people with 
whom individuals associate (peer groups) are central to this idea. For example, those
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at the bottom of the social structure are likely to live in areas where many people are 
unemployed or in very low paid menial employment.5 Therefore they will have 
greater access to individuals from whom they can learn criminal motivation or drives. 
Moreover, these areas are likely to have a higher concentration of criminals who can 
pass on their experiences of committing crime and the criminal justice system.
Differential reinforcement theory (Akers 1964) expands on differential 
association theory by suggesting that an individual’s behaviour will be criminal if the 
positive images of crime such as the financial rewards and the status criminals receive 
outweigh the negative images such as the probability of arrest and incarceration. This 
idea is strongly related to rational choice theory, which will be discussed later. It is 
probable that those with weaker labour market positions are more likely to have 
greater access to criminals (for example they are more likely to see drug dealers, 
pimps and prostitutes in their neighbourhood) than those who have stronger labour 
market positions and can afford to live in better areas. If they see the local drug dealer 
driving round in a big car, while they are struggling to support themselves or their 
families, their positive view of crime is reinforced. If these criminals are arrested, a 
negative view of crime will be reinforced. But it is often the case that the positive 
reinforcement images of crime are much more visible.
1.2.7 Ecological theories o f Crime
The physical environment in which individuals live is the focus of another set 
of theories that offer predictions of how the labour market may impact on crime. 
These are known as ecological theories of crime. They largely stem from the work of 
the Chicago School and can be seen in the work of authors such as Shaw and McKay 
(1942). Drawing from Durkheim’s theory of anomie, Shaw and McKay argue that
5 For as Cressey and Sutherland (1992) point out differential association can occur at work too.
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crime is related to social disorganisation in areas. Thus, areas with a high proportion 
of people reliant on welfare, non-employed and low wage workers will have more 
social disorganisation and thus more crime.
These ideas are related to more recent theories of crime and place including 
opportunity, routine activities approach, and the theory of broken windows. Firstly, 
Mayhew et al (1976) argue that the level of crime in areas is directly affected by the 
criminal opportunities in the area. This refers to the abundance and ease of crime 
targets. Thus, property crime might be high in areas inhabited by those with weaker 
labour market positions as these are the people who cannot afford to protect their 
property. Although more wealthy areas may have goods of higher value, they are also 
likely to have better security, house and car alarms, gated properties and even private 
security patrols.
Routine activities theory (Felson 1994) expands on these concepts by noting 
that crime is related to the day-to-day activities of people in the area. Likened to 
Durkheim’s (1933) work on social solidarity, this theory predicts that crime will be 
related to social relationships in areas. Where individuals look out for one another and 
for each other’s property and even form neighbourhood watch schemes crime will be 
lower. Thus, it is clear from these theories that within areas dominated by those with 
the poorest position in the labour market (such as inner city areas or large council 
estates), there is likely to be a higher level of anonymity and a lower level of personal 
surveillance. People are less likely to be concerned about what is happening to others 
and less likely to get involved in disputes for fear of their own safety.
Moreover, those with weak labour market positions are more likely than other 
groups to live in social housing or on housing estates, which are often easier targets 
because of the architectural design of the buildings themselves (Newman 1972), or
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the design of the street buildings are located on (Hillier and Hanson 1984). The fact 
that some properties are often less well maintained than other properties also makes 
them more vulnerable. Wilson and Kelling (1982) show how areas descend into crime 
if attention is not paid to maintenance. A broken window gives the impression that 
no-one cares, so more and more windows are broken. If nothing is done about the 
broken windows, the situation escalates into more and more serious disorder and 
crime, as criminals (such as drug dealers, pimps and prostitutes) are attracted to the 
area and the respectable people (who have the means) leave.
1.2.8 Social Control
Rather than focusing on the motivation or opportunity factors that encourage 
or discourage crime, control theory explains crime in terms of the factors which 
restrain individuals from breaking the law (Hirshi 1969). Thus, similar to Matza’s 
drift theory, crime does not occur because individuals hold criminal values or beliefs, 
but because individuals are not bound by conventional social order. According to 
Hirshi, individuals with strong bonds to society are less likely to commit crime. This 
depends on:
• Attachment: Caring about and being cared for by others
• CommitmentiHow big a stake an individual has in conformity
• Involvement: How involved an individual is in conventional activities
• Belief: The ability individuals have to neutralise conventional beliefs 
In this way, those with weaker labour market positions can be thought of as
having weaker social bonds to society than other groups. For example, as employment 
is one of the main institutions through which individuals develop a stake in 
conformity those with no jobs, or those in marginalized economic positions will have 
weaker commitments to society than others, they have less to lose by breaking the
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law. Moreover, the unemployed or under-employed are also less involved in 
conventional activities and are likely to have more spare time on their hands. 
According to social control theory this suggests that such people are more likely to be 
involved in crime. Finally, it is more likely that those with weak labour market 
positions will be able to neutralise conventional beliefs and rationalise their criminal 
behaviour as a result of their position at the bottom of the social structure i.e. ‘my 
need is greater than others’.
1.2.9 Labelling
One of the reasons social control works is because people are concerned about 
what society thinks about them, about social disapproval. They are scared of the 
stigma that is associated with being identified as a rule breaker and being labelled a 
criminal (Becker 1963). Once an individual is labelled as a criminal, not only is the 
threat of stigmatisation removed, but also an individual may start to identify with the 
label that is attached to him/her and start acting in a way corresponding to the label. 
Thus, a person becomes freer to commit crimes without need for motivation or 
justification as they are just fulfilling the label that society has attached to them.
Many of those with weak labour market positions (such as the unemployed, 
the low paid, some ethnic minority groups and those living in social housing) are 
generally perceived by society as more likely to be criminals. Regardless of whether 
they have committed a crime, such people are often labelled as criminals because of 
their labour market status, where they live or the way they look. Labelling predicts 
that such individuals are more likely to have a criminal self-image, which may 
manifest itself in higher crime rates amongst these groups.
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1.2.10 Conflict and Radical Criminology
In the same way that individuals in society see some groups as more criminal, 
so too does the criminal justice system. This often means that certain groups are more 
likely to be more heavily policed than others in society. This is demonstrated clearly 
in the disproportionate number of times police ‘stop and search’ black people (Home 
Office 2001c). As a result, such groups are likely to have more confrontational 
relationships with the law.
The aptly named conflict theory, which largely stems from Marxist 
criminology, suggests that this conflict is inherent in societies where different interest 
groups exist within the same culture and where the different groups have incompatible 
interests. For Void (1958), as long as the differing groups have similar power, a 
compromise can be established and society can reach a stable equilibrium. Where the 
groups have different strengths, the powerful group in society creates and enforces 
laws to protect its interest, which it forces upon the weaker group in society. Thus, 
crime is seen as a response from the weaker groups in society to the subjugation of 
their way of life.
Hence, because the laws are generated by the middle classes for the middle 
classes (Void and Bernard 1998) those in the weakest positions are most likely to 
come into contact with the law and also to have their actions defined as criminal.
Quinney (1978) sets out a typology of crimes that could be produced as a 
result of these conflicts:
• Crimes of Domination: Committed by those in power, such as police 
brutality, corporate and organised crime.
• Crimes of Accommodation: Committed by the subjugated, such as theft, 
burglary, robbery and violence.
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• Crimes of Resistance: Also committed by the subjugated, but takes the form 
of political struggles against the State, such as terrorism.
Closely related to conflict theories are radical theories of crime. A main 
difference, according to Williams (2001), is that while conflict theories acknowledge 
a range of potential power groups, the main focus for radical theorists is Capitalism. 
Thus for ‘radicals’ like Taylor, Walton and Young (1973), crime is a social construct 
invented by the powerful to protect their own interests. The replacement of capitalism 
with a more socialist society, where human diversity would be tolerated would 
eventually lead to the elimination of crime.
Idealistic in nature, these ideas were later reformed by Young (1975) to take the 
shape of ‘left realism’. This sought to offer a realistic empirical examination of the 
crime problem. To do so, the left realists turned to victimisation surveys, particularly 
local surveys such as the Islington Crime Survey, to examine who was at risk of crime 
and how crime affected lives. In so doing, they discovered that the most vulnerable 
groups were not only most affected by crime, but had the highest risk of crime. They 
found that most crime is done by working class people, against working class people 
(Young 1996).
1.2.11 Rational Choice
Seen in the work of Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973), individuals have a 
choice between crime and work, or more generally, they choose to allocate their time 
across crime-work space. These decisions are a function of a number of factors, 
including expected earnings from crime, expected earnings from the labour market, 
and perceptions of the severity of the punishment if one gets caught.
Thus, this theory predicts that those with the weakest labour market positions 
are more likely to be involved in crime as they have less to lose and more to gain by
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doing so. Seen as a simple work/crime decision, this explains why people with no 
work may decide to partake in crime. But on a more complex level, this can also shed 
light on how individuals who are employed may decide to commit crimes and the 
extent to which they allocate their time between work and crime (Fagan and Freeman 
1999).
1.2.12 From Theoretical Predictions to Hypothesis Construction
It is quite obvious that a large number of theories predict that shifts in the 
labour market should be related to crime. Some theories discussed here explain why 
individuals with weak labour market positions are likely to commit more crime than 
others in society. Others offer explanations as to why areas that are characterised by 
factors associated with weak labour market positions (such as high social housing) are 
likely to have higher crime rates than other areas.
These theories will be discussed further in specific Chapters. But from this 
discussion, it is evident that a range of different theories predict that those with weak 
labour market positions are likely to have greater motivation (i.e. strain), greater 
potential for learning (i.e. differential association), more opportunity (i.e. routine 
activities) or less control (i.e. social control theory). While for the sake of simplicity 
and clarity these theories are described here separately it is clear that there is much 
interaction and overlap among these, often very, different theories, in terms of the 
predictions they offer empirical work on crime and the labour market. All the theories 
discussed above predict differences in crime across different labour market situations. 
It is this relationship which enables the formulation of the key hypothesis of this 
thesis - namely to what extent are shifts in labour market situations associated with 
crime.
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1.3 Facts: Crime
1.3.1 The Extent o f Crime Today
There were 5.5 million crimes recorded by the police in the 2001/2002 (Home 
Office 2002). This corresponds to a rise of 7% since the previous year. Total crime 
recorded by the police has fallen in four of the last six years (it rose by 3.8% in 
1999/2000).
A massive proportion of total recorded crime in this period were property 
crimes. Indeed, in 2001/2002 crimes against property accounted for around 82% of 
the total number of crimes. The largest single crime type within the group of property 
crime was thefts. Between 2001/2002 there were some 2.3 million thefts recorded by 
the police. Almost half (46%) of the 2.3 million thefts are made up of thefts of, and 
from, vehicles. 2001/2002 saw a rise in property crime of 6% on the previous year. 
However, until this time, property crimes had been falling since the mid 1990s6 
(Home Office 2001a).
During the same period, 812,954 violent offences were recorded by the police. 
The main offences which made up this group were: common assault (32%), non-life 
threatening woundings (28%), harassment (14%), robberies (15%) and sex offences 
(5%). Violent crime rose by 8% compared to the preceding year, the sixth consecutive 
rise in the last 6 years (Home Office 2001).7
1.3.2 Trends in Recorded Crime over Time
Over the longer term the evolution of recorded crime in England and Wales 
can be seen in Figure 1.1. Although recorded crime declined since its peak of
6 Although changes in recording practises in 1998 means that crime rates after 1999 are not strictly 
comparable with those before this date.
7 See above.
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5,383,000 crimes in 1992, with 4,615,449 crimes recorded in 1999,8 recorded crime 
was some 83% higher than in 1980 and a massive 447% higher than in 1920.
These trends help explain why the government spends around 13 billion 
pounds a year9 on the criminal justice system. As noted earlier, this makes the 
criminal justice system the fourth highest category o f public expenditure (following 
social security, health and education) in Britain.
Figure 1.1 Recorded Crime in England and Wales 1918-1999
Q>
E
uo
TJd>
- o
oo0)
o'
Year
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1.3.3 Problems with Recorded Crime
The figures given above and used in much of this thesis are crimes reported to 
and recorded by the police. Thus, as is often pointed out such figures exclude any 
crimes that are either not reported to or recorded by the police. They exclude what is 
termed ‘the dark figure of crime’. The extent to which this is a cause for concern 
depends on a number of factors: Why do crimes not appear in the official statistics?
8 The long time trend stops in 1999 because as mentioned above changes in recording practises in 1998 
make comparisons after 1999 difficult.
9 For the year 2000-2001.
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Do we need to know every crime in order to study its causes? Can we deal with 
potential problems methodologically? And, are there any other sources of crime data 
that are more reliable?
According to Brantingham and Brantingham (1984) and Williams (2001), 
there are many reasons why individuals may not want to report crimes to the police. 
These include instances where a crime is so subtle that no one becomes aware of it 
(e.g. breaking and entering where nothing is touched), instances where an occurrence 
is not perceived to be a crime (e.g. violence in the course of sport) and events where 
the victim is willing (e.g. drug offences). While it is true that these do not appear in 
the official statistics it is doubtful that such offences would ever appear as crimes no 
matter how they were recorded. Moreover, there is always likely to remain a ‘dark 
figure’ of crime regardless of the method used to collect the data (Williams 2001), 
given that there are some crimes that people will not want to report to the police or 
tell to an anonymous interviewer.
There is another reason given by Brantingham and Brantingham (1984) and 
Williams (2001) for failing to report a crime which is that the crime is perceived to be 
too trivial. Indeed, the British Crime Survey (BCS), indicates that this is one of the 
main reasons for not reporting a crime to the police (accounting for 70% of all those 
crimes not reported in the most recent sweep of the BCS) (Home Office 2002). Most 
serious offences are reported, as are any crimes which are required to be reported 
under the terms of insurance requirements, such as household theft and vehicle theft 
(Home Office 2002).10 This means that many of the crimes analysed in this thesis are 
well represented in the official statistics.
10 In the 2001/2002 BCS 94% of all thefts o f cars were reported and 84% o f all burglaries where 
something was stolen were reported (Home Office 2002).
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Minor offences are also those which are least likely to be recorded by the 
police. Police forces are bound by law to record crimes, but as Williams (2001) points 
out there must be prima facie  evidence that a crime has been committed and it must 
be of a serious enough nature to warrant police attention. This may result in the less 
serious crimes going unrecorded by the police.
Given the issues discussed above, there still remain a large number of crimes 
that do not appear in the official statistics. Brantingham and Brantingham 1984 argue 
that this does not mean that we are unable to study crime or the causes of it:
'‘Many criminologists ...seem to think that the scientific assessment o f  
causal patterns in criminality or criminal events depends on a complete 
enumeration o f all crimes that occur. Such a complete enumeration is no 
more necessary to criminology than a counting o f all the stars is 
necessary to a viable cosmology. ”
Brantingham and Brantingham 1984, p50.
Although there remains a ‘dark figure’ of unreported and unrecorded crime 
where this is consistent, an examination of changes in crime as presented in this thesis 
should not be affected. Thus as Brantingham and Brantingham (1984) note of official 
statistics:
“they consistently index changes in the trends and patterns o f  crime even 
though they are an invalid measure o f the totality o f criminal events. ”
Brantingham and Brantingham 1984, p64.
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Even in instances when this is not completely accurate (for example if the 
propensity of different police forces to record crimes is slightly different) the choice 
of methods used to analyse the data can account for these differences. Such methods 
will be discussed as and when they are applicable in each Chapter. But as a general 
introduction, this works because one of the benefits of official statistics is that they 
allow the analysis of data measured across areas and over time. This allows the 
researcher to set up area longitudinal data that follows the same units over time and 
allows the use of methods that control for factors which either differ across area but 
are constant through time, or are constant across area and differ through time.
For example, if the likelihood of reporting and recording crimes shifts across 
time (because of a government drive to reduce the ‘dark figure’ for example), where 
this affects all police force areas in the same way these time differences can be 
controlled for. Going back to the previous example, if some police force areas record 
crime more or less accurately than others, the methods used can control for such 
differences, as long as these area differences are constant through time.11
Potentially more problematic issues are related to changes in definitions that
make comparisons across different time periods or different police force areas
difficult. There are two issues of this type dealt with in this thesis. The first is related
to police force boundary changes that occurred between Gwent and South Wales in
April 1996. This is dealt with by amalgamating the two police force areas to provide a
consistent area over the period under examination. The second issue is the change in
1 ?the police accounting rules that occurred in April 1998, that makes it difficult to 
compare crime rates before and after this date. For the most part, this thesis
11 This methodology is referred to as accounting for ‘fixed effects’ and will be discussed in much 
greater detail in the empirical Chapters where it is applied.
12 New rules measure one crime per victim. Also the definition of notifiable offences has be widened to 
include all indictable offences, all triable-either-way offences and associated summary offences (Home 
Office 1999a).
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overcomes this problem by confining the period of examination to years when the 
accounting rules are constant. However, Chapter 4 also offers a methodological 
technique to deal with the crime rates over the period in which the accounting rules 
changed.
Expressed slightly more technically, under-reporting or mis-recording of 
crime can produce measurement error. This is the difference between the measured 
observed value y  and the true value of a variable y*. So any discrepancy between the 
true and measured value is given by e=y-y*. The model we want to estimate is:
y* = a  + pX  + £
But instead we have to estimate:
y  = a  + pX + £ + e
So now the error term in the model contains two components, e the normal 
error term and e the measurement error. When the measurement error is in the 
dependent variable (i.e. the crime rate) y  replaces y*. So long as the measurement 
error in y is not systematically related to any of the independent variables, (for 
example, in a model of crime where X  measures wages if low wage people are less 
likely to report crime the error term will be correlated with the wages measure on the 
right hand side of the equation) the estimated model will not be biased.
Even if the above example is correct and low wage people or less likely to 
report crimes (either because they are not insured or they have a negative view of the 
law or they are criminals themselves (McDonald 2001)) measurement error need not 
be too much of a problem. It depends on the size of the measurement error. This in 
turn depends on the variance of X  relative to the variance of the measurement error. 
When the variance of X  is large relative to the variance of the measurement error any
13 Technically this amounts to E(X,  e) ^  0.
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inconsistency in the results will be small. The result of measurement error is 
attenuation bias where the estimate of p  will always be closer to 0 than the true p  . 
Thus, the results produced under measurement error will be slightly conservative 
estimates rather than other way round, which would perhaps be more worrying.
1.3.4 A Item ative Sources o f Data: Self-Report Studies
There are alternative sources of information on crime, which may or may not 
be more accurate reflections of the level of crime in society.14 The main alternative 
source on the extent of crime comes from self-report studies, where individuals are 
asked whether they have ever (or within a specific period of time) committed an 
offence. The Youth Lifestyles Survey is an example of a self-report study and is 
studied in Chapter 6 (see Chapter 6 for more details of this particular study).
While self-report studies are not affected by bias associated with the selection 
and processing of individuals by the criminal justice system, they are associated with 
some methodological problems of their own. Firstly there are hardly any nationally 
representative self-report studies of crime in the UK.15 Secondly, these types of 
studies are usually cross-sections at one point in time.16 Studies which have been 
constructed over a period of time, such as the Cambridge Longitudinal Study of 
Juvenile Delinquency (see Farrington et al 1986), cover only a small sub-sample of a
• 17specific group of people.
Thus, while self-report studies provide rich data, the information collected are 
usually not representative. The small sample sizes mean we have no way of 
establishing how similar the individuals in a particular study are to the rest of society.
14 These are only briefly mentioned here as they are not the main concern o f this thesis.
15 The Youth Lifestyles Surveys are representative o f a selection of young people, 16-25 year olds for 
the 1992/1993 study. The 1998/99 study covers 12-30 year olds. And even these studies exclude young 
people living in institutions hospitals; prisons or young offender institutions; residential care homes; 
army barracks; nurses’ accommodation, and colleges and public schools. Or the homeless.
16 Such as the Youth Lifestyle Surveys.
17 The Cambridge study followed 411 boys from a specific area in South London.
34
The most extreme example of this is found in case studies of a particular individual or
1 o
group of individuals or in personal accounts of crime. The cross-sectional aspect of 
many of these studies19 also pose problems of representativeness. While results may 
be representative at that particular time, there is no way of knowing how this
9 0compares with previous or later periods. In both cases, it is not possible to infer any 
conclusions from results drawn from the data outside of those in the study. Usually, it 
is not even possible to compare the results from study to study. This is not very 
helpful to any criminologist interested in influencing criminal policy.
Also, there is no way of establishing the validity or reliability of what the 
respondent tells the interviewer in self-report studies. Respondents may conceal or 
exaggerate their involvement in crime, or may answer in a way that they think the 
interviewer wants them to. Moreover, if the information is being asked retrospectively 
respondents may not remember accurately events that have happened in the past or 
may say they happened at a specific time which the researcher is asking about when 
in reality they happened before or after that date (Brantingham and Brantingham, 
1984). Technically these induce measurement error as with the official statistics.
1.3.5 Alternative Sources o f Data: Victimisation Studies
These are similar to self-report crime studies but instead of asking respondents 
whether they have committed a crime, they ask whether they have been a victim of 
crime. There exist a number of local victimisation surveys (such as the Islington 
Crime Survey (1985, 1990); the Edinburgh Crime Survey (1990); the Manchester 
Survey of Female Victims (1986); and the Merseyside Crime Survey (1984)), but the 
largest and most extensive study of this type in the UK is the British Crime Survey
18 Although this is not to say the rich data these studies produce are not useful for other types o f work.
19 Such as the Youth Lifestyles Surveys.
20 Also as we will see in later Chapters it is very difficult to establish causality using cross sectional 
data.
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(BCS). This measures crimes against individuals aged 16 and over living in private 
households in England and Wales (Home Office 2001b).
While some claim these to be the most accurate reflection of the level of crime 
in society (Williams 2001), like the self-report studies, victimisation studies such as 
the BCS are associated with their own methodological problems. The first of these is 
that victimisation surveys tell us about victimisation rather than crime. Thus, they 
only cover a sub-set of crimes for which there is a victim. Therefore, there is no 
information on crimes with no victims (such as prostitution); or crimes where the 
victim may collude with the criminal (such as drug dealing); nor crimes where the 
victim is no longer around (i.e. murder); or crimes where the victim is a corporation 
(Williams 2001). In all, only 62% of crimes in the BCS are comparable to the official 
statistics, while only 53% of officially recorded crime is comparable to the BCS 
(Home Office 1998b).
Survey victimisation studies are subject to many of the same difficulties as 
self-report studies for reasons related to representativeness, reliability and validity. In 
terms of representativeness even the most recent sweep of the BCS, which is by far 
the largest and most comprehensive to date, notes in its appendix:
“As in any sample survey, it is difficult to represent the population 
adequately. Some respondents are impossible fo r  interviewers to locate at 
home, and others refused to be interviewed. ”
(Home Office 2001b, p89).
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If those who did not take part in the survey are in any way different from those
who did take part (for example, if they are more or less likely to be victims of crime)
21the sample will not be representative.
99Although the BCS has been carried out over a period of time, the fact that the 
area information remains anonymous23 and that area sampling schemes have changed 
across surveys means that researchers cannot construct area panels to follow over 
time. The best that can be done is to analyse changes across time in the various cross- 
sections. Methodologically this is much weaker than using longitudinal data, because 
the units of comparison are not the same.
Also, there is some evidence that many respondents admit to being victims of 
fairly minor or trivial offences, which would not necessarily be thought of as criminal 
offences in the eyes of the law (Conklin 1986). This means that victimisation surveys 
tend to overestimate the extent of crime (ibid). This factor, combined with issues of 
validity and reliability discussed above (i.e. respondents lying about crimes or 
inaccurately remembering time frames etc) make it unlikely that figures from 
victimisation surveys are any truer a reflection of the level of crime in society than the 
official statistics.
Moreover, as Williams (2001) points out, the authors of the BCS themselves 
admit that for crimes that are well reported to the police such as vehicle theft and 
burglary the official statistics probably offer a truer reflection of crime. While, crimes 
that are unlikely to be reported to the police such as rape do not appear in the BCS 
either.
21 Like self-reported crime surveys, victimisation surveys tend to under represent crime against 
particular groups, often the most heavily victimised groups such as young people, the homeless and 
prostitutes, for example.
22 1981, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001/2002.
23 Although areas codes were initially available for early years o f the BCS, these have subsequently 
been removed.
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Thus, it becomes clear that at least in the UK,24 while there are methodological 
shortcomings associated with the use of official statistics, this is also true of the 
alternative measures of crime available. Thus, while the official statistics have some 
limitations, the issue is to know and acknowledge where the problems lie, try to sort 
them out or avoid them (as was done with the boundary and accounting rule changes), 
or to use methodologies which attempt to minimise the problems (by looking at 
changes over time, for example). Taking all these factors into account, the official 
statistics provide a rich source of data on crime measured across areas and over time, 
not found anywhere else in the UK.
1.4 Facts: Labour Markets
The next section describes various aspects of the UK labour market, 
concentrating on a number of factors that are likely to be salient in studying crime and 
the labour market.
1.4.1 Unemployment
Unemployment in Britain rose rapidly during the 1970s, reaching a peak in 
1984. After this unemployment rates fluctuated around a relatively high level (Nickell 
1999). The International Labour Organisation (ILO) definition of unemployment 
currently stands at around 5%. Although this figure is relatively low, it masks many 
inequalities within unemployment. For instance, for many groups, such as 
professionals, unemployment is rare, while for other groups such as those with no 
qualifications unemployment is commonplace (ibid). The young face particularly high 
rates of unemployment and their position has worsened over the last thirty years. In
24 The crime data in the US is more extensive.
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1975 the unemployment rate for 16 to 24 year olds was around 8%. By 1998 it had 
risen to 14%.
There are also differences across gender. Females are less likely to be 
unemployed than males. While unemployment of prime age males (25 to 49) has 
increased over time (from 4% in 1975 to around 6% in 1998) the unemployment rate 
of similarly aged females has fallen (from 6% in 1975 to 5% in 1998) (Nickell 1999).
Unemployment rates depend to a large extent on educational qualifications. 
This feature seems to have become stronger over time. As more and more people are 
gaining educational qualifications the difference between those with education and 
those without has widened in terms of unemployment. In 1979 the unemployment rate 
of those with a degree was 2%, whereas, by 1998 it had only risen slightly to 3%. In 
comparison, the unemployment rate for those with no qualifications rose massively 
over this period from 7% in 1979 to 12% in 1998. This rise was primarily the result of 
rising unemployment rates for uneducated males. Unemployment for males with no 
educational qualifications rose from 7% to 16% between 1979 and 1998. In 
comparison the unemployment rate for similarly qualified females rose from only 7% 
to 8% over this period (Nickell 1999).
1.4.2 Inactivity
The unemployed are not the only group of people not in work. There is 
another group of people who are out of work but who are not actively looking for a 
job. This group is known as the inactive. The economically inactive is a large group, 
which currently constitutes around 8 million people (four times larger than the 
unemployed) (Gregg and Wadsworth 1999). Like unemployment there are huge 
differences in labour market inactivity rates across gender, age and education levels. 
Females traditionally have higher rates of inactivity than males, but while male
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inactivity has increased in the last thirty years (from 3% in 1975 to 13% in 1998), the 
female inactivity rate has fallen from 37 to 27% over the same period (ibid).
Like unemployment, inactivity is strongly related to educational attainment. 
The less education an individual has, the more likely that he/she will become 
economically inactive. This is true for both males and females. In 1979 the inactivity 
rate for males with a degree was less than 1%, by 1998 this had risen to 7%. While for 
those with no qualifications, inactivity rose from 5% to 30% between 1979 and 1998. 
The rise in inactivity for the least educated females was smaller than for males, going 
from 41% to 49%. For the most highly educated women inactivity actually fell during 
this period, from 23% to 13%.
1.4.3 * Workless Households1
Since the 1970s female participation in the labour market has increased 
considerably. Estimates from the Family Expenditure Survey show that in the UK in 
1970 only 38% of all employees between the age of 16 and 64 were female, but by 
2000 this figure had risen to almost 50%. However, it is argued that much of the rise 
in female employment has been amongst women with working partners (Desai et al 
1999). Thus, the rise in female employment has not occurred in the same households 
where male unemployment and inactivity has risen. This has meant that work has 
become polarised across certain ‘work-rich’ households, while other ‘work-poor’ 
households are left with no access to any earned income. Trends towards this 
polarisation of work has resulted in a massive rise of ‘workless households’ (Gregg, 
Hansen and Wadsworth 1999). In 1975 around 7% of households were workless, by 
1998 this had risen to 18%.
Perhaps the most alarming occurrence associated with this phenomenon is the 
link between workless households and poverty. Indeed, around 75% of workless
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households live in poverty (defined as having below half the average equivalised 
household income after housing costs). Poverty among those in workless households 
is particularly acute amongst those with children. Around 89% of workless 
households containing children live in poverty (ibid).
1.4.4 Wage Inequality
The gap between the rich and the poor rose during the 1980s, to its highest 
level last century (Machin 1999). In 1975 the difference between male wages at the 
top end of the earnings distribution (the 90th percentile) and the bottom end (the 10th 
percentile), as measured by the 90-10 earnings ratio, was 2.86, (that is the male at the 
90th percentile in the earnings distribution was paid 2.86 times more than a male at the 
10 percentile of the distribution). By 1996 it had risen to 3.96. The corresponding 
figures for female wage inequality are 2.91 and 3.54 respectively.
Examining the male wage distribution alone shows that while the gap between 
those in the middle of the wage distribution (measured by the 50th percentile) and 
those at the top increased over this period (the 90-50 ratio went from 1.70 in 1975 to 
1.93 in 1996), a larger proportion of the overall inequality came from the difference in 
the gap between those in the middle and those at the bottom end of the distribution. 
Indeed, the 50-10 ratio increased from 1.69 in 1975 to 2.05 in 1996.
For females, the pattern was the other way round. A greater part of wage 
inequality came from the difference between those at the top and those in the middle. 
The 90-50 ratio rose from 1.78 in 1975 to 2.01 in 1996. The 50-10 ratio went from 
1.64 to 1.76 in this same period.
Of course, wages are strongly determined by educational qualifications and so 
to some extent, wage inequality reflects changes in the wage returns to education. 
Thus, while those with a degree have always been paid more than those with no
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qualifications, the gap between the two educational groups is now bigger than in the 
past. Machin (1999) presents evidence to show that in the 1970s the percentage log 
(weekly wage) difference between a graduate and a person with no educational 
qualifications was 54%. By the 1990s this difference had risen to 66%.
The main explanation for the rise in wage inequality is skill biased 
technological change, that is the use of technology that requires a more skilled 
workforce and reduces, if not removes, the demand for less skilled workers (Machin 
1999). Other explanations lie in increased international trade, particularly from less 
developed countries which reduces the demand for less skilled workers. And the 
decline of Trade Unions, who in the past compressed wages in their role as ‘defenders 
of the egalitarian pay structures’ (Machin 1999, p 199).
The introduction of the National Minimum Wage to the UK labour market in 
April 1999 made an important contribution to reducing the wage inequality discussed 
above and improving the financial situation for those workers at the bottom of the 
wage distribution (at least around the year of introduction). Indeed, Metcalf (1999) 
estimated that some 2 million workers would see their wages rise by around 30%.
Alleviating the situation for the very low paid is especially important because 
low pay tends to be persistent (Stewart 1999) and mobility in the wage distribution for 
those at the bottom is very limited (Dickens 1999). Low paid individuals are more 
likely to exit into unemployment or inactivity in a Tow pay -  no pay’ cycle (Stewart 
1999) than move up the wage distribution (Dickens 1999).
1.4.5 Hypothesis Testing
It is clear that the last thirty years or so have witnessed many changes in the 
nature of the labour market. These changes provide an ideal situation in which to test 
empirically hypotheses concerning possible effects that shifts in the labour market
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may have on crime. This is explored in some detail in the remaining Chapters of this 
PhD. Chapters 2 and 3 in particular look at the effect of changes in unemployment, 
wages and wage inequality on crime, while Chapter 4 looks at the impact of the 
National Minimum Wage. Chapter 5 examines the effect that increasing female labour 
force participation may have on crime, while Chapter 6 looks at the importance of 
education in relation to crimes committed by youths.
1.5 Thesis Aims and Outline
1.5.1 Broad Aims o f This Work
There has already been a large amount of work done in the area of this thesis. 
Yet there remains a general lack of consensus as to which labour market variables are 
most related to crime; which data are most appropriate to study the question; and, 
which methodologies are best suited to uncovering causal relationships between crime 
and the labour market (for discussions see Box 1987, Chiricos 1987 or Freeman 1983, 
2000).
In light of the often conflicting evidence that has been presented on these 
issues, the broad aims of this research are four-fold. Firstly, by taking (often very 
large) changes in the labour market discussed above and examining their differential 
impact on crime, this research aims to establish which labour market variables are 
most associated with crime.
Secondly, by using a number of different data and methodologies, the research 
attempts to contribute to debates surrounding the strengths and weakness of different 
data and methods available for their analysis. In particular, much of the work in this 
area in the UK uses macro level data (see Field 1990, Hale 1998 and Wells 1995 for 
examples). This research aims to improve upon that by utilising area level data, which
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allow the use of a wider range of more robust techniques of analysis (for example area 
fixed effect models that were briefly mentioned above and will be discussed later).
Thirdly, through the dissemination of findings resulting from this research, the 
aim is to bring the above debates to a wider audience of academics and non­
academics, policy makers, and public practitioners where it may have the ability to 
inform social policy in this area. And fourthly, as well as answering questions in this 
field this research aims to highlight new questions that social scientists may want to 
ask and try to answer in the future.
1.5.2 Chapter Outlines
1.5.2.1 Chapter Two -  Looking for A Relationship between Crime and the Labour
Market: Some Exploratory Research
As noted above, despite the large literature that exists within the field of crime 
and the labour market, the evidence points to a general lack of consensus as to which 
labour market variables are most related to crime and what methodologies are most 
appropriate for examining such a relationship. This Chapter is the first of two which 
introduce facts, concepts and issues surrounding research in crime and the labour 
market and which attempt to build up evidence that is utilised in the later Chapters of 
this thesis.
In an attempt to establish relationships between crime and its correlates in 
England and Wales in the 1990s, this Chapter looks at a number of key labour market, 
demographic and deterrence variables and the effect these factors have on different 
crimes. This Chapter examines two ways in which the crime rate varies: between 
police force areas and within police force areas. It also uses a number of different 
methodologies to explore the strengths and weaknesses of each of these approaches.
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The results show that the discovery of significant relationships is easier using 
cross-sectional data, but that these results are possibly misleading, produce difficulties 
in terms of being able to establish causality and therefore make it hard to draw 
implications for criminal policy. Examining area level data over time is shown to be 
much more useful. Although using this data and its associated methodologies makes it 
more difficult to establish significant relationships, those that are discovered are more 
robust even to the inclusion of dynamic effects.
By using area-level longitudinal data to exploit cross-area changes to identify 
the determinants of crime, the results show that the 1990s saw property crimes rising 
by more in areas where wage inequality rose by more. Crime was also lower in areas 
where the number of police officers was higher and it was also lower where there was 
an increase in the proportion found guilty of all crimes.
Explaining violent crime rates proves more difficult, as their relative 
infrequency makes the results much noisier. Despite this, evidence from this Chapter 
shows that violent crime is positively related to average wages; it is higher in areas 
where the average wage is higher over the period under examination and lower in 
areas where the number of police officers is higher.
The results also show that both property and violent crimes are heavily 
persistent over time and that failure to account for this persistence may mean that 
some of the factors that help explain crime are ignored.
1.5.2.2 Chapter Three -  Spatial Patterns o f  Crime: Can Labour Market Variables
Explain them?
Residential location is a strong determinant of the level of crime. This theme is 
the basis of Chapter 3, which provides an introduction to basic facts and details 
concerning area level crime in England and Wales. Thus, with the aid of mapping
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technologies, this Chapter carries out an exploration into the spatial distribution of 
crime across 374 local authorities in England and Wales. Using various statistical and 
Geographical Information Systems (GIS) mapping techniques, the Chapter focuses on 
establishing and plotting spatial patterns of crime across different geographical 
locations. It examines the extent to which the uneven distribution of crime can be 
explained by the distribution of a range of demographic, labour market and socio­
economic determinants of crime.
The findings show that crime is not randomly located but that in general, there 
exists positive spatial association across areas. Areas of high crime are located near to 
other high crime areas and low crime areas are located near to other low crime areas. 
Across the areas of England and Wales there is shown to be clusters of both positive 
and negative association, although positive spatial associations are more prevalent.
Statistical regression analyses show that some of the spatial association can be 
explained by the variations in a number of measurable variables. The variables that 
are found to be statistically significant (and thus able to explain at least some of the 
spatial association of crime across areas for property crime) are related to the age, sex, 
educational level, labour market position and the financial situation of individuals 
living in the area. Property crime is found to be higher in areas where the proportion 
of males in the area and the proportion of young people aged under 25 are higher and 
where the proportion of 16-19 year olds in full time education is lower. Property 
crime is also higher in areas with a higher proportion of lone parents and individuals 
claiming lone parent income support; in areas where the income at the bottom end of 
the distribution is lower and the top end higher; and in areas where a higher 
proportion of the population is unemployed.
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Like the previous Chapter, evidence from this Chapter suggests that it is 
harder to uncover the determinants of violent crime than property crime. 
Nevertheless, some factors are shown to be significantly related to violent crime. 
Areas with a higher proportion of males, a higher proportion of non-whites and a 
higher proportion of people claiming lone parent income support have higher rates of 
violent crime than other areas.
After controlling for differences in the measurable area characteristics the 
spatial association of crime across areas that is left is attributable to unmeasured 
factors. Although on the whole these unmeasured characteristics produce less spatial 
association, the unmeasured variables do produce some spatial associations. Those 
that remain are different in nature to the patterns produced by the measurable 
variables.
The spatial association produced by the measurable characteristics are 
dominated by positive associations of high crime rates around the large city areas 
such as London. This is not true of the spatial patterns produced by the unmeasurable 
determinants of crime. This provides evidence that much of the rural / urban crime 
differential can be explained by differences across these areas in the measurable 
characteristics of those areas.
1.5.2.3 Chapter Four -  Crime and the Minimum Wage: A Quasi-Natural Experiment
This Chapter looks at the relationship between crime and low wages in a 
rather different way. If one thinks that differential wage opportunities matter for 
crime, then presumably the best way of testing for the existence of a crime-wage link 
is to look at a situation where people on the margins of criminal participation receive 
a (potentially large) wage increase. Such a situation is clearly offered when a binding 
minimum wage floor is introduced to a labour market that previously was not
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regulated by minimum wage legislation. This was the case when a National Minimum 
Wage (NMW) was introduced in the UK in April 1999. If labour market conditions 
are related in an important way to crime, or an individual’s propensity to commit 
criminal acts is altered by changing labour market opportunities, then one may well 
see changes in crime occur in the time period surrounding minimum wage 
introduction.
The empirical methodology utilised in this Chapter involves comparing what 
happened to crime rates before and after the Minimum Wage was introduced in the 
police force areas of England and Wales. Changes in various crime rates before and 
after minimum wage introduction are related to the initial proportion of low wage 
workers (i.e. those paid less than the minimum wage prior to its introduction) in those 
areas. Identification of the minimum wage effect comes from the fact that there are 
more low wage workers in some areas than in others and therefore, the Minimum 
Wage should be thought of having more of an effect there than in areas where there 
are fewer low wage employees.
The results uncover a statistically significant negative relationship, showing 
relative crime reductions in areas that initially had more low wage workers. This 
finding remains robust to controlling for other relevant determinants of crime; to 
benchmarking against earlier time periods; and to using initial period wage measures 
that look at the types of individual that might be thought of as more likely to be on the 
margins of crime. Overall, the results are in line with theoretical predictions that 
crime and low wages are related and that by improving the position of the low paid 
one does see a reduction in crime.
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1.5.2.4 Chapter Five — Rising Crime and Improvements in the Socio-Economic
Position o f Women: Are they Related?
The previous Chapters show a robust relationship between labour market 
variables and crime. This Chapter puts this relationship to a different kind of test by 
utilizing one of the most noticeable changes to have taken place in the labour market 
in the last thirty or forty years, namely the increased labour force participation of 
women. If we believe that crime is related to labour market opportunities, the 
movement of females into the labour market may have an effect on crime. In the past, 
most theoretical and empirical work in this area has tended to focus on the effect of 
this movement on female crime, arguing that increases in female labour supply should 
lead to a shift in the total share of crime committed by women; either generating more 
or less female crime compared to male crime.
While this is an interesting area of research, females make up only a relatively 
small fraction of those who engage in crime. Therefore, examining the effect female 
labour force participation has on female crime is likely to uncover only a very small 
part of the impact that shifts in female labour supply may have on crime. On the other 
hand, if increased female labour force participation in any way damages the labour 
market position of males, and there exists a connection between crime and the male 
labour market, this will imply a larger effect on the overall crime rate. Thus, this 
Chapter builds on evidence from earlier Chapters that shows that weak labour market 
positions are positively related to crime. Using data on overall offences, as well as sex 
specific convictions data, measured across police force areas between 1975 and 1998, 
the Chapter examines the effect of increasing female employment on crime by
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assessing the impact it has on the male labour market and the subsequent effect this 
has on crime.
The results show that in areas where female employment rose, crime also rose. 
This result is robust to measuring crime as all notifiable offences for property crimes 
and male property crime convictions. The results are stronger for male-specific 
crimes, probably due to the fact that including even a small number of female crimes 
is likely to bias the coefficient downwards, as female employment and female crime 
are likely to be negatively related.
Findings suggest that the positive relationship between female labour supply 
and crime may be produced as a result of female employment reducing male wages. 
The fact that the results are stronger when female employment is measured as the 
share of low skilled male occupations suggests that it is the wages of the least skilled 
males that are most affected. This is supportive of the idea that women substitute for 
less skilled men, thus increasing pressure on males who are already likely to be on the 
margins of crime and thereby increasing crime. These results are congruent with the 
findings from the previous Chapters.
While a positive relationship between female labour supply and crime is 
uncovered, this does not mean that female employment necessarily produces bad 
outcomes. The results suggest that the issue may lie with the fact that females entering 
the labour market are substituting for the low skilled males. It is likely that as females 
continue to improve their educational qualifications and accumulate labour market 
experience they will compete for jobs with males further up the employment ladder 
who are less likely to be on the margins of crime. It is likely that as women substitute 
for males higher up the employment ladder, the effect of increasing female labour 
supply on crime will become weaker.
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1.5.2.5 Chapter Six — Age Differences in Crime: Are They Explained by Education?
Previous Chapters of this thesis examine the impact of the labour market on 
crime. As discussed previously, one of the main determinants of an individual’s 
position in the labour market is his/her educational attainment. This is even more 
pertinent today than in the past, given the large changes that have taken place in both 
the education system and the labour market in recent years. These include the massive 
increase in higher educational participation, coupled with a rise in demand for a more 
skilled workforce and an increase in the wage returns to education. All of which 
mean that the gap between those with education and those with none is greater today 
than in the past.
At the same time, education is strongly related to crime. According to a report 
by HM Chief Inspectorate of Prisons (Home Office 1998c) there were 10570 young 
people under the age of 22 in the custody of the prison services in England and Wales 
in 1997. This represented a 5% increase on the previous year. The report points out 
‘most of the youngsters had been failed by the education system’ (Chapter 3, 
paragraph 3.12). Around two thirds of these youths had no formal qualifications, 
many had regularly truanted from school and over 50% had been excluded (or left 
voluntarily) before the age of 16.
With these facts in mind, this final empirical Chapter examines the effect of 
education on shaping the crime-age profile of two groups of young males: those who 
have more education (those who stay on after the compulsory school leaving age) and 
those with less (those who leave school at age 16). As a critical part of childhood 
years is children’s exposure to the education system, the focus of this Chapter is on 
potentially different crime-age profiles for people with different levels of educational
25 These were all discussed above in section 1.4 ‘Facts: Labour Market’.
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attainment. And on factors which are likely to be related to crime and age and which 
may be able to account for observed differences in the two profiles. These factors 
include: neighbourhood/area, school, individual, family and labour market variables.
The results show that the crime-age profiles for the less educated seem to be 
different from the profile for the more educated group (those who stayed in education 
past the compulsory leaving age). Whilst the probability of the more educated group 
committing offences is reduced to negligible levels by the age of 25, the profile for 
the less educated group shows little sign of decline from around the age of 22. By age 
25 the latter group has a much higher probability of committing all three types of 
offences than the more educated group.
Once other variables are introduced into the equation, the gap between the two 
profiles is reduced. In some cases, for particular ages or offences, the gap is 
completely removed. Overall, the most important sets of variables in accounting for 
the gap in the profiles for all three crime types are school, family and individual 
variables. These variables differentially account for more or less of the gap at 
particular ages. The factors which matter most are: whether individuals live in the 
parental home (negative for all offences); whether their family had previous contact 
with the police (positive for all offences); whether the individual had played truant 
from school (positive for all offences); whether the individual’s father was SES V 
(positive for violent offences), and; whether an individual lived in social housing 
(positive for violent offences). These are the variables that bring the profiles together 
in the full model. These are also the variables that act as individual determinants of 
crime, regardless of age.
This Chapter shows that age, although correlated with crime, is also correlated 
with other variables such as schooling, individual and family characteristics which are
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differentially associated with the probability of young people of the same age 
committing crimes. Once we take into account the fact that the two groups vary in 
terms of other observable characteristics (such as whether they truanted or were 
excluded from school, where they live, who they live with and what they do), we see 
a reduction in the gap between the two groups and the profiles are brought together.
Having discussed the motivation and structure of this thesis the following 
Chapter begins the empirical analysis of the relationship between crime and the labour 
market.
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2. Looking for A Relationship between 
Crime and the Labour Market: Some 
Exploratory Research
2.1 Introduction
Knowledge of what are the most important determinants of criminal behaviour is 
central to criminology as an academic subject, and to any input the discipline can have 
into the process of policy design and implementation. As a consequence a number of 
researchers have adopted a quantitative approach to look at the factors that affect crime. 
A large number of these have turned to the labour market for explanations of criminal 
behaviour.
However, data constraints meant that in the early days of this research nationally 
representative data were only available at the macro level. While work using these 
aggregated data provides evidence of links between crime and a number of labour market 
measures, it has been criticised for its failure to look at what is happening beneath the 
national level. Other types of data available at this time allowed quantitative researchers 
to carry out cross-sectional analyses examining the relationship between crime and the 
labour market in a particular area, or between two or more areas in a particular year. 
While this has also produced a number of findings, its lack of representativeness is a 
severe limitation.
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Improvements in data collection and availability and advances in the 
methodological techniques for dealing with data now mean that it is possible to look at 
temporal and spatial differences in crime at the same time. This allows researchers to 
combine the advantages of both time series and cross-sectional methodologies. Use of 
area data means that questions can be asked about what is happening at a more micro 
level, making it possible to discover relationships which may well be obscured in national 
level data. Moreover, following areas over time makes it possible to control for area 
characteristics that are otherwise unobserved and may affect the relationship between 
crime and its correlates. In this way, it may be possible to identify a more accurate 
relationship between crime and other factors and even to identify causal relations.
This Chapter uses different types of data and a number of different methodologies 
to address two key areas within the field of crime and the labour market. Firstly, it 
explores why some areas have higher crime rates than others, paying particular attention 
to two possible determinants of crime, the nature of the formal labour market and the 
strength and deterrence capabilities of the criminal justice system. At the same time, this 
work addresses questions concerning the appropriate use of data and the methodological 
tools available for dealing with them.
2.2 Existing Empirical Work
Most empirical research on the determinants of crime in the UK has been at the 
national level. This work typically utilises time series data on crime rates and their 
determinants. In the UK the leading exponent of this type of work is Field (1990) who, in 
an examination of crime trends post World War II, found that property crime was 
negatively related to consumption. When consumption was higher, property crime slowed
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down or declined, and when consumption was lower, crime rose. When criticised for only 
looking at short run relationships, Field (1998) extended his data to 1997 and looked at 
both short and long term relationships. He found a long run positive relationship between 
the stock of consumer goods and the rise in property crime (burglary and theft). However, 
he could find no relationship between property crime and unemployment (either in the 
long or short run)1, or between property crime and those cautioned, found guilty or 
imprisoned.
Building on this work, Pyle and Deadman (1994a) used annual data for England 
and Wales between 1946 and 1991 and found that not only consumption, but also real 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was negatively associated with changes in crime. In fact, 
real GDP may be a better measure than consumption of the link between crime and the 
labour market. Unlike Field, they also found a positive relationship between 
unemployment and crime. Although in a study using Scottish data Deadman and Pyle 
(1994b) failed to uncover such a relationship between crime and unemployment.
Using the same data as Deadman and Pyle (1994a), Hale (1998) found that 
personal consumption was the most important correlate of property crime over both the 
short and long run. While changes in unemployment were related to changes in property 
crime in the short run, no long run relationship between the two variables could be 
established.
However, recently macro studies have been criticized for their failure to explain 
more recent trends in crime (see Dhiri et al, 1999, or Pudney et al, 2000) and for the lack 
of practical policy implications that can be drawn from their findings. Moreover, it has
1 Field (1998) found unemployment and property crime to be correlated but that this relationship was wiped 
out once consumption was included in the equation.
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been argued that because of the level of aggregation, the findings from macro studies are 
less robust than studies using less aggregate data (Chiricos, 1987).
In the United States data quality and collection are clearly more wide-ranging 
than in the UK and work on the determinants of crime has utilized individual level data 
(e.g. Witte 1980, Myers 1983, or Thomberry and Christenson 1985). There are, however, 
very few individual level data sources on crime in the UK and where it does exist, it is 
either single cross-sections that focus only on young people (like the Home Office’s 
1992/3 Youth Lifestyles Survey2 and the 1998/9 Youth Lifestyles Survey3), or it covers a 
very specific (and usually small) cohort of people. An example of the latter is the 
Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development that has been heavily used by researchers 
(e.g. by Farrington et al, 1986, or West, 1982), to show that individuals are more likely to 
commit crimes when they are unemployed than when they are in work. But this survey 
only covers 411 males bom in a particular area of South London in 1953. With the 
exception of these rather specific data sources there are very few individual level data 
sources available in the UK and none that are nationally representative.4
Whilst there are hardly any individual level sources of crime data in the UK, it is 
possible to look at the relationship between crime and its hypothesised determinants at 
the level of police force area. There are 43 police force areas in England and Wales and 
data have been recorded at this level for some time. The existence of such data means
2 This data has been used by Graham and Bowling (1995) and Hansen (2001) (see Chapter 6).
3 For more details see the report by Flood-Page et al (2000).
4 Data on convictions does exist in the Offenders Index data but, apart from publicly available data on a 
few selected cohorts, this is only available for internal Home Office use. Moreover it just contains data on 
convicted offences with very little data on characteristics of offenders. There is also victimization data in 
the British Crime Surveys of 1982, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2001 (each reports 
victimizations that have taken place in the previous year). However, as a survey the results are subject to 
sampling error, the surveys are not nationally representative and cannot be analysed at area level on a 
consistent basis though time as the areas remain anonymised. Although area codes were available in the 
past (see Hale et al 1994, Osbom et al 1992, 1996, Osbom and Tseloni 1998, Trickett et al 1995b for 
examples).
57
that researchers can carry out empirical work that looks at changes in crime across these 
police force areas over time. Clearly this adds a cross-sectional dimension that the macro 
work is unable to consider.
For example, Willis (1983) was one of the first to use police force area level data 
in his cross-sectional analysis of England and Wales in 1979. He found that a 1% rise in 
unemployment was associated with a small increase in theft and violence against the 
person, but was unrelated to sexual crimes. However, this study only used a single cross- 
section. As will be seen later, this has very serious drawbacks, especially when the main 
variable of interest, crime, is strongly persistent over time.
More recent work by Wells (1994) who examined changes over time across 41 
police force areas5 between 1975 and 1992, found changes in unemployment to be 
positively associated with some types of property crime: household burglary and vehicle 
theft.
Witt, Clarke and Fielding (1998, 1999) aggregated the 43 police force areas in 
England and Wales to the regional level6 to look at the relationship between crime, male
n
unemployment and wage inequality. In both studies they find changes in crime to be
Q
related positively to changes in male unemployment and wage inequality.
Reilly and Witt (1996) use data from 42 police force areas in England and Wales,9 
between 1980 and 1991, to look at the relationship between crime (burglary, theft and 
robbery), male claimant count unemployment and household income, while controlling
5 Surrey was excluded for lack of unemployment data.
6 The 1998 study considers ten regions (North West, North, Yorkshire and Humberside, East Midlands, 
West Midlands, East Anglia, London, South East, South West and Wales). The 1999 study considered nine 
by further aggregating London and the South East.
7 In the 1998 study the crimes are burglary, theft from a vehicle, other theft, shoplifting and robbery. In 
1999 they are property, vehicle, other theft, burglary and handling stolen goods.
8 No relationship was found for shoplifting crimes in the 1998 study.
9 There are actually 43 police force areas but the authors aggregate the City and Metropolitan forces.
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for other demographic and deterrence variables which may affect their estimated 
relationships. Their findings show that household income is negatively related to burglary 
and theft. However, the estimate is driven to insignificance once unemployment is 
controlled for.
Work on area data by Machin and Meghir (2000) gives a stronger focus to the 
relationship between crime and the low wage labour market. They look at cross-area
tVichanges in crime and changes in the 25 percentile of the area wage distribution, finding 
a negative correlation between the types of crime they examine (theft and handling, 
burglary, vehicle crime and total property crime) and low wages, even after controlling 
for other variables including demographic change and measures of deterrence. They also 
consider the associations between area crime rates and criminal justice system variables 
in areas (focusing specifically on conviction rates and sentence lengths) and find that 
both these criminal justice variables are negatively associated with crime.
It is clear that there has only been a limited amount of work carried out so far in 
the UK at police force area level. This contrasts with the United States where a larger 
body of work exists, and where a number of robust findings have emerged. For example, 
Allan and Steffensmeier (1989) use US state level data between 1977 and 1980 to 
examine the relationship between property crime arrest rates (robbery, burglary, larceny 
and auto theft) for juvenile (13 to 17 years old) and young adult (18 to 24) males and 
employment conditions. They find that unemployment is positively related to juvenile 
arrests, but that low pay and low hours are associated with high arrest rates for young 
adults.
Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) focus on the link between crime and 
unemployment and use annual state level data between 1970 and 1993 to show that
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unemployment is positively related to both violent and property crimes. They try to 
account for omitted variable bias by controlling for alcohol consumption and by using 
prime defence contracts per capita as an instrument for unemployment. When they do 
this, they find even larger unemployment effects.
Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002) look at the link between both 
unemployment and wages in their analysis of US annual county level data between 1979 
and 1995. They find that although unemployment is positively related to crime, the wage 
of low skilled workers is a more important correlate of crime. Indeed, they report that the 
falling wages of unskilled men between 1979 and 1995 led to an increase in burglary of 
nearly 14%, a rise in larceny/theft of around 7%, a 9% increase in aggravated assault and 
an 18% rise in robbery.
In the US, there have also been a number of area level studies which focus on the 
relationship between crime and the criminal justice system. For example, Marvell and 
Moody (1996) use annual state and city level data between 1968 and 1993 to look at the 
relationship between crime rates and police numbers. They find that increases in crime 
rates lead to a higher number of police, but the relationship is greater the other way 
around, a higher number of police reduces crime.
Levitt (1998) considers state level data on youths for the period 1978 to 1993 to 
look at the relationship between juvenile crime and juvenile punishment. He finds that 
higher levels of punishment are associated with lower crime rates for both property and 
violent crimes. Drawing on this work, Levitt and Lochner (2001) use the same data to 
look at the deterrence effect of differences in juvenile and adult punishment. They find 
that states where adult punishment is most severe have the largest decline in crime around 
the age of majority.
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This Chapter builds on this research by using data in different ways to find the 
most robust correlates of crime.
2.3 The Correlates of Crime: Theoretical Considerations
Over the years many variables have been considered as possible determinants or 
correlates of crime. In this Chapter two groups of variables are examined, the nature of 
the formal labour market and the strength and deterrence capabilities of the criminal 
justice system.
There are a number of reasons for focusing on labour market and criminal justice 
system correlates of crime. Firstly, if we think about the basic economic model of crime 
(seen in the work of Becker, 1968 or Ehrlich, 1973), an individual’s decision to engage in 
crime is a function of a number of factors including the expected utility from crime, the 
expected utility from the formal labour market, perceptions of the likelihood of 
apprehension and the severity of punishment if caught. Thus, the labour market and the 
criminal justice system account for three out of four factors which enter the simple 
rational choice economic model of crime.10
Secondly, these two factors are potentially important determinants of crime in 
other frameworks. For example, the labour market position of an individual is of central 
importance to a number of criminological theories. Strain theory, for example, predicts 
poor labour market conditions may cause stress or strain and thereby push people towards 
crime (see Merton 1957). Furthermore, many of the low paid are in jobs where promotion 
or career advancement is hard (if not impossible). Thus their opportunities to have money
10 Unfortunately in the UK there is no or little data available at this level which would allow the final 
factor, expected utility from crime, to be examined. Machin and Meghir (2000) have attempted to proxy for 
this by using information from the British Crime Survey on the value of goods stolen.
61
and status may be blocked. Unable to achieve success legally, these individuals may be 
forced to resort to participate in illegal activities.
Of particular relevance, is social control theory, which predicts a relationship 
between crime and both labour market position and the ability of legal sanctions to deter. 
In this framework social control works at two levels: informal social controls are the 
pressures brought to bear on individuals to abide by societal norms through their ties with 
society; formal social controls are more coercive attempts by the criminal justice system 
to deter crime (by threat of detection and incapacitation). Informal controls affect 
individuals differentially as individuals vary in the extent to which they feel attached to 
society. As one of the major institutions through which bonds are formed between 
individuals and society is the labour market, those with weak labour market positions, 
such as the unemployed or low paid, are likely to feel less attachment to society than 
others. With weaker bonds to society, these people feel less pressure to conform to 
societal norms and thus society is less able to deter them from breaking the law. Because 
they care little about what society thinks of them, even the prospect of stigmatisation, 
social disapproval or being labelled as a criminal has little power to deter them from 
breaking the law. Thus, social control theory may predict a positive relationship between 
crime and unemployment and /or wages.
However, formal social controls exert an additional coercive force that 
compounds the effects of informal social control discouraging criminal behaviour. Thus, 
the threat of apprehension and punishment works to persuade individuals, who otherwise 
may have considered committing a crime, not to do so. If the fear of formal sanctions 
works in this way we should expect to see a negative relationship between crime and
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criminal justice variables as the higher the likelihood of detection and the more severe the 
punishment (or the perceived likelihood and severity), the lower the expected crime rate.
Moreover, there are a number of deterrence theories that predict a relationship 
between deterrence and crime (for example, Silberman 1976). These are based on similar 
reasoning to economic rational choice theories, but express scepticism of the assumptions 
embodied in the economic models and prefer to emphasise the uncertainty and non- 
rational behaviour of individuals and the inconsistency and discrimination of the criminal 
justice system.
A third reason why it seems sensible to look at factors related to the labour market 
or the criminal justice system is that there is disagreement in many quarters as to which 
set of variables are the more important correlates of crime. Indeed, from a policy 
perspective it is important to discover whether initiatives to reduce crime would be best 
targeted at discovering the labour market position of individuals most likely to engage in 
crime and improving conditions for these individuals (thereby reducing or removing their 
need to engage in crime); or whether initiatives would be more effective in reducing 
crime if they were targeted at measures to deter or incapacitate those who do offend.11
2.4 Data Description and Descriptive Analysis
There are 43 police force areas in England and Wales, but for the work in this 
Chapter, two sets of police forces (the City of London and Metropolitan police forces, 
and the Gwent and South Wales police forces) have been amalgamated together. The 
reason for joining the City and Metropolitan forces together is because the small number 
of residents living in the City produces artificially high crime rates. Gwent and South
11 This is not to deny that there could be other factors which might be important in influencing cross area 
differences in crime rates but these are not the focus of this Chapter.
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Wales have been aggregated as a result of a police force boundary change that occurred
in the period under examination so that only the amalgamated area grouping is consistent
12over the time period studied.
The data have been constructed from a variety of sources at the level of the police
force areas of England and Wales for the years between 1992 and 1998. The start date
was used on the grounds that 1992 was the first period for which computerized data on
11measures of the criminal justice system were available. The end date was dictated by 
changes in the accounting rules that took place in April 1998 which make comparison 
after this date difficult.14 The data cover four main areas: crime; features of the criminal 
justice system; the labour market; and population and demographic characteristics of 
areas.
2.4.1 Crime Data
The crime data15 cover notifiable offences at the police force area level, with total 
recorded crime being broken down into the following categories: violence against the 
person; sexual offences; robbery; burglary; theft and handling stolen goods; fraud and 
forgery; criminal damage; drug offences; and other offences.
These are crimes reported to and recorded by the police. As Chapter 1 showed, 
while official statistics may not identify all crimes, there are still good justifications for 
using them to study the causes of crime.16 Increased pressure on the public to report 
crimes (due to insurance requirements) and on the police to record crimes means that in 
recent years there has (to some extent) been a convergence of trends in notifiable 
offences and trends in self-reported victimisations from the British Crime Survey (which
12 In April 1996.
13 Also data on the explanatory variables were not available before this date.
14 Home Office Statistical Bulletin 18. October 1999. Although see Chapter 5 for an attempt.
15 The crime data was supplied by the Home Office.
16 Notifiable offences are the only nationally representative data available at the area level.
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many believe is a truer reflection of crime (see Brantingham and Brantingham 1984 for 
discussion)). Moreover, as Chapter 1 discussed, evidence from the British Crime Survey 
suggests that most of the crimes not reported to or recorded by the police tend to be
17trivial in nature.
Table 2.1 reports the total number of notified offences in England and Wales 
between 1992 and 1998 for all crimes and for the crime categories detailed above. It also 
reports information on crime rates computed as the number of crimes divided by the 
population. The Table reveals what is by now a well-known pattern. After the very sharp
1 ftrises that occurred through the 1970s and 1980s total recorded crime peaked in the early 
1990s and then began to fall. Crime fell over the 1992 to 1998 period from around 5.6 to
4.4 million crimes or, in terms of rates, from .109 down to .085 crimes per person. But 
there is some variation by type of crime, while there was little or no change for violent 
crimes, most non-violent crimes fell over this period. In particular, theft and handling 
crimes fell rather sharply.
17 See Appendix A for further discussions concerning the use of official statistics.
18 In 1970 there were 1,568,000 crimes in England and Wales, by 1980 this had risen to 2,521,000 and by 
1990 the figure was 4,364,000.
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Table 2.1 Crime in England and Wales, 1992 to 1998 (Numbers of crimes and 
crimes/population)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Change
1992-1998
All crime 5594826
.109
5529219
.107
5255290
.102
5100241
.098
5036553
.096
4598327
.088
4457531
.085
-1137295
-.024
All
violent*
284199
.006
294231
.006
311744
.006
310936
.006
344768
.007
347064
.007
330816
.006
226617
.000
Violence
against
the
person
201777
.004
205102
.004
219741
.004
212588
.004
239342
.005
250827
.005
232736
.004
210959
.000
Sexual 29528
.001
31284
.001
31987
.001
30274
.001
31391
.001
33165
.001
34861
.001
5333
.000
Robbery 52894
.001
57845
.001
60016
.001
68074
.001
74035
.001
63072
.001
63219
.001
-18033
.000
Non-
Violent*
5285053
.103
5208871
.101
4913306
.095
4759872
.092
4658150
.090
4214620
.081
4085697
.078
-1196247
-.025
Property+ 4210021
.082
4124449
.080
3822146
.074
3691593
.071
3548529
.068
3180027
.061
3069944
.059
-1140077
-.023
Burglary 1355274
.026
1369584
.027
1261441
.024
1239484
.024
1164583
.022
1015075
.019
965312
.018
-389962
-.008
Theft 2854747
.056
2754865
.054
2560705
.050
2452109
.047
2383946
.046
2164952
.041
2104632
.040
-750115
-.016
Fraud
and
forgery
168600
.003
162836
.003
146144
.003
133016
.003
136225
.003
134398
.003
160424
.003
-8176
.000
Criminal
damage
892623
.017
906746
.018
927447
.018
913991
.018
951274
.018
877042
.017
833314
.016
-59309
-.001
Drugs 13809
.0003
14840
.0003
17569
.0003
21272
.0004
22122
.0004
23153
.0004
22015
.0004
8206
-.0001
* Excluding ‘Other’ crimes as they are a mixture o f violent and non-violent offences.
+ Property crimes = theft + burglary
2.4.2 Criminal Justice System Data
Although this thesis is mainly interested in the relationship between crime and the 
labour market, it is also important to look at the effect of deterrence (for reasons already 
discussed). Not only is the effect of deterrence on crime of interest, but also, if deterrence 
is related to crime, failing to include it in the model will mean that the model will be 
under-specified and could suffer from omitted variable bias (see Appendix B for further
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discussion of bias). This will result in biased estimates of the coefficients on all the 
independent variables, including the labour market ones.19
For these reasons, for each crime category there is also information on a number
90of features of the severity of the criminal justice system. These include the total number 
of people found guilty, the number placed in immediate custody, the average sentence 
length and the number of police officers.
Table 2.2A shows that for almost all crime categories, convictions have risen. For 
all crimes, the conviction rate rose by about 1/3, going from 7 percent to just over 10 
percent. At the same time (as Table 2.2B shows), the total number given immediate 
custody as a proportion of those found guilty of each crime increased. This is true for 
most crimes. The total number imprisoned went up from 12 percent of all convictions to 
19 percent, corresponding to a rise of over 50 percent between 1992 and 1998.
Table 2.2A Disposals on Principal Offence Basis (Total found Guilty as a
Proportion of Each Notifiable Offence)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Change
1992-1998
Total crime .074 .070 .075 .075 .078 .091 .101 .027
A ll violent* .353 .311 .301 .301 .285 .308 .352 -.001
- Violence 
against the 
person
.443 .397 .380 .389 .363 .382 .453 .011
- Sexual .198 .160 .170 .192 .178 .163 .153 -.039
- Robbery .096 .088 .082 .076 .080 .089 .088 -.008
Non-Violent* .055 .052 .056 .055 .058 .067 .074 .019
Property+ .049 .047 .049 .047 .050 .058 .063 .013
- Burglary .033 .029 .030 .029 .028 .031 .032 -.001
- Theft .057 .056 .058 .057 .062 .071 .077 .019
- Fraud and 
Forgery
.154 .147 .178 .178 .161 .163 .152 -.003
- Criminal 
damage
.039 .034 .035 .035 .035 .040 .045 -.006
- Drugs# 1.643 1.476 1.583 1.485 1.540 1.757 2.218 .575
*Excludes ‘other’ crimes. +Property crimes = theft + burglary. # Value >1 because of differences in the 
accounting rules of drugs crimes. For notifiable offences the crime is counted, for disposals each person 
involved in that crime is counted.
19 Unless in the special case that they are completely independent o f the omitted deterrence measures.
20 Provided by the Home Office.
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Table 2.2B Disposals on Principal Offence Basis (Total given Immediate Custody
as a Proportion of those found Guilty of Each Crime)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Change
1992-1998
Total crime .123 .128 .145 .170 .179 .186 .191 .068
A ll violent* .142 .159 .168 .187 .200 .197 .196 .054
- Violence 
against the 
person
.098 .111 .125 .141 .150 .152 .153 .055
- Sexual .334 .398 .366 .416 .446 .465 .504 .170
- Robbery .706 .695 .686 .668 .711 .717 .715 .381
Non-Violent* .111 .113 .130 .157 .163 .173 .175 .064
Property* .119 .120 .147 .178 .179 .194 .200 .081
- Burglary .273 .295 .343 .382 .419 .452 .473 .200
- Theft .077 .075 .098 .126 .126 .140 .148 .071
- Fraud and 
Forgery
.096 .102 .103 .141 .155 .165 .171 .075
- Criminal 
damage
.042 .035 .039 .045 .047 .048 .048 .006
- Drugs .162 .165 .145 .167 .197 .191 .173 .011
* Excludes ‘other’ crimes. + Property crimes = theft + burglary
Whilst the conviction rates have risen, average sentence lengths seem to have 
fallen a little. This can be seen in Table 2.3. This is true for most crime categories except 
sexual crimes and burglaries, where sentence lengths have risen.
Table 2.3. Average sentence lengths (months)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Change
1992-1998
Total crime 14.7 14.7 14.1 13.9 14.9 14.8 13.6 -1.1
- Violence 
against the 
person
14.3 13.8 13.8 13.3 14.1 12.9 11.8 -2.5
- Sexual 36.4 36.1 36.3 36.8 37.1 37.9 38.7 2 3
- Robbery 39.0 38.8 39.8 38.2 38.1 39.1 35.3 -3.7
- Burglary 11.5 11.1 11.4 12.0 13.8 15.8 15.5 4.0
- Theft 6.1 6.4 6.1 6.0 5.7 5.7 4.9 -1.2
- Fraud and 
Forgery
12.3 11.3 11.0 9.8 10.5 9.7 9.3 -3.0
- Criminal 
damage
11.3 14.3 14.7 13.6 12.9 13.4 10.6 -0.7
- Drugs 28.1 28.1 27.7 28.1 28.1 28.9 27.0 -1.1
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The final criminal justice related variable is the number of police officers. This is 
described in Table 2.4. The consistently defined data on the number of police officers run 
from 1993 onwards (no numbers were provided by the Metropolitan Police in 1992) and 
shows a fall of around 1000 police offices over this period.
Table 2.4 Number of Police Officers
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Change
Number of 
police officers
97778* 124663 123743 124811 124792 124802 123780 -883
(93-98)
* Excludes numbers in the Metropolitan Police which are not available for 1992.
2.4.3 Labour Market Data
While there has been a fair amount of work done in the area of crime and the 
labour market, there is no agreed consensus as to which labour market variable has the 
greatest effect on crime. Various research studies find that unemployment (Land, McCall 
and Cohen 1990), low wages (Gould et al 2002), inequality (Fowles and Merva 1996), at 
least to some extent, are related to crime.
The labour market information used in this Chapter comes from two main 
sources, the New Earnings Survey (NES) and the Labour Force Survey (LFS). The 
former is an employer based survey (covering about 1 percent of the workforce in each 
year). It reports in April of each year which enables these data to be matched to the 43
91police force areas, mainly at county level. The same is true of the Labour Force 
Survey’s anonymised area level data.22 From the NES average hourly wages are
21 The match is geographically exact for almost all police force areas. A problem occurs where the 
Metropolitan Police offers services to some (mostly) small areas o f counties on the border of London. This 
affects the borders of Essex, Hertfordshire and Surrey and means that one should be careful to look at 
changes over time in modeling work (where this feature of the Metropolitan Police stays constant over 
time, for the sample period we have here).
22 Individual level data contains county level identifiers, but only from 1995 onwards.
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calculated, as well as the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of the hourly wage 
distribution. From the LFS unemployment rates have been calculated for each police 
force area. Table 2.5 shows hourly wages at different percentiles of the wage distribution, 
and shows evidence of rising inequality as the higher percentiles grow at a faster rate 
between 1992 and 1998 than the lower percentiles. From the Table we can see that the 
unemployment rate has fallen from 10 to 6 percent over this period.
Table 2.5 Earnings (£ per hour) and ILO Unemployment
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Change
1992-1998
Mean 7.19 7.50 7.71 8.00 8.29 8.67 8.88 1.69
10th percentile 3.37 3.47 3.52 3.57 3.71 3.86 3.93 0.56
25th percentile 4.33 4.47 4.55 4.62 4.79 5.00 5.04 0.71
50th percentile 5.94 6.17 6.29 6.49 6.73 7.01 7.13 1.19
75th percentile 8.60 8.95 9.20 9.60 9.94 10.38 10.63 2.03
90th percentile 12.35 12.80 13.11 13.91 14.38 14.95 15.36 3.01
ILO
Unemployment
.104 .105 .095 .087 .080 .072 .063 -.041
Source: Earnings from New Earnings Survey, ILO unemployment from Labour Force Survey.
2.4.4 Population and Dem ographic Data
Areas vary greatly in the size of the population and the population make-up. 
These differences can also affect the level of crime in areas. Usually areas with a higher 
population also have more crime. This makes sense in that the larger the population, the 
greater the pool of potential perpetrators and victims of crime and the greater the stock of 
goods to steal. Of course, some people are more likely to be involved in crime than 
others, so it is also important to control for the demographic make-up of the population in 
the area. For example, evidence suggests that blacks (Freeman 2000), and those with no 
educational qualifications (Lochner 1999) are more likely to commit crime than others.
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Population numbers, which match police force areas, have been supplied by the
23Home Office. Demographic data have been assembled from the LFS. These include the 
number of ethnic minorities and the number of 16 to 19 year olds in full time education. 
Table 2.6 shows that the demographics (population shares of ethnic minorities), 
unsurprisingly, stay fairly constant through this time period. Finally, the percentage of 16 
to 19 year olds in education has increased from 49 to 57 percent between 1992 and 1998, 
reflecting the growing participation of students in post compulsory education.
Table 2.6 Unemployment and Demographics from the Labour Force Survey
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Change
1992-1998
Share non-white .052 .052 .053 .053 .055 .058 .061 .009
Share of 16-19 
year olds in 
education
.494 .530 .558 .569 .579 .586 .568 .074
2.5 Methodology
Studies of data that vary across time and space have a great number of 
methodological advantages. Firstly, from an exploratory point of view, the data can be 
aggregated in a number of ways to show the strengths and weaknesses of the different 
data and methodologies available for dealing with them. This Chapter will focus on two 
ways of looking at the data. The first will look at all the time periods combined and 
examine the differences between police force areas. In doing this, the data effectively 
become cross-sectional data (but using cross-sectional data averaged over a number of 
years means that results are likely to be more accurate and robust than data that use a 
single period cross-section, as they ameliorate measurement error (see Appendix B)). The 
model that makes this possible is:
23 The data used are anonymised county level data from the LFS. Individual level data is available at county 
level but only between 1995 and 1999.
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Ca = pXa + £ a
where C is the mean crime rate between 1992 and 1998, X  is a mean measure of the
explanatory variables over the same time period and s  is the mean error term reflecting 
the fact that explanatory variables are unlikely to fully explain the variation in crime. The 
subscript ‘a’ denotes police force area.
Between area differences allows the identification of high crime areas and low 
crime areas and can inform us which variables are related to high and low crime. 
However, with area level data measured over time, it is also possible to control for 
differences in crime across the police force areas and create an even arena where crime 
and its correlates can be examined. This is done by holding constant factors that may 
differ across high and low crime areas, some of which we would otherwise be unable to 
observe. These are referred to as ‘area fixed effects’. Moreover, factors which vary over 
time (but are constant across areas (such as macro-economic shocks which hit the 
economy as a whole) can also be controlled for by including time dummies in the model, 
in the same way as the area fixed effects. The model in this case becomes:
C at =  a +  P X at + F a + T t +  8  at 
Where F is the area fixed effects and T are time dummies. The subscripts ‘a’ and ‘t ’ 
denote that the regressions are run on data following areas over time.
Thus, from a methodological point of view, spatial data measured over time has a 
number of advantages and provides the opportunity to use various techniques to analyse 
different aspects of the relationship between crime and its correlates, an analysis to which 
this Chapter now turns.
72
2.6 Splitting Crime into its Constituent Parts
It is possible to decompose the variance of changes over time in crime rates into 
two groups. The first group is the variation in crime occurring between areas, in other 
words the amount of variance in the crime rates that can be attributed to differences in the 
characteristics of different police force areas. The second is the variance within areas. 
The following Table shows these variance decompositions for the three crime rates.
All
Crimes
Property
Crimes
Violent
Crimes
Percent of Variation in Crime Between/Within Areas 87/13 81/19 87/13
Between 1992 and 1998 most of the variation in crime occurred between areas, 87
percent of the variation in all/violent crimes occurred between areas and 81 percent of the
variation in property crimes. This leaves 13 percent of variation in crime occurring within
areas for all crime and violent crime and 19 percent for property crime. Both types of
variation will now be discussed in turn in an attempt to establish a relationship between
crime and its determinants.
2.6.1 Between Area Variation in Crime
Between area variation is an important aspect of crime. Indeed, there exist large
differences in crime across different areas of England and Wales. According to the 2001
British Crime Survey, crime is much higher in inner city areas than any other areas, while
rural areas have much lower crime rates than elsewhere (Home Office, 2001b). Police
force statistics reveal similar geographical patterns; the metropolitan forces (City, Greater
Manchester, Merseyside, Metropolitan, Northumbria, South Yorkshire, West Midlands,
West Yorkshire) tend to have higher crime rates than other forces. In the year April 2000
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to March 2001 Greater Manchester had the highest crime rate with over 1,400 crimes per 
1000 of the population. Crime tends to be lowest in the more rural forces such as Dyfed- 
Powys which had only 476 crimes per 1000 of the population during the same period 
(Home Office 2001a).
As early as the 1920s and 1930s, the Chicago School established that crime varied 
across area and identified some areas as high crime areas and others as low crime areas. 
They also noted that these patterns persist long after the initial cause of the high or low 
crime incidence in the area no longer exist. This is because people do not change their 
behaviour immediately to a given stimuli, but react slowly over much longer periods. If 
an area is formally associated with high crime, it will take quite some time for people to 
notice a change and it will take even more time for confidence in the area to grow to the 
point where residents and business may feel safe there. We can think of this as the 
permanent component of crime. Even though crime rates fluctuate, crime is, on average, 
higher in some areas than others. For example, here are the crime rates (expressed per 
1000 of the population) in two imaginary areas, Area A and Area B over a four year 
period:
Year Area A Area B
Year 1 23.3 6.1
Year 2 23.0 5.3
Year 3 22.9 4.5
Year 4 22.8 4.1
We can see from this example that on average Area A is a high crime area (23 
crimes per 1000 of the population) and Area B is a low crime area (5 crimes per 1000 of 
the population) and that despite movement over time about these mean crime rates (there 
is in fact more movement in Area B) Area A remains a high crime area and Area B 
remains a low crime area.
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That some areas are essentially high crime areas and others are low crime areas 
(and remain so over time) can be seen clearly in Figures 2.1 to 2.3. These show crime 
rates for all crimes (Figure 2.1), property crimes (Figure 2.2) and violent crimes (Figure 
2.3) between 1992 and 1998, with the crime rates expressed as the number of crimes per 
person. In each case, lines are fitted through the median crime rate in each time period.
This persistence can also be seen by calculating the correlation between crime in 
the start year (1992) and end year (1998) of the sample. The closer the correlation 
coefficient is to 1 the more the crime rates in the two periods are similar (1 indicates a 
perfect positive linear relationship between the two variables, -1 would indicate a perfect 
negative linear relationship). From the table below we can see that the coefficients are 
high (very high for the aggregate crime measure and for property crime, slightly lower 
for violent crime) indicating the crime rates in 1992 and 1998 are highly correlated.
All
Crimes
Property
Crimes
Violent
Crimes
Correlation Coefficient For 1992 and 1998 Crime Rates .93 .93 .81
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Figure 2.1 Area Crime Rates 1992-98 (All Crimes / Population)
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Figure 2.2 Area Property Crime Rates 1992-98 (Theft + Burglary/ Population)
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Figure 2.3 Area Violent Crime Rates 1992-98 (M urder+Sex+Robbery/ Pop)
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In the same way that crime is unevenly distributed across areas, it is likely that so 
too are the determinants of crime. By carrying out a regression of the mean crime rates 
across areas on the mean of the independent variables we will be able to see which 
variables are associated with high crime areas and which are associated with low crime 
areas.24 There are three sets of independent variables considered: the first are 
demographic variables and include the proportion of non-whites in the area and the 
proportion of 16 to 19 year olds in full time education. The second set of variables are 
labour market variables and include the area unemployment rate and a measure of wage 
inequality (75th percentile-25th percentile). The final set of explanatory variables are 
deterrence measures, these include the proportion found guilty, the proportion 
incarcerated, the number of police officers and the average sentence length.
Table 2.7 shows police force area models of crime averaged over the years 1992 
to 1998,26 carried out separately for property and violent crimes. For property crimes all 
the demographic and labour market variables are statistically significant as are two of the 
four deterrence measures. As might be expected, high crime areas are also those with a 
higher proportion of non-whites and a lower proportion of 16 to 19 year olds in full time 
education. They are also areas with a higher proportion of people unemployed and where 
wage inequality is greater. Higher property crime areas are also those with a lower 
number of police officers and where average sentence lengths are shorter.
For violent crime high crime areas are also areas with a higher proportion of non­
whites and a higher proportion of unemployed. Unlike property crime, areas of high 
violent crime are also areas with a higher proportion of 16-19 year olds in full time
24 The model used can be seen in the methodology section (2.5).
25 The log o f variables is used as it allows the examination o f elasticities, in other words it makes it possible 
to say how much the dependent variable will be affected by a 1% rise in the independent variables in 
percentage terms.
26 So the data effectively become a cross-section.
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education, perhaps suggesting a higher incidence of fighting or other forms of violence 
amongst students. Alternatively this may be a spurious relationship reflecting the fact
2Rthat violent crime is less frequent, and therefore, more noisy than property crime. 
Violent crime is also higher in areas where average sentence lengths are shorter and 
rather surprisingly where more people are found guilty. It appears rather counter intuitive 
that violent crime should rise in an area where more people are being found guilty.
29Therefore again these results may be spurious.
Table 2.7 Police Force Area Models of Crime in England and Wales, Averaged 
between 1992-98
Property Crime Violent Crime
Proportion non-white .178***
(.012) (.015)
Proportion of 16-19 year -1.60*** .688***
olds in education (.169) (.180)
Proportion unemployed .268*** .826***
(.067) (.115)
Wage Inequality 1.22*** -.381
(.274) (.374)
Proportion found guilty .046 .230**
(.141) (.118)
Proportion jailed .046 -.014
(.105) (.090)
Police numbers - 071*** -.032
(.016) (.026)
Average sentence length -.278*** -.363***
(.106) (.135)
R-Squared .997 .999
Sample Size 41 41
27This could also reflect student representation in city center areas where more drinking and likely victims 
are to be found.
28 Less than 10% of all crimes per year are violent crimes.
29 When the model breaks violent crime into its constituent parts (i.e. violence against the person, sexual 
offences and robbery) violence against the person is the only offence that attracts a statistically significant 
positive coefficient. Sexual offences has a positive but insignificant coefficient while robbery attracts a 
negative coefficient. This is likely to be due to the fact that violence against the person and sexual crimes 
tend not to be rational acts, while robbery is. Therefore, those committing robbery are more likely to 
respond to incentives or deterrence in much the same way as those committing property crimes.
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While these findings are interesting, they tell us very little about the relationship 
between crime and its correlates. It is highly likely that a high crime area is also an area 
with high unemployment for example, which is why cross-sectional studies tend to find 
statistically significant relationships between crime and such variables at this level. 
However, these observed relationships may actually be produced by any number of 
intervening variables, many of which are unobservable. Using this type of methodology, 
there is no way to control for the presence and effect of these intervening variables. Thus, 
such models are highly likely to suffer from omitted variable bias, so the results should 
be viewed with caution. This may explain why some counter intuitive results emerge.
Moreover, because the picture observed is static (i.e. a snapshot at one point in 
time) it is not possible to generalise findings outside of the sample or to establish causal 
relationships. This means that from a policy perspective, few implications can be drawn 
about the relationship between crime and its determinants from these findings. What is 
needed is an examination of fluctuations in the crime rate, in an attempt to establish what 
lies behind these movements.
2.6.2 Within Area Variation in Crime: Area-level modeling
The results so far indicate that some areas are high crime areas while some are 
low crime areas and these patterns tend to persist over time. But it is also true that within 
these areas, crime rates fluctuate over time and it is thus important to establish what 
factors lie behind this movement. To do this, the permanent component of crime must be 
removed. As detailed in the methodology section, it is possible to do this with data 
measured at police force area level over time by controlling for area fixed effects. This, is 
done by holding constant factors that may differ across high and low crime areas, some of 
which we would otherwise be unable to observe. This makes it possible to better isolate
81
associations between crime and its correlates. This is the methodological question which 
corresponds best to the theory. What happens to crime across areas if an hypothesised 
determinant of crime changes?
2.7 Area Level Models of Crime
30There are a number of ways to estimate models that include fixed effects. The 
first is to include dummy variables for each police force area. In this case, the model 
looks like:
Ca( = a  + Pxdemoat + fi2 labourmarket at + fi2deteral +Fa +Tt + eat
where C is the measure of crime, a  is the constant, demo is a vector for the demographic 
variables of interest, set out in the data section, labourmarket is a vector for the labour 
market variables of interest and deter a vector for the set of deterrence variables. F
represents the area fixed effects, (measured using a dummy variable for each police force 
area (minus 1, as the constant a  is included in the model)). T represents time dummies 
for each year (again minus 1). £ is the error term incorporating any factors that influence 
crime which are not included in the model (although the fixed effects and time trends will 
account for such variables, where they are constant across time in the case of the former 
and constant across area in the case of the latter).
The subscript ‘a’ indicates each police force area and the subscript ‘t ’ each time 
period. Note that the area fixed effect only has an ‘a’ subscript, because it controls for 
differences across areas that are constant through time, while the time trend only has a ‘t ’ 
subscript as it accounts for differences through time which are constant across areas.
30 This Chapter focuses on two methods but other ways include demeaning the variables.
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The second fixed effects model uses changes or differences in the variables of 
interest across time periods. Thus, from the above model we get:
(Cat = a  + Pxdemoat +  P2labourmarket at +  p zdeterat + F a + £at)
(c at- 1  = a + Pydemoat_x+ P2labourmarketat_x+ P3deterat_, + F a + £at_l)
Or:
(Cat -  Cat_x )  =  «  +  / ? ,  ( demoat -  demoat_x) + P2 (labourmarketat -  labourmarketf l M )
+  / ? 3(deterat -  deterat_ x) + (Fa - F a) + (sat -  £ a t _ x )
This can also be written more simply as:
A Ca = a  + /?, Ademoa + P2 ^ labourmarket a + p^detera + Asa
Where A indicates the change from 7’ to ‘t-F.  The area fixed effect Fadoes not 
appear in the final equation as it has been ‘differenced away’ (i.e. Fa -  Fa). Thus, this
model is referred to as a ‘first differenced equation’ (Wooldridge 2000).
There is no general consensus as to which method is best, but usually where 7 ’ is 
small, as in this case, dummy variables are thought to produce more efficient results. This 
Chapter will use both methods. If the findings are robust, both methods should give 
similar results.
Table 2.8 shows the relationship between property crime and a number of 
explanatory variables, while controlling for differences in areas characteristics and time 
trends with the use of dummy variables. The Table reports six specifications. The first 
(shown in column (1)) is a simple fixed effects regression of property crime on the 
demographic variables. The second (2) and third (3) regress property crime on labour 
market variables, while the fourth (4) and fifth (5) columns examine the effect of
83
deterrence variables on property crime. The final column (6) shows the preferred model, 
where only the independent variables shown to have an effect on property crime are 
included.
The results from the first specification show that the measures of demography 
included here, ethnicity and education, do not have a statistically significant effect on 
property crime despite both being important predictors of crime in other research.
The second specification examines the effect of unemployment and then a 
measure of the top and bottom of the wage distribution. Results for this specification 
show that while the measure of unemployment attracts a negative sign, the coefficient is 
statistically insignificant. Thus, like much of the literature that emphasizes the fragile 
nature of the crime-unemployment relationship (see Freeman, 1999), there appears to be 
no evidence in this property crime model of a crime-unemployment link. This is an 
excellent example of how failing to control for area fixed effects (or looking at single 
cross-sections) can prove to be misleading. In the previous model, a positive relationship 
was found between crime and unemployment. That this relationship vanishes with the 
inclusion of fixed effects suggests that there are other characteristics of areas that explain 
the cross-sectional correlation.
The measure of the bottom end of the wage distribution, the 25th percentile 
(which effectively captures the extent of low pay in the area), attracts a negative sign, but 
is only significant in a two-tailed test. The 75th percentile wage, which can be thought of 
as a proxy for the stock on wealth in the area (for example, more disposable income, 
more goods to steal, lower guardianship of property because people are more likely to be 
out in the evening) attracts a positive sign, statistically significant at a greater than 1% 
level. In this specification an F-test on the 25th and 75th percentiles produces an F statistic
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of 4.97, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. This means we are unable to 
reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on the two variables are equal and opposite.
th thThus, in the third specification the 25 and 75 percentiles are combined to create 
a wage inequality index, which is added to the specification along with the 
unemployment measure. Again, the coefficient on the unemployment variable, while 
attracting a negative sign remains statistically insignificant. On the other hand the wage 
inequality measure is positive and is strongly statistically significant at a greater than 1% 
significance level.
The fourth and fifth specifications examine property crime using two different 
ways to measure deterrence. Column (4) shows the results from looking at crime specific 
deterrence measures, those found guilty, those jailed and the average sentence length for 
property crimes only. The final deterrence measure in this specification is the number of 
police officers. This latter variable is the only measure of deterrence that attracts a 
statistically significant coefficient. Column (5) shows the same specification, but this 
time measured for all crimes. The proportion jailed and the average sentence length 
remain statistically insignificant, like the previous specification, but the proportion found 
guilty of all crimes in the area attracts a negative coefficient, statistically significant at the 
5% level. Again, the coefficient on the number of police officers is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The fact that the proportion found guilty of all 
crimes has a greater deterrence effect on property crime than the crime-specific measure 
of deterrence suggests that if the rational choice theory is correct, people make decisions 
not having weighed up the actual costs and benefits of their action, but the perceived 
costs and benefits, which are often based on incomplete or even incorrect information.
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The final specification (6) shows the preferred model, including the variables that 
remain statistically significant. Thus, included in this model is the wage inequality 
measure, which attracts a positive sign, statistically significant at the 5% level; the 
proportion found guilty of all crimes, which has a negative sign (significant at a greater 
than 1% level); and the number of police which also attracts a negative sign (significant 
at the 5% level).31
Table 2.9 reports a set of results for the same property crime specifications as 
above, but using changes over time rather than dummy variables to capture the fixed 
effects. Reassuringly, the results produced are very similar to those reported above. The 
statistically significant variables in the model are the same as before, so that in the final 
model the wage inequality measure attracts a positive coefficient, statistically significant 
at the 5% level, the proportion found guilty attracts a negative coefficient (significant at 
the 5% level) and the coefficient on the number of police officers shows a negative sign, 
significant at the 10% level. The magnitude of the coefficients from both models are very 
similar, although for all statistically significant measures they are slightly lower using the 
first differenced model (the wage inequality coefficient is .358 in the dummy model and 
.315 in the changes model, the equivalent figures for the proportion found guilty are - 
.139 and -.089 and for the number of police officers -.316 and -.201).
31 Note the high R-squared -  this is a result o f including a dummy variable for each police force area, which 
means the model explains much of the variation in the data.
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Table 2.8 Police Force Area Models of Property Crime in England and Wales,
1992-98 Including Area Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Basic Model 
with 
Demographic 
Variables
Labour 
Market 
(Unemploy­
ment and 
wages)
Labour
Market
(inequality)
Deterrence
(Crime
Specific)
Deterrence
(Overall)
Final Model
Proportion
Non-White
-.015
(.013)
Proportion of 
16-19 year olds 
in Full Time 
Education
-.011
(.056)
Proportion
Unemployed
-.038
(.039)
-.045
(.038)
25th. Percentile 
Wage
-.302
(.237)
75th. Percentile 
Wage
.526***
(.201)
Wage
Inequality
.432***
(.179)
.358**
(.171)
Proportion 
Found Guilty
-.006
(.044)
-.137**
(.057)
-.139***
(.045)
Proportion
Jailed
-.010
(.043)
-.022
(.057)
Police Numbers -.465***
(.149)
-.341**
(.154)
-.316**
(.153)
Average
Sentence
Length
.011
(.040)
.036
(.042)
Area Fixed 
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed 
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared .9997 .9997 .9997 .9997 .9997 .9997
Obs 287 287 287 286 286 286
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis 
* significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
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Table 2.9 Police Force Area Models of Property Crime in England and Wales,
1992-98 Specified in First Differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Changes in: Basic Model 
with 
Demographics
Labour 
Market 
(Unemploy­
ment and 
wages)
Labour
Market
(inequality)
Deterrence
(Crime
Specific)
Deterrence
(Overall)
Final
Model
Proportion 
Non-White
-.009
(.011)
Proportion 
of 16-19 year 
olds in Full 
Time 
Education
.017
(.038)
Proportion
Unemployed
.003
(.028)
.000
(.028)
25th.
Percentile
Wage
-.228
(.191)
75th.
Percentile
Wage
.331***
(.156)
Wage
Inequality
.298**
(.138)
.315**
(.130)
Proportion
Found
Guilty
.021
(.033)
-.063**
(.042)
-.089**
(.036)
Proportion
Jailed
-.030
(.030)
-.047
(.035)
Police
Numbers
-.215*
(.130)
-.227*
(.127)
-.201*
(.122)
Average
Sentence
Length
-.023
(.025)
-.042
(.035)
Year Fixed 
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared .687 .692 .9997 .693 .699 .703
Obs 246 246 246 245 245 245
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis 
* significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
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Thus, both methods show that property crime is positively associated with wage 
inequality. Where wage inequality is greater or has increased the most property crime is 
higher or has increased the most. This supports the idea that relative deprivation (Stack 
1984), not just being poor, but being poorer or having less than others around you, is an 
important predictor of crime. The results also show that property crime is negatively 
associated with the proportion of people in the area found guilty of all crime and the 
number of police officers. Where a greater proportion of people are found guilty of crime 
or where there has been a higher rise in those found guilty, and where there are more 
police officers or where there has been a rise in the number of police officers, property 
crime is lower or has declined by more. This supports rational choice and deterrence 
theories, which posit that the higher the likelihood of apprehension the more people will 
be dissuaded from breaking the law. It also provides evidence in favour of government 
policy to put ‘bobbies back on the beat’.
Tables 2.10 reports the results from the fixed effects model for violent crime 
using dummy variables to control for area fixed effects. As with property crime, the 
Table reports six specifications. With the exception of the wage inequality measure (in 
this case replaced with the mean wage measure), the specifications are the same as the 
property crime model.
Column (1), which reports the coefficients on the demographic variables, shows 
that like property crime, neither ethnicity nor education have a significant effect on 
violent crime. The unemployment measure also remains statistically insignificant, as do 
both measures of the wage distribution (the 25th and 75th percentile), (column 2). As such, 
the inclusion of the inequality measure in the property crime model is not appropriate 
here. Instead a measure of the average wage in the area is added to the model in
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specification (3). As the results show this measure attracts a positive sign and is 
statistically significant at a greater than 1% level. This supports the findings of Cantor 
and Land (1985) who posit that violent crime is higher when people have more spending 
power to go drinking as alcohol consumption is so highly correlated with violent crime 
(Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 2001).
Of the deterrence measures, only the number of police officers attracts a negative 
coefficient that is statistically significant. The final, preferred specification (6) thus 
contains only mean wages, which attracts a positive sign, statistically significant at a 
greater than 1% level, and the number of police officers, which attracts a negative 
coefficient, statistically significant at the 5% level.
The results from the fixed effect dummy variable model indicate that violent 
crime is positively associated with mean wages. Areas where average wages are higher or 
where the average wage rose by more are areas where there has been more violent crime, 
or where violent crime has risen by more. On the other hand, violent crime was found to 
be negatively related to the number of police officers. Areas with more police officers or 
areas where there has been a rise in the number of officers are the areas with lower crime 
or where violent crime had decreased by more.
However, these findings are not reproduced when the model is specified in first 
differences (Table 2.10). Indeed, in the first differenced model, none of the variables in 
the final specification (6) are statistically significant. Thus, for violent crime the findings 
do not seem very robust. This is in line with other work in the area that has found it 
difficult to establish the determinants of violent crime (for a discussion of this see 
Chiricos 1987).
32 The proportion found guilty attracts a positive, statistically significant coefficient. This is counter 
intuitive.
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The fact that the fixed effect and first difference models produce similar results 
for property crime, but not for violent crime, is in line with the idea that first differences 
exacerbates measurement error. The models produce very different results for violent 
crime, which is likely to contain more measurement error than property crime. For this 
reason, the fixed effects models probably deserve more attention.
Table 2.10 Police Force Area Models of Violent Crime in England and Wales,
1992-98 Including Area Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Basic Model 
with 
Demographics
Labour 
Market (Wage 
distribution)
Labour 
Market (Mean 
Wages)
Deterrence
(Crime
Specific)
Deterrence
(Overall)
Final M odel
Proportion
Non-White
-.014
(.026)
Proportion of 
16-19 year 
olds in Full 
Time 
Education
-.135
(.112)
Proportion
Unemployed
-.048
(.071)
-.034
(.070)
25th.
Percentile
Wage
.561
(.630)
75th.
Percentile
Wage
.487
(.376)
Mean Wages 1.13***
(.450)
1.22***
(.452)
Proportion 
Found Guilty
.281***
(.075)
.228*
(.057)
Proportion
Jailed
-.056
(.078)
-.166
(.109)
Police
Numbers
- 798*** 
(.301)
-.639*
(.328)
-.525**
(.302)
Average
Sentence
Length
.078
(.059)
-.002
(.083)
Area Fixed 
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed 
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared .9997 .9997 .9997 .9997 .9997 .9997
Obs 287 287 287 286 286 286
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis, * significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
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Table 2.11 Police Force Area Models of Violent Crime in England and Wales,
1992-98 Specified in First Differences
0 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Basic Model 
with 
Demographics
Labour 
Market (Wage 
distribution)
. Labour 
Market (Mean 
Wages)
Deterrence
(Crime
Specific)
Deterrence
(Overall)
Final M odel
Proportion 
Non-White
-.005
(.017)
Proportion 
of 16-19 
year olds in 
Full Time 
Education
-.038
(.077)
Proportion
Unemploye
d
.027
(.059)
.041
(.056)
25tb.
Percentile
Wage
.115
(.533)
75tb.
Percentile
Wage
.470
(.291)
Mean
Wages
.660*
(.393)
.622
(.392)
Proportion
Found
Guilty
.285
(.081)
.202**
(.095)
Proportion
Jailed
-.045
(.053)
-.111
(.075)
Police
Numbers
.018
(.040)
-.362
(.353)
-.346
(.363)
Average
Sentence
Length
-.009
(.041)
-.023
(.058)
Area Fixed 
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed 
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared .203 .212 .212 .241 .216 .212
Obs 287 287 287 286 286 286
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis, * significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
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2.8 Incorporating Dynamics into Crime Models
Earlier findings indicated that crime is highly persistent over time. While the 
inclusion of area fixed effects will control for part of this, there may still be persistence 
above and beyond this. It is therefore important to include some measure of inertia in the 
models. One way to do this, is to include a measure of the lagged dependent variable in 
the model, in an attempt to account for historical factors which cause differences in the 
dependent variable that are otherwise difficult to account for (Wooldridge 2000).
One issue with first differencing models is that it necessarily produces serial 
correlation when a lagged measure of the dependent variable is added to the model. This 
is because a non-zero correlation is induced between the lagged dependent variable and 
the error term. The problem arises from the fact that the error term will pick up a range of 
factors that have not been included in the model (for example peer pressure). In a 
contemporaneous model, the error term is assumed not to be correlated with any of the 
explanatory variables. So peer pressure is represented by the error term as it is not 
reflected in any of the other right hand side variables. However, in a dynamic first 
differenced model, the contemporaneous error term may be correlated with the lagged 
dependent variable which may also include a measure of peer pressure. This will result in 
biased estimates. This can be seen more clearly in the model below:
(Cat -  Cat_j) = a  + / ? ,  (demoat -  demoat_x )  +  p 2 (labourmarketat -  labourmarketa t _ x )
+  / ? 3(deterat -  deter3 , _ , )  +  8 (CaM -  Cat_2) + (Fa - F a) + (eat -  sat_x)
The potential correlation exists because:
E [(£ at-i — C a(_2), ( s at — £ at_x) ^  0
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This problem can be overcome using an instrumental variable technique 
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). However, a more simple procedure is to 
incorporate the lagged variables into the fixed effect dummy variable model, where no 
bias problem exists. This is done for property crime in Table 2.12. The Table reports two 
specifications. The first simply shows the preferred specification from the previous fixed 
effects dummy variable model for property crime. The second includes a lagged measure 
of the dependent variable.
The first thing to note is that the lagged measure of property crime is strongly 
positive and statistically significant at a greater than 1% level. The inclusion of the 
lagged dependent variable slightly reduces the coefficient on all the independent 
variables. However, with the exception of the wage inequality measure, all remain 
statistically significant. Thus, the results show that even after accounting for some 
persistence, property crime remains strongly persistent in the fixed effects model.
Table 2.13 shows the results from the dynamic models of violent crime. As with 
property crime the Table reports three specifications. The first is the preferred model 
from the previous fixed effects dummy variable model (column (6), Table 2.10), which 
for violent crimes contains a measure of the average wage in the area and the number of 
police officers. The second specification (2) adds in a lagged measure of violent crime in 
the area.
The results show that like property crime, violent crime is strongly persistent over 
time. Having already accounted for some persistence in the fixed effects model, the 
coefficient on the lagged violent crime variable attracts a positive coefficient statistically 
significant at a greater than 1% level. The coefficient itself is slightly larger in magnitude
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than the lagged measure of property crime at .580 compared to .472. Thus, violent crime, 
even more so than property crime, is heavily persistent.
Table 2.13 Police Force Area Models of Violent Crime in England and Wales,
1992-98 Using Dummy Variables and Including Lagged Variables
0 ) (2)
Preferred Model (1) Plus Lagged Crime Measure
Wage Inequality .358**
(.171)
.186
(.150)
Proportion Found Guilty _  J39***
(.045)
-.118***
(.036)
Police Numbers -.316**
(.153)
-.256**
(.101)
Property Crime -  Lagged 472***
(.054)
Area Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Test for Serial Correlation Yes Yes
R-Squared .9997 .9999
Obs 286 246
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis, * significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Table 2.12 Police Force Area Models of Property Crime in England and Wales,
1992-98 Using Dummy Variables and Including Lagged Variables
(1) (2)
Preferred Model (1) Plus Lagged Crime Measure
Mean Wages 1.22***
(.452)
.873**
(.434)
Police Numbers -.525**
(.302)
-.001
(.291)
Violent Crime- Lagged .580***
(.105)
Area Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Test for Serial Correlation Yes Yes
R-Squared .9997 .9997
Obs 286 246
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis, * significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
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2.9 Concluding Remarks
In an attempt to establish simple descriptive relationships between crime and its 
correlates in England and Wales in the 1990s, this Chapter has looked at two ways in 
which the crime rate varies: between police force areas, and within police force areas. 
Using different methodologies, it was found that the discovery of significant relationships 
was easier using cross-sectional data. However, these results are possibly misleading, do 
not allow causality to be established and as a result can offer few implications for 
criminal policy. Examining area level data over time has proven much more successful. It 
allows us to ask the conceptual question in the right way: If X changes what happens to 
crime? Although more difficult to establish significant relationships, those that have 
been discovered are more robust, even to the inclusion of dynamic effects.
Thus, when using area level panel data to exploit cross-area changes in order to 
identify the determinants of crime, the results show that in the 1990s property crime in 
areas experiencing a growth in wage inequality rose by more. Crime has been lower in 
areas where the number of police officers was higher and it has been lower where the 
proportion found guilty of all crimes has increased.
Explaining violent crime rates has proven more difficult since their relative 
infrequency makes the results much noisier. Despite this, evidence has shown that violent 
crime is positively related to average wages, it is higher in areas where the average wage 
has been higher over the period under examination and lower in areas where the number 
of police officers has increased.
33 The equivalent cross-sectional question is: Is crime high when X  is high?
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The results have also shown that both property and violent crimes are heavily 
persistent over time and that failure to account for this persistence may mean that some of 
the factors that help explain crime are ignored.
As well as highlighting which factors are most closely associated with different 
crimes, these findings point to the potential usefulness of area data in understanding 
crime. This will be utilised in the following Chapter, which further explores the 
relationship between crime and the labour market at area level.
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3. Spatial Patterns of Crime: Can Labour 
Market Variables Explain Them?
3.1 Introduction
Residential location is a strong determinant of the level of crime. Indeed, the 
location of where you live strongly determines the level of crime you are likely to 
experience. In 1999, a person living in South Africa was nine times more likely to be 
murdered than someone living in the USA. A person in the USA was four times more 
likely to be a victim of homicide than someone living in the UK, who in turn was one and 
a half times more likely to be killed than someone in Norway (Home Office, 2001a).
The likelihood of being a victim of crime in England and Wales is documented in 
the British Crime Survey (BCS), a household survey that asks about people’s experiences 
of crime. Figures from the 2000 BCS show that the risk of victimisation ‘varies 
considerably across households with different characteristics and situated in different 
localities” (Home Office 2002). Those living in urban areas, inner city areas, areas of 
high physical disorder, in social housing and on council estates are consistently more 
likely to be victims of property crime (domestic burglary and vehicle related theft) than 
those living in other areas.
These findings are supported by the official crime statistics which show that while 
the average crime rate across all police forces in England and Wales (between April 2000 
and March 2001) was 9,814 crimes per 100,000 of the population, the rate was higher for
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Metropolitan forces (Metropolitan, City, West Midlands, Merseyside, Greater 
Manchester, West Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and Northumbria) where the average 
crime rate was 12,775 per 100,000. The highest rates were in Greater Manchester 
(14,104), West Midlands (13,892) and London (City and Metropolitan combined with 
13,761 crimes per 100,000 of the population). This contrasts markedly with areas such as 
Dyfed-Powys, Surrey and Wiltshire, all of which had rates of less than 6000 crimes per
100,000 of the population (at 4,760, 5,874 and 5,989 respectively). But even within 
police force areas, crime rates vary across geographical location. Within greater 
Manchester (the highest crime police force area), the violent crime rate was as high as 
2,600 crimes per 100,000 of the population in Manchester itself, while Stockport and 
Wigan had only 1,200 crimes per 100,000 of the population (Home Office, 2001b).
Such evidence highlights what the Chicago School drew attention to in the 1920s 
and 30s, and what has by now become a well known picture. Crime is massively 
unevenly distributed across geographical location. This Chapter, with the aid of mapping 
technologies, carries out an exploration into the spatial distribution of crime across local 
authorities in England and Wales. Using various statistical and Geographical Information 
Systems (GIS) mapping techniques, the Chapter focuses on two aspects of research in the 
geography of crime. The first is the examination of the spatial distribution of crime, and 
involves looking for spatial patterns of crime across different geographical locations. The 
second focuses on the extent to which the uneven distribution of crime can be explained 
by the distribution of a range of demographic, labour market and socio-economic 
determinants of crime.
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3.2 Spatial Patterns of Crime: Theoretical Considerations
There are a number of reasons for thinking that crime is likely to be non-randomly 
distributed across the areas of England and Wales. The previous Chapter has shown that 
crime in an area will be dependent on a number of other characteristics such as the 
demographic and socio-economic make-up of that area. If factors such as these are 
associated with crime at this local level the distribution of crime is likely to reflect the 
distribution of these other structural characteristics. This may produce a number of 
possible distributions. Firstly, it is likely that areas that are geographically close to each 
other will share similar demographic and socio-economic characteristics. There are a 
number of theories that predict differential involvement in crime by groups with different 
labour market or socio-economic characteristics. Such theories (discussed at length in the 
previous two Chapters) include rational choice theory (Becker 1968), anomie (Durkheim 
1933), strain theory (Merton 1968), differential opportunity (Cloward and Ohlin 1960) 
and social control theory (Hirshi 1969), all of which predict higher involvement in crime 
for those with weaker labour market positions. Thus, these theories would predict that 
areas that are geographically close and which share similar socio-economic 
characteristics, will produce clusters of areas with similar crime rates.
Alternatively, given that there are a finite number of criminals,1 it may be the case 
that if crime is high in one area (if there are less police in that area, or the properties are 
less well protected, for example) then, as rational choice, social control or deterrence 
theory predicts, crime will be lower in the neighbouring areas than expected in a random 
distribution. On the other hand, if there is a police clamp-down on crime in an area, this
1 In the sense that at any point in time only som e people com m it crimes.
100
may lead to the migration of criminals to surrounding areas, producing an area of low 
crime surrounded by high crime areas. All of these scenarios will produce non-random 
patterns of crime distribution. But if the geographical distribution of crime is produced 
solely by the location of these other area characteristics, once such differences are 
controlled for, there should be no spatial correlation between crime across areas and 
crime should be distributed randomly across the areas of England and Wales.
Other theories suggest that the spatial association of crime across areas depends 
not only on individual characteristics or individual situations within areas, but on the 
interaction of people with areas and with other people in the areas. For instance, one of 
the findings from the early work on the geography of crime in Chicago (Shaw and 
McKay 1942) is that crime in an area is associated with social disorganisation, which 
creates an atmosphere where criminal behaviour is culturally transmitted. This 
disorganisation, or social breakdown, which is very closely related to the situation of 
individuals, largely resulted from a lack of community. This can be elaborated with 
reference to social control theory (Hirshi 1969) which predicts that areas where the 
community is weaker will be associated with higher crime, as informal social controls 
which deter people from engaging in crime (such as fear of peer disapproval or 
stigmatisation) will be weaker in these areas.
According to subcultural theories (Cohen 1955), crime will be spatially associated 
across areas, not because of disorganisation, or social breakdown, but because some areas 
are much more heterogeneous than others, and therefore will have a greater number of 
subcultures. For Fischer (1984), cities have more subcultures than smaller rural areas and 
as urban areas are more populous not only will the subcultures in these areas be larger,
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they will also be more able to resist outside influences and more able to diffuse their 
subcultural beliefs to the wider society (Fischer 1995).
The diffusion of subcultures is strongly related to peer pressure (Hirshi 1969), 
where individuals are encouraged to behave in the same way their peers do. In larger 
urban areas, where subcultures exert more influence, peer pressure to adhere to the 
beliefs and behaviours of the subculture will be greater. Also, central to this, is the idea of 
differential association (Sutherland 1950) and differential opportunities (Cloward and 
Ohlin 1960). The first of these theories predicts that crime will be spatially associated 
across the areas that offer increased opportunities to learn criminal behaviour through 
face-to-face interaction. The second, that crime will be associated across areas that offer 
greater opportunities for involvement in criminal behaviour such as gang membership.
These theories predict that crime will be correlated across areas depending on the 
ability of areas to create an environment more (or less) favourable to the development of 
criminal attitudes and forms of behaviour. This is often strongly correlated with area or 
population size or population make-up (Fischer 1995). This is also an important factor for 
routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson 1979, Cohen and Cantor 1980) that stresses 
that criminal behaviour depends not only on motivated offenders, but also on the 
availability of suitable targets. This refers to the availability and vulnerability of potential 
targets of crime. Thus, area size is again important in predicting geographical association 
of crime across areas.
For example, urban areas provide more available targets by the simple fact that 
these areas are more populous (so there exists more targets for inter-personal crime) and 
as a result have a greater stock of goods to steal (providing more targets for property
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crime). Also, the fact that urban areas are more populous means that diverse groups are 
likely to be located closer together than in less populated areas. Thus, poor areas may be 
located close to wealthy areas thus creating tension arising from inequalities experienced 
across the different areas. These inequalities lead to feelings of relative deprivation that 
may manifest themselves in crime.
Targets are often more vulnerable in urban areas, where individuals often do not 
have the resources to protect their properties (having alarms or security locks installed, 
for example). Moreover, inner city areas (in particular areas of social housing and 
housing estates) are often easier targets because of the architectural design of the 
buildings themselves (Newman 1972) or the streets in which they are situated (Hillier and 
Hanson 1984). The fact that properties in large urban areas are often less well maintained 
than other properties also makes urban areas more vulnerable. Wilson and Kelling (1982) 
show how areas descend into crime if attention is not paid to maintenance. A broken 
window gives the impression that no-one cares, so more and more windows are broken. If 
nothing is done about the broken windows, the situation escalates into more and more 
serious disorder and crime, as criminals (such as drug dealers, pimps and prostitutes) are 
attracted to the area and the respectable people (who have the means) leave.
Routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson 1979) also predicts crime will be 
spatially associated across areas depending on the level of guardianship in these areas. 
City areas have a higher proportion of single occupied dwellings than elsewhere and 
multiple occupant dwellings are often made up of groups of single people rather than 
family units. This means that properties in these areas are more likely to be left 
unoccupied than in other areas. Larger urban areas are also less likely to have any form of
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‘protective neighbouring’ (Schneider and Schneider 1978). There may also be a less 
developed sense of community in larger areas so it is less likely that neighbours will look 
out for one another or one another’s property. They are less likely to be involved in 
community groups such as neighbourhood watch schemes; less willing to take action if 
they see a crime in progress; less likely to report a crime or suspicious behaviour; and 
less likely to cooperate with the police in the event of a crime (Conklin 1986).
There are a wide range of theories that predict spatial association of crime across 
areas. While they differ in their reasons for this predicted association, most suggest that 
the spatial association of crime can be accounted for by differences across areas in 
criminal determinants. It is a test of this prediction generated from these theories which 
forms the subject matter of this Chapter.
3.3 Existing Empirical Work
Examining the geographical distribution of crime is not a new research activity. 
Although generally attributed to the Chicago School, maps locating the areas of crime 
date back to the previous century. Much of the early work on the geographical 
distribution of crime focused on the location of crime within a particular city. The most 
well known of course is Shaw and McKay’s (1942) study of Chicago. Work in the UK 
around this time included mapping the location of crime in London (Burt 1925) and 
Liverpool (Jones 1934), and later on in Cardiff (Herbert 1977), Luton (Timms 1965) and 
Sheffield (Baldwin and Bottoms 1976).3
2 The focus is on whether the spatial association o f  crime across areas can be accounted for by the location  
o f  other factors, rather than a test o f  which these theories is correct.
3 For a more up to date studies w hich use crime mapping techniques see Hirschfield and Bowers 2001.
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Since then data availability and statistical and mapping techniques have greatly 
increased the range and potential of spatial analytic studies. Over the more recent period 
spatial analysis has been used to examine the distribution of a wide range of phenomena, 
from fertility (Tolnay 1995) to disease (Marshall 1991) and child deaths (Gupta 1997), 
trade unions (Hedstrom 1994) and even the location of ant nests (Harkness and Isham 
1983). A number of studies have looked at the spatial patterning of crime. Much of this 
work has been done in the US. For example, Spilerman (1970) looked at the distribution 
of racial disorders in 673 US cities between 1961 and 1968. He found that racial 
disorders were not random occurrences, but that cities differed in the likelihood of racial 
disorder. The distribution of these disorders could not be explained by the structural 
factors of the cities, but by the individual values held by the black population in the cities.
Messner at al (1999) examined the spatial distribution of homicides in the 
counties that make up the St. Louis Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), plus three other 
counties in the surrounding MSA’s between 1979 and 1995. They relate the distribution 
of violent crime to the distribution of two principle components: a population structure 
component (which measures population size and density) and a resource component 
(measuring percentage black; percentage of families below the poverty line; median 
family income; the Gini coefficient of family income inequality; and the percentage of 
single parent families) and find clusters of high crime ’hot-spots' and low crime 'cool 
spots' which traditional correlates of crime are unable to account for.
Glaeser at al (1996) used crime recorded at city level in 1970, 1985 and 1986 and 
then New York data from 1993, to look at spatial differences in the propensities towards 
crime across cities. They found that even after controlling for underlying area
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characteristics, there remained geographical variation in the crime rates, which could not 
be explained. They attributed this variation to differences in social interactions.
Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) used videotaped observations of over 23,000 
streets in Chicago along with census data, police records and a local survey of 3,500 
residents to look at social and physical disorder in 196 neighbourhoods. They found that 
even after controlling for the structural characteristics of the neighbourhoods there 
remained differences in crime and disorder, which they argue could be explained by what 
they termed ‘collective efficacy’ (i.e. social cohesion among residents and the informal 
social control of public space).
Outside of the US, Murray et al (2001) used GIS crime mapping techniques to 
examine the distribution of crime in 541 suburbs around Brisbane, Australia in 1996. 
Their results show that crime is not randomly distributed. They identified clusters of 
areas with high crime rates, areas with low crime rates, areas of high crime surrounded by 
low crime and low crime areas surrounded by high crime which could not be explained 
by standard correlates of crime. They could only be explained by reference to geography, 
in particular the location of transportation routes and stops and the distance to the nearest 
police station.
In the UK a great deal of work that examines the geographical distribution of 
crime in the UK uses data from the British Crime Survey, which in the early periods 
identified the areas where the respondent resided. This made it possible for researchers to 
aggregate individual characteristics from the BCS to provide a picture of the area or 
neighbourhood (see for example Trickett et al 1992, 1995a, 1998) or match BCS areas to 
Census data (see Hale et al 1994, Osborn et al 1992, 1996 Osborn and Tseloni 1998,
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Trickett et al 1995b). Thus, Trickett et al (1992) aggregated the 1982 BCS to area level 
and found that the distribution of crime was non-random, in particular it depended on 
whether the area had a high crime rate or a low crime rate. While in low crime areas 
crime appears to be randomly located, in high crime areas crime is clustered across 
particular households. Trickett et al (1995a), looking at differences between the 1982 and 
1988 BCS, found that crime became more unevenly distributed across areas over time.
Osborn et al (1992) matched the 1984 BCS to 1981 Census data and, examining 
both household and area/neighbourhood characteristics, found that crime victimisation is 
unevenly distributed and that controlling for household and area characteristics only goes 
part of the way to explaining the distribution. Using data from the 1992 BCS matched to 
1991 Census data Osborne and Tseloni (1998) found that crime victimisation remains 
distributed in a non-random fashion even when the household and area characteristics, 
which are related to victimisation risk, are controlled for.
Using data on crimes reported to the police Brimicombe et al (2001) used a 
combination of statistical and GIS mapping techniques to look at the geographical 
distribution of racially motivated crimes in 24 wards that make up the London Borough 
of Newham. They found that the distribution of racially motivated crimes is related to the 
ethnic composition of the area, but after controlling for this, some areas have higher rates 
of racial crime than expected.
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3.4 Data and Descriptive Analysis
3.4.1 Crime Data
There are 43 police force areas in England and Wales and within each of these 
areas are a number of sub-areas referred to as Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership 
areas (CDRPs). There are 376 CDRPs in England and Wales, although in this Chapter 
only 3744 areas are considered. These areas correspond to Local Authorities.
While a number of studies have used data at police force area level (for example, 
Reilly and Witt (1996), Machin and Meghir (2000) and Hansen and Machin (2001)) there 
has been little work at this more disaggregate level (for exception see Bowers et al 2001 
or Chainey 2001). Data at this level are only available since April 1999 so it is not 
possible to carry out a comprehensive time series analysis. However, the large number of 
areas at this level (374) provides an excellent base to look at cross-sectional geographical 
variation in crime and its correlates. Moreover, because each CDRP covers only a small 
area, the data are well suited to examine more localised relationships in particular areas 
rather than assuming characteristics are homogenous within counties.
The crime data are crimes reported to and recorded by the police at CDRP level. 
They are examined separately for property crimes (burglary, theft of a motor vehicle and 
theft from a motor vehicle) and violent crime (violence against the person, sexual 
offences and robbery). These figures come from the Home Office publications on 
notifiable offences that can be accessed on the web at: www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds.
Because these are official statistics on recorded crime, as discussed previously, 
they are unlikely to represent the true level of crime, as not all crime is reported to or
4 The Scilly  Isles and the City o f  London have been dropped as there are too few  observations in these tw o  
areas.
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recorded by the police. Increased pressure on the public to report crime and on police to 
record it means that more crimes are appearing in the official statistics. As the data are 
for 2000, this will be especially true. Also as the data are a cross-sectional there is no 
concern about differences in reporting or recording practices over time. While some may 
believe that victimization surveys offer a more accurate reflection of crime, as Chapter 1 
noted, it is not obvious that this is necessarily true, as these types of surveys are 
themselves associated with potential problems (also see Brantingham and Brantingham 
1984 for more details). Moreover, official statistics form the only basis of nationally 
representative crime data at this very disaggregate area level.
The number of CDRPs within each police force area, along with aggregate 
property and violent crime rates, are shown in Table 3.1.
3,4.2 Labour Market Data
To these crime data are matched a set of possible correlates of crime. The first set 
of variables are labour market variables. As the crime data are available for a relatively 
short period of time, matching other variables over this period is an easier task than over 
longer periods. As such, the data are rich in regard to the correlates of crime. The labour 
market variables chosen for examination are the variables most often discussed in theory 
and found in existing empirical work to be the strongest predictors of crime.
Thus, a number of studies have found crime to be related to unemployment 
(Devine et al 1988, Pyle and Deadman 1994a, Levitt 1998). Others have shown that 
income is more important (Field 1998, Gould at al 2002), particularly wages at the 
bottom end of the distribution (Machin and Meghir 2000, Hansen and Machin 2001) and 
wage inequality (Hseigh and Pugh 1983, Fowles and Merva 1996).
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Table 3.1 Police Force Area and Sub-Areas
Police Force Number of Sub Areas Aggregate Property 
Crime Rate (per 1000 of 
population) in 2000
Aggregate Violent Crime 
Rate (per 1000 of 
population) in 2000
Avon and Somerset 9 29.81 12.70
Bedfordshire 4 27.99 11.29
Cambridgeshire 6 21.59 10.23
Cheshire 8 18.02 6.61
Cleveland 4 37.42 7.61
Cumbria 6 12.82 8.99
Derbyshire 9 22.47 10.81
Devon and Cornwall 16 17.32 8.51
Dorset 8 18.68 6.63
Durham 8 18.54 9.31
Dyfed-Powys 4 5.88 11.96
Essex 14 15.53 7.48
Gloucestershire 6 20.42 10.15
Greater Manchester 10 46.48 20.15
Gwent 5 19.20 26.74
Hampshire 14 16.27 10.82
Hertfordshire 10 18.30 5.17
Humberside 4 33.11 12.20
Kent 13 20.02 9.46
Lancashire 14 21.74 9.73
Leicestershire 9 24.85 13.27
Lincolnshire 7 16.60 6.71
London 32 32.68 28.11
Merseyside 5 30.56 13.71
Norfolk 7 16.98 8.14
North Wales 6 14.24 9.00
North Yorkshire 8 15.35 7.19
Northamptonshire 7 24.36 9.76
Northumbria 11 19.98 9.26
Nottinghamshire 8 36.38 16.61
South Wales 7 26.51 11.48
South Yorkshire 4 31.55 7.74
Staffordshire 9 27.36 19.51
Suffolk 7 12.58 10.37
Surrey 11 12.90 8.36
Sussex 13 21.31 12.87
Thames Valley 16 26.50 8.48
Warwickshire 5 20.29 6.14
West Mercia 13 15.87 7.73
West Midlands 7 37.44 23.72
West Yorkshire 5 41.69 10.56
Wiltshire 5 12.06 8.26
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Included in the data as labour market variables are ILO unemployment and a 
measure of the top and bottom of the income distribution in the area, measured as a 
standard deviation below and above the average income in the area. These measures 
come from a variety of sources including the Labour Force Survey and the Office for 
National Statistics regional data (all at Local Authority level) (see Appendix A for 
details). They capture not only labour market opportunities, but may also reflect 
residential segregation patterns i.e. packets of low price housing near high price housing 
created by area income inequality.
3.4.3 Dent ographic Data
The second set of variables matched to the crime data are population and 
demographic variables. As mentioned in the previous Chapter such variables are 
important because areas differ not only in their population size and density but also in the 
make-up of their population. All of these factors are likely to cause differences in crime 
across areas. The demographic variables considered in this model are the proportion 
male, the proportion non-white, the proportion under 25, the proportion of 16 to 19 year 
olds in full time education, the proportion of social housing and the proportion of lone 
parents.5 These variables have been chosen because past empirical work has found they 
may be important determinants of crime. For example, significant differences have been 
discovered between the offending rates of males and females (Graham and Bowling 
1995), whites and blacks (Blau and Blau 1982, Land, McCall and Cohen 1990) and 
whites and Asians (Graham and Bowling 1995, Flood-Page et al 2000). Differences in 
criminal participation by age have been well documented (Greenberg 1977, Hirschi and
5 A lso  included in the m odels is a variable that measures the extent o f  lone parents in the area claim ing lone  
parent incom e support. This is designed to capture the financial burden o f  lone parents.
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Gottfredson 1983 and Hansen 2001), as has the importance of gaining post-compulsory 
education (Lochner 1999 and Hansen 2001). Differences in housing tenure (Reilly and 
Witt 1996) and in family make up (Messner et al 1999, Levitt 1998, Levitt and Lochner 
2001) have also been shown to be related to crime.
3.4.4 Deterren ce Data
The final set of variables are deterrence measures. As mentioned in the previous 
Chapter, it is important to include a measure of deterrence in the area as economic 
theories of crime predict that this is very likely to be related to criminal activity in the 
area. Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) predicted that deterrence is one of the main 
considerations for people deciding whether or not to commit a crime. Freeman (1983) 
and Freeman and Rogers (1999) found that deterrence measures have an ability to reduce 
crime and that the effects of deterrence measures are more important than labour market 
and other variables on crime. Moreover, failing to include a measure of deterrence in the 
model (even though it may not be of primary interest), will bias the results as deterrence 
is likely to affect crime and is potentially correlated with the explanatory variables (see 
Appendix B for further discussion of bias). The deterrence variable included in this data 
is the crime specific clear-up rate in the area.
3.5 Methodology
The focus of this Chapter is two-fold: firstly, it looks at the spatial distribution of 
crime at CDRP level and secondly, it examines the extent to which the distribution of 
demographic and socio-economic variables are able to account for observed variations in 
the crime rates. The first part involves identifying patterns of spatial association in the
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crime rates of areas. To do this, GIS mapping techniques are used to plot the crime rates 
in the 374 CDRP areas on a map of England and Wales. From these maps, visual 
inspection allows identification of the location of crime and the discovery of geographical 
patterns in the data. However, as Messner et al (1999) point out visual inspection of maps 
are unable to accurately detect patterns in the data. The human eye is biased towards 
discovering patterns where none exist. So this must be supplemented with tools that allow 
the more rigorous analysis of the spatial distribution of crime. In this case, the Moran’s I 
statistic is used to identify significant spatial associations (see below for definition).
Having identified patterns in the distribution of crime, this Chapter goes on to 
examine which area characteristics are related to crime at CDRP level. This is done by 
carrying out a series of statistical regressions of property and violent crime on a number 
of possible explanatory variables (as detailed above). If any of these variables are 
associated with crime, controlling for them in the model should alter the geographical 
distribution of crime. To see if this is the case, the residual crime rates from the full 
model (i.e. the variation that can not be explained by the model) are plotted on a map of 
England and Wales and compared to the map of the raw crime rates. If the pattern looks 
more random with the inclusion of the explanatory variables, this means that the 
distribution of crime can be explained, at least in part, by the underlying area 
characteristics. Again Moran’s I statistics and maps are used to examine whether patterns 
in the residual crime rates across areas are statistically significant.
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3.6 Measures of Spatial Association
3.6.1 Raw Data Maps
The maps used in this paper are produced using a GIS package called ArcView, 
which allows the area crime data to be displayed on a map of England and Wales. Using 
graduated colour, where the colours change according to the amount of crime in each 
area, these maps are able to show the spatial location and distribution of crime. The 
distribution of property crime is shown in Figure 3.1. With the darker shading 
representing areas of higher crime, it is clear that property crime is higher in the more 
urbanised areas, with pockets of high crime around London, Birmingham and the areas 
surrounding Leeds, Bradford and Manchester. It is low in the geographically sparse areas 
such Wales.
The map for violent crime (Figure 3.2) produces similar results. Although violent 
crime looks more dispersed than property crimes, there remain clusters of high violent 
crime areas around London, Birmingham, Leeds and Manchester. There is also a pocket 
of high crime around Newport in South East Wales and Kings Lynn in East Anglia.
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Figure 3.1 The Distribution of Property Crime
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Figure 3.2 The Distribution of Violent Crime
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3.6.2 Moran’s I: Global Measure
While these maps provide excellent visual aids for examining the basic 
geographical distribution of crime, they do not provide a measure of the magnitude of 
spatial association, or any indication of whether the patterns observed could have 
occurred by chance. What is needed is a more formal measure of the spatial correlation of 
crime across areas. The classic indicator is the Global Moran’s I statistic (see Cliff and 
Ord 1973 or Anselin 1999). This statistic measures the degree of spatial clustering in the 
data in terms of the correlation between area-specific crime rates and the average crime 
rates in ‘neighbouring’ area-groups. This can be written as:
f  Cov(Xf>X,) } x .x .
Var(X,) XX?
i
where X { is the crime rate in a specific area and X i is the average crime rate in the 
neighbouring areas.
A given area’s ‘neighbouring’ crime rate is constructed as an inverse-distance 
weighted average of all other areas in the data set. Neighbouring areas that are closer to 
the initial area are given higher weights, while areas further away receive lower weights.6
Thus, Moran’s I is a statistical technique which, rather simply, tells us whether 
crime levels in an area are similar to crime levels in other areas. Just like the standard 
correlation coefficient, the statistic is bounded by -1 and 1. A value greater than zero 
indicates positive spatial correlation with high crime rate locations generally 
neighbouring other high crime rate locations, and low crime rate locations neighbouring 
other low crime rate areas. A negative value indicates that high crime areas tend to be
6 Although other weights may be constructed based on spatial proximity weighting schemes. When this is 
done the basic results are unchanged.
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close to low crime rate areas. If there is no systematic spatial pattern, the statistic is close 
to zero (the expected value with randomly distributed data is -l/(n -l)  in small samples).
The Moran’s I statistics for the raw data indicate some degree of positive spatial
association in crime rates across England and Wales, though the degree of spatial
association is quite low. The Global Moran’s I statistic for both measures of crime is 
higher than expected. In the case of violent crime the Moran’s I is .11837 (z = 17.463); 
for property crime it is .08146 (z = 14.589). Both are statistically significant at greater 
than the 1% level.
3.6.3 Moran’s I: Local Measure
The results presented so far suggest that on the whole neighbouring areas tend to 
have similar rates of crime. However, this has little meaning when we consider that 
England and Wales covers some 150,000 square kilometers and that there are 374 CDRPs 
within this area. It may well be the case that although there is a positive spatial
association overall, within this there are a number of different associations (see
O’Loughlin at al 1994).
To examine this possibility a Local measure of Moran’s I can be used to look for 
smaller pockets of spatial association within the overall picture. A local measure of 
Moran’s I is produced in the same way as the global measure but where the global 
measure is:
I  Cov(X„X,)
Var(X, ) ZX?
i
In other words:
x.x. X 2X 2 xnxn 1 1____ |______ l  L | _|______ n n
Var(Xl) Var(X2) ......... Var{Xn)
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The local measure just takes7:
I L = X tX t
Like its global counterpart the Local Moran’s I L measure not only identifies 
positive and negative spatial associations, but also tests whether these are statistically 
significant.
The null hypothesis is that there is no spatial association of crime rates across the 
areas of England and Wales. This is tested using a Bonferroni Correction method (see 
Ord and Getis 1995 for details). This is necessary as there are 374 areas which means that 
if we are interested in testing for statistical significance at the 5% level over 18 
observations will show statistically significant spatial associations just by chance. The 
Bonferroni Correction simply tests for statistical significance at the 5% level by removing 
the element of chance (dividing 5 by 374). This reduces the chance of committing a type 
I error -  rejecting the null hypothesis when it is in fact true.
Moreover, Local Moran’s I can be mapped using ArcView in a similar way to the 
raw crime rates. This can be seen in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, this time the shading represents 
statistically significant positive spatial associations (darkest red shading) or statistically 
significant negative spatial associations (darkest blue shading) using the Bonferroni 
Correction Method. The lighter coloured shading represents statistically significant 
associations at the 5% level using the less stringent, uncorrected level of significance 
(where, as discussed earlier, the chance of committing a type I error is higher).
Figure 3.3 shows that for property crimes the clustering of positively associated 
crime rates around London and Manchester, Leeds and Pembrokeshire visible in Figure
7 Thus the global measure is just the sum of all the local measures.
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3.1 is statistically significant. Going back to Figure 3.1, we can see that for the first three 
areas the positive association identified is high crime areas with high crime areas. In 
Pembrokeshire the positive association refers to the clustering of low crime areas 
together. For violent crime (Figure 3.4) the Local Moran’s I identifies fewer areas of 
spatial association, the predominant areas are those in London. There are smaller pockets 
of positive association in Manchester and South East Wales around Newport. These are 
all positively correlated high crime areas. The only areas of negative association are those 
areas around London which have low rates of violent crime compared to the high rates of 
crime in more central parts of London.
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Figure 3.3 Local Moran’s I for Property Crime
Ural IVfcraris l-FttpertyCrime 
p J  5%sigi neg (Bcnfenxh) 
LIJ 5% sign neg (no correction) 
L J  Insigiticanct 
j H Z I j  5%sigi pee (no oorrecticn) 
[_ □  5%sigi pee (Bonferrori)
Figure 3.4 Local Moran’s I for Violent Crime
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3.7 Regression Results
It is likely that some of the spatial association of crime across areas can be 
explained, at least in part, by the relationship crime has to a number of observable or 
measurable variables and the geographical distribution of these variables. To examine 
which area characteristics are associated with crime at this level, regression analysis is 
carried out with crime as the dependent variable and a number of variables that may be 
related to crime as the independent variables.
Because individuals can act in one of two ways: either a crime occurs and is 
recorded or it is not, the model used is a probit. This model is based on the assumption 
that the probability distribution in question (i.e. the probability of committing an 
offence), is normal and predicts probability Y=1 (i.e. a person commits an offence) 
compared to Y=0 (not committing an offence). However, this model is based on the 
actions of an individual and the data are ‘grouped data’, that is, each observation at 
CDRP level consists of a number of individuals. So in this case a grouped probit or 
normit model must be used, where the dependent variable becomes the ‘normit’ of the
o
proportion of individuals in an area who commit a crime (Greene, 2000).
The regressions are carried out separately for property crime and for violent 
crime. Table 3.2 shows the results from the property crime model. There are four 
specifications. The first (column (1)) is a simple regression of area crime rates on a 
number of variables designed to represent the demographic structure of the areas. The 
second (2) includes labour market variables, while the third (3) looks at the effect of the 
property crime clear-up rate. The final specification (4) includes all the variables
8 This is just a transformation of the proportion, 0 ( 1 1 , )  , where II  ( is the proportion and O  is the normal
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together.
The relationship between property crime and the demographic variables can be 
seen in column (1) of Table 3.2. The proportion of males in the area and the proportion of 
young people under the age of 25 are both positively associated with property crime. 
Both of these finding are statistically significant at a greater than 1% significance level. 
The proportion of social housing in an area and the proportion of single parents in an area 
also attract positive coefficients, statistically significant at a greater than 1 % significance 
level, while the proportion of 16 to 19 year olds in post compulsory education in an area 
is negatively associated with property crime. This finding again is statistically significant 
at a greater than 1% significance level.
Column (2) shows which labour market variables are related to property crime. 
The ILO measure of unemployment attracts a negative coefficient, but remains 
statistically insignificant, confirming the findings in the previous Chapter and much of 
the earlier work on crime and the labour market. Higher incomes at the lower end of the 
distribution reduce property crime, while income at the top end of the income distribution 
is positively associated with property crime. Both of these findings are statistically 
significant at a greater than 1% significance level. A fourth variable examined in this 
section is the proportion of people in the area claiming lone parent income support. This 
has been included to try to measure the effect of the relationship between single parent 
families and low pay and poverty (Desai et al 1999). This variable attracts a strongly 
positive coefficient, significant at a greater than 1% significance level.
Examining the coefficients on both income measures in column 2 it is clear that it
cumulative distribution function.
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is possible that both measures have an equal and opposite effect. When this is tested the 
F-test gives a statistic of 11.02, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, 
that the two measures are equal and opposite cannot be rejected. For this reason, as in 
Chapter 1, an inequality measure is constructed and entered into the model in column 3. 
This produces a positive coefficient on the measure of income inequality, which is 
statistically significant at a greater than 1% significance level. The results of the other 
labour market variables remain unaltered.
The property crime clear-up rate, shown in the fourth specification (4) attracts a 
positive coefficient (significant at the 5% level), which is counter-intuitive. This suggests 
that areas where a higher proportion of crimes are cleared up are also areas where more 
crimes take place. This may indicate that the variable is endogenous, thus giving spurious 
results produced by the fact that the data are a cross-section only rather than reflecting 
any true association. As discussed in the previous Chapter, cross-sectional methodology 
is susceptible to omitted variable bias, because it is unable to control for intervening 
factors that may be producing the relationship discovered. It may be the case that areas 
with more crime will have a larger police population with which to solve crimes.9
The final specification (5) examines the effect of all the independent variables on 
property crime. This full model slightly alters which factors are most associated with 
property crime at the local level, although many of the same factors discussed above 
remain important. Thus, the proportion of males in the area and the proportion of young 
people aged under 25, still attract a positive coefficient and remain statistically significant
9 Ideally we would also like information on the number of police officers. Unfortunately, police numbers 
are only available from the Home Office at police force areas and not at CDRP level. Data cannot be used 
from surveys which record occupations such as the NES, because as a sample they will have too few 
observations at this level.
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at a greater than 1% significance level in this full model. The proportion of 16-19 year 
olds in full time education is still negatively related to property crime (and is statistically 
significant at a greater than 1% level). The proportion of non-whites and the proportion 
of people living in social housing attract positive coefficients, but are statistically 
insignificant.
Both the proportion of lone parents in the area and the proportion of lone parents 
receiving income support attract positive statistically significant coefficients. But in terms 
of magnitude of effect the latter variable is clearly the more important of the two. Thus, 
the negative outcomes often attributed to the breakdown of the family and the rise of 
single parent families, such as crime, appear to be more related to the fact that single 
parent families are in greater financial need that many others in society rather than being 
a product of single parent families per se.
Of the labour market variables in the full model, the measure of income inequality 
remains unchanged from the previous specification. Income inequality is positively 
related to property crime. A finding which is statistically significant at the 5% level. In 
this final model, the measure of unemployment becomes statistically significant at the 5% 
level, indicating that areas with a larger proportion of the population who are 
unemployed, have lower property crime rates.10 This full specification also alters the 
previous counter-intuitive effect of the clear-up rate. The coefficient in this final model 
remains statistically insignificant.
10 This may indicate less opportunity for crime in areas where more people are unemployed. For example, 
there may be less goods to steal or greater guardianship of property.
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Table 3.2 Property Crime Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Basic Model 
(with 
Demographics)
Labour Market 
Variables
Labour
Market
(inequality)
Clear Up 
Rate
Full Model
Proportion Male .033***
(.033)
[.0021
.027***
(.007)
[.001]
Proportion under 
25
9 7 9 ***
(.326)
[.0521
.834***
(.289)
[.044]
Proportion of 16-19 
year olds in Full 
Time Education
-.130***
(.053)
[-.0071
_131***
(.051)
[-.0071
Proportion non­
white
.163
(.106)
[.009]
.146
(.118)
[.008]
Proportion Social 
Housing
.398***
(.092)
[.0 21]
.095
( .112)
[.0051
Proportion Lone 
Parents
1 90*** 
(.324) 
M011
.992***
(.423)
[.0521
Lone Parent 
Income Support
14.73***
(1.87)
[.813]
14.72***
( 1.8 6 )
[8121
8.39***
(2.27)
[.440]
ILO
Unemployment
-.325
(.495)
[-.018]
-.343
(.484)
[-019]
-.940**
(.440)
[-.0491
Bottom End of the
Income
Distribution
-.417***
(.122)
[-.0231
Top End of the
Income
Distribution
.439***
(.143)
[.024]
Income Inequality .412***
(.122)
[.0231
.283**
(.120)
[.015]
Property Crime 
Clear up Rate
2.18**
(.889)
[.137]
.354
(.566)
[019]
Obs 374 374 374 374 374
R-squared .565 .484 .483 .587 .611
Also includes controls for area size and population 
( ) Robust Standard Errors 
[ ] Marginal Effects
Table 3.3 reports the same set of specifications for violent crime. Thus, like the 
property crimes models, the first (column (1)) of Table 3.3 is a simple regression of area 
crime rates on a number of variables designed to represent the demographic structure of 
the areas. The second (2) includes labour market variables, the third (3) additionally
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examines a wage inequality measure, while the fourth (4) looks at the effect of the violent 
crime clear-up rate. The final specification (5) includes all the variables together.
As with property crime, the proportion of males in the area and the proportion of 
young people under the age of 25 are positively associated with violent crime (the first at 
a greater that 1% significance level, the second at the 10% level). However for violent 
crime the proportion of individuals in the area who are non-white also attracts a 
statistically significant positive coefficient. Again, as with property crime, in this 
demographic model the proportion of social housing and the proportion of lone parents in 
an area are both positively associated with violent crime and both statistically significant 
at a greater than 1% significance level.
Of the labour market variables shown in Column (2), the proportion unemployed 
and the measure of high income in an area are both positively associated with violent 
crime (significant at the 5% level). The indicator of low income attracts a negative 
coefficient, but remains statistically insignificant. This supports other research and 
findings in the previous Chapter that show violent crime to be more associated with 
higher disposable income (thus allowing people to go out more which increases the 
chance of personal violence). Moreover, when individuals do go out, they may be seen as 
more profitable targets for example, carrying more cash or mobile phones. The final 
labour market related variable is the proportion of individuals in the area claiming lone 
parent income support. This attracts a positive coefficient, statistically significant at a 
greater than 1% significance level.
As with the property crime specification the two income measures were tested 
against the hypothesis that they had an equal and opposite effect. When this was done the
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F-test produced a statistic of 3.47, which although smaller than the property crime model, 
is statistically significant at the 10% level. Thus, column 3 includes a measure of income 
inequality, which attracts a positive, but statistically insignificant coefficient. Including 
the income inequality measure does not affect the coefficient on the proportion of lone 
parents claiming income support, but it does however affect the measure of ILO 
unemployment, which is forced to statistical insignificance with the inclusion of this new 
wage measure. The violent crime clear up rate remains statistically insignificant when 
entered into the model in column 4.
The picture is greatly altered when all of the independent variables are included in 
the full model in column (5). Of all the variables discussed above only three remain 
statistically significant in the full model. Once again, this supports previous research and 
the findings from Chapter 2 which show that it is much more difficult to establish the 
determinants of violent crime than property crime. Thus, in the final model (5), the 
proportion of males, the proportion of non-whites and the proportion of people claiming 
lone parent income support in an area are positively associated with violent crime in an 
area.
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Table 3.3 Violent Crime Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Basic Model 
(with 
Demographics)
Labour
Market
Variables
Labour
Market
(inequality)
Clear Up 
Rate
Full Model
Proportion Male .045***
(.009)
[.0 0 1 ]
.058**
(.027)
[.0021
Proportion under 25 .603*
(.602)
[.018]
.379
(.283)
[.0 11 ]
Proportion of 16-19 year 
olds in Full Time 
Education
.021
(067)
[.0 0 1 ]
.023
(.060)
[.0 01 ]
Proportion non-white .875***
(.128)
[.026]
802***
(.138)
[.0241
Proportion Social 
Housing
.567***
(.115)
[.017]
.163
(.133)
[.005]
Proportion Lone Parents 1.32***
(.431)
[.0401
.042
(.373)
[.0 01 ]
Lone Parent Income 
Support
19.05***
(2.40)
[-5771
19.09***
(2.67)
[.582]
11 3 7 *** 
(2.80) 
[-335]
ILO Unemployment .938**
(.452)
[.028]
.706
(.458)
[.0 2 2 ]
-.585
(.439)
[-017]
Bottom End of the 
Income Distribution
-.208
(.168)
[-.006]
Top End of the Income 
Distribution
.541**
(.241)
[.016]
Income Inequality .149
(.182)
[.005]
.261
(.175)
r.oos]
Violent Crime Clear Up 
Rate
1.70
( 1.10)
[.0651
-.100
(.136)
[-.0031
Obs 374 374 374 374 374
R-squared .660 .635 .601 .014 .713
Also includes controls for area size and population 
( ) Robust Standard Errors 
[ ] Marginal Effects
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3.8 Residual Crime Rate Maps
The regression results indicate that there are a number of measurable 
characteristics that are associated with both property and violent crime. However, the 
variables were not able to account for the total variation in either type of crime. Thus, 
there remain a number of other factors that affect both types of crime which remain 
unmeasured. The degree to which the measured determinants are able to account for 
variations in the crime rate is given by the coefficient of determination (or the R squared). 
More specifically, this measures the proportion of variation in the crime rate that can be 
accounted for by variation in the explanatory variables (Gujarati 1995). This coefficient 
is given at the bottom of Table 3.2 for property crime and Table 3.3 for violent crime. We 
can see that even in the final model the regressions do not fully account for the entire 
variation in the crime rates. The models account for 61% of the variation in property 
crime and 71% of the variation in the violent crime rate. The variation not explained by 
the model is referred to as the residual sum of squares, in this case the residual crime.
Using ArcView, it is possible to plot the residual variation of crime on a map of 
England and Wales and compare it to the original distribution of the raw crime rates (i.e. 
the distribution of crime before the effect of the measured determinants were taken out) 
in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. The previous results showed that the measured variables account 
for the majority of the variation in crime. Therefore, we should expect the residual crime 
rates to be distributed more randomly. By examining Figure 3.5, we can see that this is 
indeed the case, residual property crime appears to be more dispersed than the raw 
property crime rates. However, there remains clustering of high crime rates around some 
of the larger cities such as London, Manchester, Doncaster and Leeds and clusters of low
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crime around the more rural areas of East Anglia and West Wales. Figure 3.6 reveals 
similar patterns for the residual violent crime rates. Although the general pattern looks 
more dispersed than the raw violent crime rates in Figure 3.2, pockets of high crime 
remain around London, Manchester and the West Midlands.
The Global Moran’s I for residual property crime of .04864 (z = 9.799) and 
.05123 (z = 9.850) for residual violent crime confirm that despite controlling for a range 
of factors which are associated with the location of crime, both types of crime remain 
positively spatially associated across England and Wales. However, the association is 
weaker than in the original data, indicating that controlling for the measurable area 
characteristics has reduced the overall level of spatial association of crime across areas.
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Figure 3.5 Residual Property Crime
N+
Residual Property Crime Rates 
| | -0.537--0.173
[ i -0.173--0.087 
H  -0.087- -0.015 
| -0.015-0.069 
i 0.069 - 0.394
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Figure 3.6 Residual Violent Crime
N+
Residual Violent Crime Rates 
[" □ -0 .451  --0.161 
] | -0.161 --0.086 
|  -0.086- -0.013 
( -0 .0 1 3 -0 .0 6 2  
|  0.062 - 0.379
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The areas of spatial association can be located by calculating Local Moran’s I 
statistics for the residual crime rates and plotting them on a map of England and Wales. 
When this is done (in Figure 3.7) we can see that for residual property crime, there are 
fewer areas where crime is spatially correlated. However, there remains spatial 
association of property crime across a number of areas.
Areas of positive association are located around Windsor, Manchester and 
Nottingham. These are areas of high residual property crime surrounded by other areas of 
high residual property crime, where the areas characteristics have not been able to 
account for much of the crime in the area. There are also a number of areas with positive 
association where low residual crime rate areas are surrounded by other low residual 
crime rate areas. These are located in the extreme North East, around Berwick-Upon- 
Tweed. These are areas with low property crime rates once the area characteristics have 
been controlled for.
There are also some locations where residual property crime is negatively 
associated across areas. However, there are fewer of these than positive associations. 
Here areas with low residual property crime rates are surrounded by areas of higher 
residual crime rates. East Riding and some areas in the Midlands are examples of this 
type of spatial patterning.
Figure 3.8 shows the results of the Local Moran’s I for residual violent crime on a 
map of England and Wales. It is clear that violent crime is less spatially associated across 
areas than property crime, though this was also true of the local measure of association in
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the original data.11 For violent crime, the dominant pattern of spatial association is 
positive. The areas around St. Albans and Stockton-on-Tees are low residual violent 
crime areas surrounded by other areas of low residual violent crime. On the other hand, 
Staffordshire and Newport exhibit positive association of high residual crime rates. There 
is some evidence of negative association around Shropshire, which is an area of low 
residual violent crime surrounded by higher crime areas.
The interesting thing to note is that while spatial association remain in the residual 
data, the location of these associations are different from the original data. This suggests 
that the spatial association in the raw data, which was produced by the geographical 
distribution of the measurable determinants of crime, dominated other associations. Once 
the effect of the measurable characteristics were netted out in the statistical regression 
models, other forms of statistical associations were produced by the unmeasurable 
determinants of crime. In the raw crime rate data, the spatial patterns for both types of 
crime were dominated by positive associations of high crime rates around the large city 
areas such as London. In the residual data this is much less true. This possibly suggests 
that much of the rural / urban crime differential can be explained by differences in the 
characteristics of these areas.
11 To some extent this is to be expected violent crime is likely to be much more idiosyncratic and 
individual than property crime
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Figure 3.7 Local MoraiTs I for Residual Property Crime
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Fieure 3.8 Local Moran’s I for Residual Violent Crime
Local Moran's F Residual Violent Crime 
| ^ |  5% sign neg (Bonferroni)
■  5% sign neg (no correction)
I Insignificant
I 5% sign pos (no correction)
ID  5% sign pos (Bonferroni)
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3.9 Concluding Remarks
This Chapter has examined the distribution of crime across 374 CDRP areas in 
England and Wales. The findings show that crime is not randomly located but that in 
general, as Moran’s I statistic identified, there exists positive spatial association across 
areas. Areas of high crime are located near to other high crime areas and low crime areas 
are located near to other low crime areas. Using a local measure of Moran’s I statistic 
clusters of both positive and negative association were discovered, although positive 
spatial associations were more prevalent.
Statistical regression analyses found that some of the spatial association could be 
explained by the variation in a number of measurable variables. The variables that were 
found to be statistically significant (and thus able to explain at least some of the spatial 
association of crime across areas for property crime), were related to the age, sex 
educational level, labour market position and financial situation of the individuals living 
in the area. Property crime was found to be higher in areas with a higher proportion of 
males in the area, a higher proportion of young people aged under 25 and a lower 
proportion of 16-19 year olds in full time education. Property crime was also higher in 
areas with a higher proportion of lone parents and individuals claiming lone parent 
income support; in areas where the income inequality is greater; and where a greater 
proportion of the population is unemployed.
Like the previous Chapter, it was harder to uncover the determinants of violent 
crime than property crime. Nevertheless, some factors were found to be significantly 
related to violent crime. Areas with a higher proportion of males, a higher proportion of 
non-whites and a higher proportion of people claiming lone parent income support had
139
higher rates of violent crime than other areas.
After controlling for differences in the measurable area characteristics, the 
remaining spatial association of crime across areas was attributable to unmeasured
1 9factors. Although on the whole, these unmeasured characteristics produced less spatial 
association (as indicated by the lower value of the global Moran’s I), they did produce 
some spatial associations. Those that were produced were different in nature to the 
patterns produced by the measurable variables.
The spatial association produced by the measurable characteristics were 
dominated by positive associations of high crime rates around the large city areas such as 
London. This is not true of the spatial patterns produced by the unmeasurable 
determinants of crime. This provides evidence that much of the rural / urban crime 
differential can be explained by differences across these areas in their measurable 
characteristics.
While these findings shed light on the spatial association of crime across 
relatively small areas of England and Wales (which have not received much attention 
from researchers in the past), there are some limitations to this work. Because this is 
relatively early days in terms of data collection at this level, the analysis in this Chapter is 
based on a cross-section. The previous Chapter showed that statistical regression 
analysis, using such data, are vulnerable to omitted variable bias. The potential problem 
of omitted variable bias is reduced here by adding a large number of independent 
variables to the right hand side of the statistical regression models.
Thus, methodologically, this research should perhaps be viewed as a type of pilot
12 These include any factors that have not been incorporated in the model, that have an affect on crime. At 
this stage we must rely on theory and common sense to inform us what such factors might be, but possible
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study in the early days of data collection. The descriptive analysis brings to light some 
important issues that can be addressed with more rigorous testing approaches, when more 
data becomes available at this level.
examples include peer pressure, non-residential land use, transportation nodes, or even the weather.
4. Crime and the Minimum Wage: 
A Quasi-Natural Experiment
4.1 Introduction
The way in which the volume of criminal activity moves over time, and what 
factors lie behind its evolution, have been important research and public policy questions 
for many years. Earlier Chapters considered the way a number of possible determinants 
of criminal behaviour could impinge upon crime and found low wages to be a robust 
indicator of criminal involvement. These findings are consistent with other work in the 
area of crime and the labour market.
This Chapter focuses on the relationship between crime and low wages in a rather 
different way than previous research on crime and the labour market. If one thinks that 
differential wage opportunities matter for crime, then presumably the best way of testing 
for the existence of a crime-wage link is to look at a situation where people on the 
margins of criminal participation receive a (potentially large) wage increase. Such a 
situation is offered when a binding Minimum Wage floor is introduced to a labour market 
that was not previously regulated by Minimum Wage legislation. This was the case when 
a National Minimum Wage (NMW) was introduced to the UK labour market in April 
1999. If labour market conditions are related in an important way to crime, or an 
individual’s propensity to commit criminal acts are altered by changing labour market
opportunities, then one may well see changes in crime occur in the time period 
surrounding Minimum Wage introduction.
4.2 Empirical Work on Crime and the Labour Market
Early empirical work in this area tended to focus heavily on links between crime 
and unemployment. Surveys of this work by Freeman (1999), Box (1987) and Chiricos 
(1987) report that the relationship between crime and unemployment appears fragile at 
best. Some studies have detected a positive relationship between crime and 
unemployment (Land, McCall and Cohen 1990, Levitt 1998), but this is often more easily 
found in studies using individual longitudinal data (see, for example, Thomberry and 
Christenson 1985; West 1982 for the UK). The same is true if specific1, rather than 
aggregate, unemployment rates are examined. However, other studies that show a 
statistically significant unconditional correlation between crime and unemployment, find 
that once other variables are taken into account, the relationship between crime and 
unemployment disappears (examples are Butcher and Piehl 1998 for the US and Machin 
and Meghir 1999 for England and Wales). Even stronger than this, others have found 
there to be no relationship between crime and unemployment at all (Cullen and Levitt 
1999).
This weak pattern of results is not so surprising when one realises that there are a 
number of conceptual reasons why unemployment may not be the most appropriate 
labour market variable to examine in relation to crime. Because criminal participation is 
unlikely to be something that most individuals enter into lightly crime may well be more 
responsive to long term labour market measures than to short run ones such as 
contemporaneous unemployment (Gould et al 2002). Indeed, there is a much larger group
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of individuals who, although in employment, are in insecure low paid, low skill jobs, or 
in part time or temporary work; who are economically and socially marginalized. 
Moreover, by the very fact that they are employed and socially connected, these people 
may be in a better position to commit crimes than the unemployed (see Box 1987, Fagan 
and Freeman 1999, Grogger 1998).2
Because of this a number of studies have looked at broader measures of crime and 
the labour market. Using the 1939 Boston Cohort Sampson and Laub (1993) find job 
stability to be negatively related to subsequent criminal behaviour. Looking specifically 
at violent offences, Crutchfield (1989) finds labour instability to be a significant predictor 
of overall violence, murder, assault and robbery. The link between job stability and 
crime has also been highlighted in UK research by West and Farrington (1977) and 
Farrington (1986).
Along the same lines, Allan and Steffensmeier (1989) find the quality of work to 
be important in relation to crime. For young adults there is a strong association between 
working less than the preferred number of hours and crime. In his UK study, Hale (1999) 
finds that changes in the structure of employment are related to crime, in particular shifts 
from manufacturing to the service sector, increasing part time and temporary jobs and 
changes between male and female employment. Similarly, and again based on UK data, 
Farrington et al (1986) find that individuals are more likely to offend if they work in low 
status jobs.
A related issue explored in other research is the role of economic incentives. The 
US evidence of Fowles and Merva (1996) and Hsieh and Pugh (1983) find poverty to be
1 This is usually the unemployment rate of young males (as in Freeman and Rogers (1999) and Allan and 
Steffensmeier (1989) for the US and Reilly and Witt (1996) for the UK).
2 In the 1980 wave of the National Longitudinal Study of Youths (NLSY) over half of those working 
reported that they had committed some crime and one fifth of those working had committed at least 1 
income producing crime (Fagan and Freeman 1999, Grogger 1998). In Fagan’s (1992) study more than 
25% of drug dealers were also working.
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positively related to crime (the latter looked at violent crimes only). Other US studies link 
the rise in crime to widening wage inequality, which has been experienced since the 
1970s as a result of a decline in both relative and absolute wages at the bottom end of the 
market (Fowles and Merva 1996, Blau and Blau 1982, Hsieh and Pugh 1983). Similarly, 
Witt, Clarke and Fielding (1999) look at police force area data in England and Wales 
from 1988 to 1996, and find that changes in wage inequality are positively correlated
a
with changes in crime.
By looking at the wage rates of low skilled workers a more recent body of work 
has concentrated on those at the bottom of the wage structure rather than looking at the 
gap between the top and the bottom of the wage or income distribution. Gould et al 
(2002) look at the relationship between changes in crime and changes in wages across 
areas in the US between 1979 and 1995 and report that the falling wages of unskilled men 
in this period led to a rise in burglary of nearly 14%, a rise in larceny/theft of around 7%, 
a 9% increase in aggravated assault and an 18% rise in robbery. From data on the police 
force areas of England and Wales between the mid- 1970s and mid- 1990s, Machin and
tilMeghir (2000) look at cross-area changes in crime in relation to changes in the 25 
percentile of the area wage distribution. They find a negative correlation between 
particular types of crime (theft and handling, burglary, vehicle crime and total property 
crime) and low wages, even after controlling for other variables such as measures of 
demographic change and measures of deterrence. Finally, Grogger (1998) uses data from 
the US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to look at the relationship between wages 
and property crimes for young people. He reports results which show falling real wages
3 A smaller body of work has looked at other measures of economic activity. For example, Witt and Witte 
(2000) consider the relation between crime and female labour supply, reporting results based on US time 
series showing common trends in crime and female labour force participation.
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not only offer an explanation of the rise in youth crime in the 1970s and 1980s but also of 
the differences in criminal involvement between age and ethnic groups.
These latter findings are clearly in line with the idea that economic incentives are 
important for crime. Moreover, they also suggest that wage measures, especially 
measures for workers towards the lower end of the wage distribution, may provide better 
measures of the state of the labour market for people on the margins of crime than 
unemployment.
This Chapter also looks at crime and wages, but by adopting a different 
methodological approach compared to other work. Examining what happened to crime 
before and after the introduction of the National Minimum Wage (NMW) to the UK 
labour market in April 1999. This provides a good testing ground for looking at the 
impact of a wage change for people deciding whether to participate in, or desist from, 
crime as the wage increases received by low wage workers were sizable. Metcalf (1999) 
estimates that about 2 million workers would receive wage gains from the imposition of 
the NMW. Moreover, the average wage gain for workers paid less than the NMW of 
£3.60 per hour (£3.00 for 18-21 year olds) before its introduction was estimated to be of 
the order of 30 percent.4
4.3 Why Should There Be A Link Between Crime and Low Wages?
Theoretically there are a number of reasons for thinking that low wages should be 
related to crime and how the introduction of a Minimum Wage would affect this 
relationship. Firstly, as Chapter 1 discussed simple choice theoretic models of crime (e.g.
4  That a large number of workers (though probably not as high as Metcalfs 9 percent) benefited is borne 
out by the ex-post study of Labour Force Survey data before and after minimum wage introduction by 
Dickens and Manning (2001). Their study shows a significant impact of the minimum wage on the wage 
distribution, with around 6  to 7 percent of workers getting wage gains. Interestingly, whilst they show 
sizable gains at lower percentiles of the distribution, they also report very little evidence of spillover effects 
up the wage distribution.
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Becker 1968 or Ehrlich 1973) propose that individuals have a choice between crime and 
work, or more generally they choose to allocate their time across crime-work space. 
These decisions are a function of a number of factors, including expected earnings from 
crime, expected earnings from the labour market, and perceptions of the severity of the 
punishment if one gets caught. Seen as a simple work/crime decision this explains why 
people with no work may decide to partake in crime. But at a more complex level, this 
can also shed light on how individuals who are employed may decide to commit crimes 
and the extent to which they allocate their time between work and crime (as already noted 
above, we know that many people do both). Thus, an increase in legal wages brought 
about by the introduction of the National Minimum Wage should reduce the incentive to 
participate in illegal activities, thus bringing the crime rate down. Also by raising wages 
workers now have more to lose by getting caught, which should also act to discourage 
criminal activity and reduce crime.5
Of course, these simple choice based models of crime have themselves been 
called into serious question for their relatively simplistic assumptions about criminal 
behaviour. But other theoretical approaches generate a relation between crime and low 
wages. For example, anomie and strain theory (Merton, 1957), predicts that people with 
low wages are likely to suffer financial hardship, sometimes in similar ways to those who 
are unemployed. This financial hardship means that low paid individuals are encouraged 
by society to strive for culturally approved goals such as material success but are unable 
to achieve these goals because of their weak labour market position. This disjunction 
between what Young (1999) referred to as ‘cultural inclusion’ but ‘structural exclusion’, 
(i.e. the difference between the desire to and ability to achieve goals), causes anomie,
5 It is something of an unanswered question as to whether the economic model is only relevant to non­
violent crimes for which monetary incentives may alter behaviour or whether it can also be extended to the
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normlessness or strain. This may well encourage individuals to commit acquisitive crimes 
either for themselves or to sell for cash in order to obtain the goods they cannot afford. It 
may also lead to feelings of frustration or anger, which may well manifest themselves in 
violence. Thus, we would expect low wages to be associated with relatively high rates of 
both property and violent crimes. An increase in wages brought about by the introduction 
of the Minimum Wage may ease the strain, which may well lead to a reduction of both 
types of crime.
Over and above the disjunction between the goals and the means faced by the low 
paid, their situation is worsened by the fact that most of them will be in jobs where 
promotion or career advancement is hard (if not impossible). Thus their opportunities to 
have money and status may appear blocked. Unable to achieve success legally, these 
individuals may be forced to resort to illegal methods. Moreover, such individuals are 
more likely to live in poorer areas where it is possible illegal opportunities to achieve 
goals are more abundant than legal opportunities (Cloward 1959). In these areas, there 
may also be peer pressure to get involved in crime (Cloward and Ohlin 1960) or 
increased opportunity for learning criminal behaviour through association and interaction 
with other criminals (Sutherland 1924, Akers 1964). As noted above, the introduction of 
the Minimum Wage in the UK raised wages of the low paid by a sizable amount and, in 
doing so, may well have reduced the need to turn to crime to achieve success or status. 
Eventually, it may even give people the power to migrate to better areas where there is 
less criminal peer pressure, although this would be much more long term.
Moreover, by increasing the wages of the low paid, the Minimum Wage may 
provide enough of an increase in spending power and financial security to dissuade the
case of violent crime. Various researchers have taken different stances upon this (though see Grogger 2000 
for an interesting attempt to apply the economic model to violent crime).
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low paid from turning to the black market for goods. In this way, by reducing the demand 
for crime, the Minimum Wage would lead to a reduction in crime.
Finally, as employment is one of the major institutions through which social 
bonds are formed between individuals and society, social control theory predicts that 
employees with low paid jobs may be less attached to society (Hirshi 1969, Box 1971). 
Thus, crime rates may be high amongst those in low paid jobs as social controls will be 
less able to deter them from breaking the law. If wages are increased due to the 
implementation of the National Minimum Wage, this may act as a mechanism for 
strengthening the social bonds between the low paid and society. More tied to society and 
therefore more constrained by social controls this group will be less likely to commit 
crimes.
Thus, there are a number of potential explanations as to why the introduction of 
the Minimum Wage may influence crime and help us try to pin down a link between 
crime and the low wage labour market. These ideas form the basis of the hypothesis that 
the introduction of the Minimum Wage may have the potential to reduce crime.
4.4 Methodology
The empirical methodology utilised in this Chapter involves comparing what 
happened to crime rates before and after the Minimum Wage introduction in the police 
force areas of England and Wales. Changes in various crime rates before and after 
Minimum Wage introduction are related to the initial proportion of low wage workers 
(i.e. those paid less than the Minimum Wage prior to its introduction) in those areas. This 
is much the same methodology as that adopted in some US work (notably Card 1992) to 
look at the relationship between employment and minimum wages in US states before 
and after the large federal Minimum Wage increase of April 1990. Identification of the
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minimum wage effect comes from the fact that there are more low wage workers in some 
areas than others and therefore the Minimum Wage should be thought of having more of 
an effect there than in areas where there are fewer low wage employees. As Card puts it:
‘From an evaluation perspective  a uniform minimum wage is an under-
appreciated asset. A rise in the federal minimum wage will typically affect a 
larger fraction o f workers in some states than in others. This variation 
provides a simple natural experiment for measuring the effect o f legislated 
wage floors, with a “treatment effect ” that varies across states depending on 
the fraction o f workers initially earning less than the new minimum ’.
Card, 1992 p.22
This approach to looking at crime and the labour market is founded upon the idea 
that a sizable change in labour market opportunities has the potential to alter an 
individual’s incentive to participate in crime. The theoretical approaches outlined in the 
previous section highlights an individual’s propensity to commit crime, say C,6 will 
depend on a number of factors. In general terms, C = C(Wc, p, S, W, Z) where Wc is the 
earnings from a successful crime, p is the probability of being caught, S is the 
punishment, W is the earnings available on the legitimate job market and Z are other 
factors relevant for crime. According to the theoretical approaches, the C(.) function 
depends positively on Wc and negatively on p, S and W. It therefore reveals a clear trade 
off between perceived earnings from crime and formal labour market activities. One can 
aggregate the C(.) function to area-level so that C(.) becomes the area-specific crime rate
6 C may reflect a discrete 0-1 choice between work and crime or may reflect the allocation of hours per 
week between formal labour market activity and criminal actions (see, for example, Ehrlich 1973). As the 
focus is on wages and crime, the latter is probably more appropriate.
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(= the number of people engaging in crime divided by the population). The empirical 
approach, based on looking at the differential impact of the Minimum Wage introduction 
across areas, can be thought of as providing a positive (and sizable) increase in W. As 
long as its impact is not offset by coincidental changes in Wc, p, S or Z (which seems 
highly unlikely in the short time period considered), one should see crime fall in areas 
where W has the potential to rise by more.
The main factors in Z (i.e. the other determinants of crime), are likely to be those 
other factors that influence both the supply and demand for crime. In a simple supply- 
demand framework, the demand side can be thought of as being characterised by an 
inverse relation between crime and criminal earnings, while the supply side is driven by 
the wage and criminal justice system variables. The demand for crime is likely, at least to 
some extent, to be shaped by demographics (e.g. if there are more well-off consumers 
perhaps the pickings from crime may be more lucrative) and so demographic changes 
over the short time period are also considered.
Thus, in summary, the empirical approach in this Chapter will compare changes 
in area-specific crime rates before and after the introduction of the NMW in April 1999. 
The quasi ‘natural experiment’ created by the fact that some areas have more low wage 
workers than others will be exploited to see if the Minimum Wage had the potential to 
reduce crime in the time period surrounding the Minimum Wage introduction.
7 These are: change in average age, change in the population share of young (<25) men, change in 
proportion black, change in population share with no educational qualifications, change in proportion 
female, change in share of public sector jobs.
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4.5 Data on Crime and the Labour Market
4.5.1 Crime Data
The crime data used in this Chapter are offences reported to and recorded by the 
police at police force area level in England and Wales over a two year period. The first 
period is the financial year prior to the introduction of the National Minimum Wage 
(April 1998 to March 1999) and the second is the year following its introduction (April 
1999 to March 2000).8
As noted previously, there are 43 police force areas in England and Wales. 
However, as in Chapter 2, these are aggregated to form 41 areas. This is done for two 
reasons. First of all the, City of London and Metropolitan police force areas are 
aggregated to a single London area because the low resident population produces 
artificially high crime rates in the City of London.9 Secondly, because of a boundary 
change that occurred in Gwent and South Wales in the mid-1990s (and because some of 
the models use data from earlier periods), these two Welsh police forces are analysed 
together as well.
Four different types of crime are examined: the total number of notified offences; 
the number of property crimes (defined as burglary plus theft and handling); vehicle 
crimes (theft of a vehicle, theft from a vehicle, aggravated vehicle taking, vehicle
8 As has been discussed in Chapter 1, using the official statistics may mean we are overlooking the crimes 
that are either not reported to, or recorded by the police. However, because of increased public awareness 
and legal requirements to report crimes, coupled with more precise recording practices by the police, most 
crimes that do not appear in the official statistics are the more trivial offences. These issues were discussed 
at length in Chapter 1 and again in Chapters 2 and 3, but for a recent discussion and more details on 
possible under-reporting problems, described as the ‘dark figure’ of crime, see McDonald (2001). 
Moreover, as Chapter 1 also noted in England and Wales the official statistics provide the only source of 
data on crimes by police force area. The British Crime Survey (which as a victim survey, some argue, 
captures, at least partially, the ‘dark figure’ of crime) does not have (publicly available) information on 
areas. A particular strength in this Chapter is that most o f the analysis is based upon changes over short 
time periods which means that the results are unlikely to be contaminated by reporting biases of this kind. 
(See Appendix B for further discussion of bias). Indeed, McDonald (2001) makes the very point that time 
series analyses may suffer from bias problems because the under-reporting of crime varies systematically 
with the economic cycle. The short time period of study is a clear advantage in this regard.
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interference and criminal damage to a vehicle); and violent crimes (violence against the 
person).
As the focus of this Chapter is on the possible links between crime and monetary 
measures, then one may plausibly ask why this analysis looks at violent crimes as well as 
non-violent crimes. Although the justification for looking at non-violent crimes is very 
clear from the economic model, many commentators would argue that violent crimes are 
much less likely (if at all) to be shaped by monetary factors (Devine et al 1998, Gould et 
al 2002). However, this is essentially an unresolved issue and one can put forward 
arguments both ways. A number of studies find that economic incentives matter for 
violent crime (see for example, Blau and Blau 1982, Merva and Fowles 1996, Grogger 
2000). This relationship is often mediated through the link between crime and drugs 
(Merva and Fowles 1996, Wilkinson 2001). Hence, this Chapter presents empirical 
models of both property and violent crime.
4.5.2 Labour Market Data
The labour market variables are obtained by aggregating individual-level data to 
police force area. This was done using data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS), 
matched using a county level identifier to the police force areas. The principal measure 
used to look at whether the Minimum Wage introduction had a differential effect by 
police force area, is a variable which measures the proportion of workers paid beneath the 
hourly minimum in the year before its introduction (£3.60 for people aged 22+, £3.00 for 
18-21 year olds). This variable is used to gauge the extent to which there is a differential 
impact of the Minimum Wage across police force areas. Towards the end of the Chapter, 
other variables measuring the nature of the low wage labour market are also considered 
as a robustness check of the main findings.
9 This actually makes no difference in practice, as the descriptive statistics and regression results are
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The empirical models also control for a number of other factors which theory and 
past empirical work inform us could be influencing the relationship between crime and 
the introduction of the Minimum Wage. These include changes in the demographic 
structure of areas or in the likelihood of detection that could be occurring during the time 
period examined. The demographic variables considered come from the LFS and are area 
measures of average age, the population share of women, of young (<25) men, of those 
with no educational qualifications and the share of public sector jobs in total 
employment. The crime clear-up rate (namely the proportion of crimes that were solved 
by the police in each area) is used to capture changes in detection rates that may coincide 
with the time periods of study.
One other variable of particular interest, which is derived from the LFS, is the 
area unemployment rate. It is possible that connections exist between changes in crime 
and changes in the unemployment rate. There are at least two reasons why this research 
needs to examine this possibility. First, a lot of the existing crime research has focused on 
the link between crime and unemployment. Secondly, there has been a great deal of 
discussion as to whether the Minimum Wage would actually increase unemployment by 
pricing workers out of jobs. There is only very weak and fragile evidence on the first 
question but the nature of the data means we can take another look at it here. With regard 
to the second point, and more importantly, to date there is little evidence that the 
introduction of the UK Minimum Wage was detrimental to jobs (Stewart 2001) except in 
some sectors that are very vulnerable to the Minimum Wage due to having large numbers 
of low wage workers (such as the care homes sector studied in Machin et al 2001). 
However, it is important here to allow for a possible unemployment effect of the
population weighted. But it seems neater and more natural to aggregate the two London areas together.
154
Minimum Wage that may arise due to its differential impact on wages across areas. This 
is done in the empirical work presented in this Chapter.
4.6 Descriptive Analysis
Table 4.1 begins the empirical analysis by showing the relationship between area 
wage structures and the extent of low pay prior to the introduction of the Minimum 
Wage. This is done by dividing areas into groups on the basis of the proportion of people 
paid beneath the National Minimum Wage in the year prior to its introduction. The police 
force areas of England and Wales were divided up into four areas described as ‘most low 
pay’ (where over 11.7 percent of workers were paid beneath the minimum in the initial 
period), ‘second most low pay’ (between 10.2 and 11.7 percent beneath the minimum), 
‘second least low pay’ (between 7.5 and 10.2 percent) and ‘least low pay’ (less than 7.5 
percent below the minimum). The Table shows the hourly wage at different percentile 
points of the wage distribution for each of these areas and then changes over time for 
each area, together with gaps in the change between the ‘most low pay’ and ‘least low 
pay’ areas. These latter changes (given in bold) can be thought of as ‘difference-in- 
difference’ estimates of the impact of the Minimum Wage on different points of the wage 
distribution.
The upper panel of the Table focuses on the 10th percentile of the hourly wage 
distribution, whereas the lower panels consider the 25th, 50th and 90th percentiles. The 
upper panel of the Table shows there to have been quite sizable wage increases at the 10 
percentile in the period surrounding Minimum Wage introduction. Furthermore, the scale
i L
of these increases was different across areas, with the ‘most low pay’ area 10 percentile 
increasing by 35 pence per hour and the ‘least low pay’ area also increasing significantly, 
although only by 18 pence per hour. The difference-in-difference estimate of 17 pence
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per hour (which is statistically significant) shows a stronger beneficial impact of the 
Minimum Wage on the 10th percentile to have occurred in low wage areas.
However, like other research in this area (notably Dickens and Manning, 2001) 
the Minimum Wage does not seem to impact higher up the distribution. There are no 
differences across areas at the 25th percentile where the changes in hourly wages are very 
similar across areas (the difference-in-difference estimate now being only 1 pence, and 
completely insignificant). The same is true at the median. At the top of the distribution 
the opposite occurs and the 90th percentile grows by more in the ‘least low pay’ areas, 
though this will be for reasons unconnected to the Minimum Wage introduction. 
Nevertheless there is an important impact on wage structures that differs across areas at 
the lower end of the distribution.
Table 4.2 looks at changes in crime rates (defined as crimes per 1000 population) 
across the same group of four areas as in Table 4.1. Looking at the difference-in- 
difference estimates (given in bold), a very clear pattern emerges. For all four types of 
crime, there seems to be a reduction of crime in the ‘most low pay’ areas as compared to 
the ‘least low pay areas’. For example, the year-on-year change in the total crime rate 
was around 11.6 crimes lower per 1000 people (comparable numbers for property, 
vehicle and violent crimes being 6.3, 3.2 and 1.6 respectively). Furthermore, for the non­
violent crimes, this gap seems to be driven by crime falling in the areas with more low 
paid workers and rising in the areas with few low paid workers. For violent crimes, the 
crime rate appears to increase across all areas, but by less where there are more low wage 
workers.
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Table 4.1 The Introduction of the National Minimum Wage And Area Hourly
Wage Structures
Year Before 
Introduction
Year After Introduction Change 
(Standard Error)
10th Percentile
Most Low Pay 3.25 3.60 .35 (.03)
2nd Most Low Pay 3.43 3.70 .26 (.03)
2nd Least Low Pay 3.58 3.82 .24 (.06)
Least Low Pay 3.96 4.13 .18 ( .1 0 )
Most Low Pay -  Least 
Low Pay
-.71*** (.06) . 5 4 *** ( 08) .17* (.06)
25th Percentile
Most Low Pay 4.17 4.40 .23 (.06)
2nd Most Low Pay 4.39 4.61 .22 (.07)
2nd Least Low Pay 4.63 4.90 .27 (.12)
Least Low Pay 5.22 5.45 .23 (.18)
Most Low Pay -  Least 
Low Pay
-1.06*** (.13) I © * * * . 0 1  (.06)
SO411 Percentile
Most Low Pay 5.80 6.09 .30 (.11)
2nd Most Low Pay 6.13 6.47 .34 (.12)
2nd Least Low Pay 6.55 6.97 .42 (.25)
Least Low Pay 7.51 7.81 .30 (.38)
Most Low Pay -  Least 
Low Pay
-1.71*** (.26) -1.72*** (.29) - . 0 1  (.1 0 )
90th Percentile
Most Low Pay 12.19 12.59 .41 (.24)
2nd Most Low Pay 12.63 12.97 .34 (.36)
2nd Least Low Pay 14.07 14.67 .55 (.53)
Least Low Pay 16.22 17.44 1.22 (.90)
Most Low Pay -  Least 
Low Pay
-4.03*** (.69) .4.84*** (.63) -.81 (.35)
Notes: Areas are split into four (almost) equal sized groups of police force areas (3 groups of 10 and one of 
11 areas). The groupings are based upon the proportion of workers paid less than the Minimum Wage in the 
year prior to its introduction. Areas in the Most Low Pay group have over 11.7 percent of workers beneath 
the Minimum Wage. Areas in the 2nd Most Low Pay group have between 10.2 and 11.7 percent of workers 
beneath the minimum. Areas in the 2nd Least Low Pay group have between 7.5 and 10.2 percent o f workers 
beneath the minimum. Areas in the Least Low Pay group have less than 7.5 percent o f workers beneath the 
Minimum Wage.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* significant at 10% level, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 4.2 The Introduction of the National Minimum Wage and Area Crime
Rates (Per 1000 Population)
Year Before 
Introduction
Year After Introduction Change 
(Standard Error)
Total Crime Rate
Most Low Pay 98.47 96.04 -2.43 (11.54)
2nd Most Low Pay 1 0 0 . 1 1 101.94 1.83 (14.73)
2nd Least Low Pay 102.52 105.52 3.00(13.06)
Least Low Pay 99.11 108.24 9.14(22.03)
Most Low Pay -  Least 
Low Pay
-.64(16.22) - 1 2 . 2 1  (18.80) -11.56*** (3.54)
Property Crime Rate
Most Low Pay 63.50 60.24 -3.26 (8.99)
2nd Most Low Pay 60.93 59.08 -1.86 (8.99)
2nd Least Low Pay 66.26 65.21 -1.05 (8.04)
Least Low Pay 57.73 60.75 3.03 (9.61)
Most Low Pay -  Least 
Low Pay
5.77 (8.91) -.51 (9.69) -6.28***(1.95)
Vehicle Crime Rate
Most Low Pay 28.12 26.04 -2.08 (3.39)
2nd Most Low Pay 30.28 30.25 -.03 (5.55)
2nd Least Low Pay 31.02 30.70 -.32 (4.22)
Least Low Pay 27.13 28.26 1.13(3.55)
Most Low Pay -  Least 
Low Pay
.99 (3.43) -2.22 (3.51) -3.21*** (.80)
Violent Crime Rate
Most Low Pay 8.33 8.91 .58(1.04)
2nd Most Low Pay 10.03 11.60 1.58(1.69)
2nd Least Low Pay 8.51 9.87 1.36(1.82)
Least Low Pay 11.47 13.61 2.15(4.86)
Most Low Pay -  Least 
Low Pay
-3.14(3.19) -4.70 (3.79) -1.56 (.65)
Notes: As for Table 4.1.
Thus, the descriptive statistics seem to indicate that the introduction of the 
Minimum Wage operated as we would expect, increasing wages at the bottom end of the 
wage distribution thereby reducing wage inequality more in areas with a higher 
proportion of workers paid beneath the minimum level before its introduction. 
Furthermore, crime seems to have been moderated (in relative terms) in those areas more 
affected by the introduction of the Minimum Wage (i.e. those with a higher proportion of 
workers paid beneath the minimum level before April 1999).
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This pattern is confirmed in Figure 4.1, which plots the change in the crime rates 
against the initial proportion of low paid workers, over the period prior to, and post, the 
Minimum Wage introduction. This is shown separately for total, property, vehicle and 
violent crime. For all crime types, the graphs show crime went up by less in the areas 
with more low paid workers in the period before the Minimum Wage was introduced. All 
the regression lines fitted through the data points show there to be a negative relationship 
between changes in crime and the initial low pay proportion. The next section puts these 
findings to a more rigorous test by subjecting the data to a range of statistical tests.
Figure 4.1 Changes in Crime Rates And The Initial Proportion Low Paid, 
Between April 1998-March 1999 And April 1999-March 2000
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4.7 Regression Results
4.7.1 Basic Regression Results
Table 4.3 shows the results of regressions of changes in crime on the proportion 
of workers paid less than the minimum in the period before the Minimum Wage was 
introduced. Three sets of specifications are reported for each category of offence. The 
first is a simple regression of the change in crime on the initial period proportion of 
workers paid beneath the minimum. This is simply the slope of the regression lines fitted 
through the data points given in Figure 4.1. The second specification shows how this is
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affected by adding in the demographic controls10 and the change in the crime clear-up 
rate. The third specification additionally adds in the change in the unemployment rate.
A comparison of column (1) and (2) shows the negative relationship between the 
change in crime (using all four measures) and the initial low pay proportion is not wiped 
out by the inclusion of the extra variables. In all cases, although the estimated coefficient 
on the initial low pay proportion falls (in absolute terms), it remains statistically 
significant. The coefficient on the change in the clear-up rate is interesting, as it appears 
to suggest negative deterrence effects for non-violent crimes but displays no association 
with changes in violent crimes. Nonetheless, the estimates reported in column (2) 
reinforce the earlier descriptive analysis, showing relative falls in crime occurring in the 
lower wage areas that were more affected by the introduction of the Minimum Wage.
The final specification (in column (3)) adds changes in the log(unemployment 
rate) as an explanatory variable. This is important because as noted above a critical 
question surrounding the introduction of the National Minimum Wage is its likely impact 
on unemployment. There was much speculation on this before the introduction of the 
wage floor as opponents of minimum wage legislation argued that minimum wages tend 
to hurt those they set out to initially help as the imposition of a Minimum Wage prices 
workers out of jobs.11 Were this to be true there would be another mechanism we would 
need to consider here, namely that there would be more unemployed workers who could 
not get jobs who may then turn to crime. In this case, the Minimum Wage may raise 
crime rates. For this reason, it is important to also control for changes in unemployment 
that may have occurred differentially across areas, in case we are biasing the coefficient
10 The estimated coefficients on these variables are not reported as the main concern is with the initial 
proportion low paid variable.
11 Of course there has been a lot of (sometimes acrimonious) debate about the economic effects of 
minimum wages, especially their impact on unemployment. This is not of major concern here, but see 
Metcalfs (1999) discussion of the UK debate.
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on the low pay proportion by neglecting another route in which crime may be affected by 
the labour market.
The inclusion of unemployment into the model has little effect on the coefficient 
on the initial low pay proportion, which remains negative and statistically significant for 
all four crimes (though it is very much on the margins of significance for violent crimes). 
For total, property and vehicle crime, there is no statistically significant association 
between changes in crime and changes in unemployment. However, for changes in 
violent crime the coefficient on the change in the unemployment rate is estimated to be 
positive and significant. This is the only place where an unemployment effect is found, 
supporting the discussion in Freeman (1999) that the relationship between crime and 
unemployment is a hard one to uncover.
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Table 4.3 Regressions of Changes in Log(Crime Rates)on the Initial Low Pay 
Proportion Across Police Force Areas in the Years Before and After 
Minimum Wage Introduction
0 ) (2 ) (3)
Change in Log(Total Crime Rate)
Proportion Paid Beneath Minimum Wage in Year Before -1.235*** -.980*** -1.007***
Introduction (.268) (.239) (.250)
Change in Clear Up Rate -.170*
(.078)
-.175*
(.081)
Change in Log(Unemployment Rate) .080
(.088)
Demographic Controls No Yes Yes
R-Squared .400 .468 .486
Change in Log(Property Crime Rate)
Proportion Paid Beneath Minimum Wage in Year Before -1.236*** -.894 *** - 910***
Introduction (.337) (.235) (.239)
Change in Clear Up Rate -.257***
(.076)
-.260***
(.078)
Change in Log(Unemployment Rate) .045
(.071)
Demographic Controls No Yes Yes
R-Squared .400 .572 .578
Change in Log(Vehicle Crime Rate)
Proportion Paid Beneath Minimum Wage in Year Before -1.166*** - 1 .0 1 2 *** - 1 .0 0 2 ***
Introduction (.253) (.282) (.283)
Change in Clear Up Rate -.157*
(.091)
-.156*
(.092)
Change in Log(Unemployment Rate) -.029
(.1 0 1 )
Demographic Controls No Yes Yes
R-Squared .292 .378 .380
Change in Log(Violent Crime Rate)
Proportion Paid Beneath Minimum Wage in Year Before -1.079*** -1.005** -1.053**
Introduction (.281) (.471) (.520)
Change in Clear Up Rate -.003
(.126)
- . 0 1 2
(.133)
Change in Log(Unemployment Rate) .141
(.064)
Demographic Controls No Yes Yes
R-Squared . 1 2 1 .261 .285
Notes: Coefficients (heteroskedastic consistent standard errors) reported. The sample size in all regressions 
is 41 police force areas. All regressions weighted by area population. The demographic controls entered 
were -  change in average age, change in the population share of young (<25) men, change in population 
share with no educational qualifications, change in proportion female, change in share of public sector jobs. 
* significant at 10% level, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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4.7.2 Using other Wage Measures to gauge the initial Proportion Low Paid
The results so far point to a negative association between changes both in 
property and vehicle crime rates and the incidence of low pay over the period of 
Minimum Wage introduction. This suggests that shifts in the nature of low wage labour 
markets do have the potential to affect crime. However, a potentially relevant 
consideration is that, to date, the analysis has used measures of the extent of low pay in 
the overall area labour market. Whilst these measures are a useful barometer of the state 
of the low wage labour market in these local areas, it is also the case that most people do 
not commit crimes and that those that do or those who are on the margins of criminal 
choice, are disproportionately males, young and are likely to be in low skilled jobs.
Taking these considerations into account Table 4.5 shows the results from 
regression models (comparable to column (3) of Table 4) that refine the nature of the 
initial low pay variable. The Table reports estimated coefficients on three different 
measures of low pay in the period prior to Minimum Wage introduction. Column (1) 
reports the estimated coefficient from a model incorporating a measure of the proportion 
beneath the minimum for males employed in occupations where the mean wage is below 
the 25th percentile of the average male wage. This is referred to as the low skilled males 
low pay measure. Column (2) uses the initial low pay proportion for males under the age 
of 25 only. Finally, column (3) returns to the full sample of people in a police force area 
but, rather than using the headcount measure considered so far, computes how far the 
wage bill would need to be raised to take all people initially beneath the minimum up to 
the Minimum Wage. Potentially, this will give different results to the headcount if the 
wage shortfall differs across areas.
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Because the focus is on specific sub-groups then one should note that the 
magnitude of the estimated coefficients will differ from earlier results and indeed that is
i j
what happens in Table 4.5. But the general thrust of the earlier results is certainly borne 
out. There is seen to be a more pronounced negative relationship between changes in 
crime and the initial low pay proportion in the period surrounding Minimum Wage 
introduction in the police force areas of England and Wales.
Table 4.4 Using Other Measures of Low Pay
( 1 ) (2 ) (3)
Low Skill 
Males Low 
Pay Measure
Young Males 
Low Pay 
Measure
Wage Bill 
Share 
Measure
Change in Log(Tota) Crime Rate)
Proportion Paid Beneath Minimum Wage in Year Before 
Introduction in Period Surrounding Introduction
-.882***
(.315)
-.387***
(.179)
-6.660
(2.291)
R-Squared .432 .423 .431
Change in Log(Property Crime Rate)
Proportion Paid Beneath Minimum Wage in Year Before 
Introduction in Period Surrounding Introduction
-.969***
(.301)
-.439***
(-142)
-6.920
(2.267)
R-Squared .592 .571 .578
Change in Log(VehicIe Crime Rate)
Proportion Paid Beneath Minimum Wage in Year Before 
Introduction in Period Surrounding Introduction
-.798**
(.367)
-.311*
(.177)
-5.941**
(2.683)
R-Squared .556 .547 .550
Change in Log(Violent Rate)
Proportion Paid Beneath Minimum Wage in Year Before 
Introduction in Period Surrounding Introduction
-1.292*
(-776)
-.813**
(.313)
-9.071*
(5.062)
R-Squared .240 .248 .239
Notes: These are extensions based upon the same specification as column (3) o f Table 4.3. Other notes as 
for Table 4.3.
4.7.3 Benchmarking Against Earlier Time Periods
A potentially very important concern that emerges from considering the results 
presented so far is whether these results really identify any change resulting from 
studying the Minimum Wage period. For example, it might be that crime rates have not
12 In fact the means of the three variables in the pre-introduction year were: low skill males .08; young 
males .15; wage bill .01. Hence the differences in scale of the reported coefficients.
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been rising as fast in low wage areas in time periods when the Minimum Wage was not 
present. Were this to be the case, the results may be spurious.
This possibility is explored by looking at regression models specified in the same 
way as those considered to date for earlier time periods. In the simplest specification 
reported above (in column (1) of Table 4.3), the regression relationship between changes 
in property crime and the proportion below the Minimum Wage in the initial period for 
the periods around Minimum Wage introduction was as follows (standard error in 
parentheses):
Change in Log(Property Crime) = -1.235 Proportion Paid Less Than The Minimum Wage in Period 1
(.268)
For earlier periods of change [(financial year 1996-1997) — (financial year 1997- 
1998)] and [(financial year 1995-1996) -  (financial year 1996-1997)] the regression 
relationship is:
Change in Log(Property Crime) = -.272 Proportion Paid Less Than The Minimum Wage in Period 1
(.171)
So, in this earlier time period there is a (weak) negative association between 
changes in property crime and the initial low pay proportion, but it is nowhere near as 
marked as around the Minimum Wage introduction period. Indeed, the regression line fit 
through the points has a slope four and a half times as large (in absolute terms) in the
13period surrounding Minimum Wage introduction. This shows a tilting of the crime low
13 Of course, as the periods not surrounding minimum wage introduction are pooled, the regression slope is 
the average slope across all periods. However, if  each period is taken individually, the slope is always 
markedly steeper in the period surrounding minimum wage introduction.
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pay relationship such that the relationship between changes in crime and low pay 
becomes stronger in the period when the Minimum Wage was introduced.
These differences can be seen in Figure 4.2 which plots the relationship between 
crime and the proportion low paid in periods prior to the Minimum Wage. When this is 
compared to Figure 4.1, which charts the same relationship but over the Minimum Wage 
introduction period, it is clear that there is a much stronger negative association in the 
period surrounding the Minimum Wage than in previous periods.
Figure 4.2 Changes in Crime Rates and the Initial Proportion Low Paid 
in Earlier Time Periods
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A more formal way of thinking about this is to explicitly couch the modelling
approach in a “difference-in-differences” framework. The analysis covers two distinct
time periods, one where the Minimum Wage raised wages by more in low wage areas
(which we can call period M), and one where no minimum wage legislation was in place
(period NM). It is therefore possible to benchmark the measures of the change in crime
from the period surrounding Minimum Wage introduction ACM against the measure of
the change in crime from the non-minimum wage period ACNM. Thus, Table 4.5 shows a
set of results from regressions that benchmark the basic results against the relationship
between changes in crime and the initial low paid proportion in earlier time periods. As
these add a further differenced set of data in the control periods where there was no
minimum wage legislation in operation, one can think of these estimates as triple
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differenced, or difference-in-difference-in-difference estimates.14 For the case of changes 
in total crime, the estimator is simply the gap between the coefficients on the initial low 
pay proportion variable across the two specifications (for the example considered, this is 
-1 .235- {-.272} =-.963).
Thus, Table 4.5 reports coefficients on the initial low pay proportion in the period 
surrounding Minimum Wage introduction from five specifications for each model of 
crime. Columns (1) to (3) are the same specifications as in Table 4.3, but benchmarked 
against earlier time periods. The change in the period surrounding Minimum Wage 
introduction (from financial year 1998/99 to financial year 1999/2000) is compared to 
changes in two earlier time periods (the change from financial year 1996/97 to 1997/98 
and the change from 1995/96 to 1996/97). The reason for these choice of benchmark 
periods is a change in the way crime statistics were collected by police force areas that 
occurred in 1998 prevents us from being able to calculate the change from financial year 
1997/98 to 1998/99.15 However, the Home Office has published scaling factors (for total 
crimes) that can bridge this gap (as they collected crime numbers on the old and new 
reporting basis) and so the scaled change for these financial years is also included in the 
control group in column (4). Column (5) then implements a very stringent test by 
additionally including into the column (3) specification a full set of police force area 
trends.
14 Or alternatively one can think of the estimates as difference-in-difference estimates of the change model 
(i.e. double-differenced in changes rather than triple-differenced in levels). As such they compare the 
relationship between changes in crime and the initial low pay proportion in the treatment period 
surrounding minimum wage introduction with the same relationship in the earlier (non-minimum wage) 
control periods.
1 5  This is because April 1998 saw a change in the way crimes were counted and classified under Home 
Office rules. The changes, and their effects on crime by area and type of crime, are discussed in detail in 
Annex A of Home Office (1999). The principal motivation for the change was to try and get crime statistics 
to measure one crime per victim and to widen the definition of a notifiable offence (to include all indictable 
and triable-either-way offences plus some related summary offences). The Home Office reports that the 
definition change mostly affected violent crime, drug crime and fraud and criminal damage. Notice that the 
latter three crimes are not included in the analysis but, for the crimes analysed, the counting rule changes
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The coefficients reported in the first three columns of the Table make it clear that 
the earlier estimates are not picking up a relationship that existed in earlier time periods. 
For total, property and vehicle crimes, the coefficient on the low pay proportion is seen to 
be significantly more negative in the period surrounding Minimum Wage introduction 
than in the comparison periods. The coefficient in the violent crime equation is also 
negative but the standard error is large, making the estimates very imprecise.
As already noted, the first three columns of Table 4.5 exclude the period 
measuring changes across financial years 1997/1998 to 1998/99 (the period directly 
preceding that surrounding Minimum Wage introduction) due to the change in the way 
that crimes were counted that occurred from April 1998.16 However, as previously 
discussed, there exists a set of scaling factors reported by the Home Office (1999) that 
make it possible to compute the change for this period in a manner consistent with the 
Minimum Wage introduction years to see whether this definitional change matters or not 
for the main findings. The results produced by incorporating the scaled data from this 
extra period are given in column (4).17 They tend to confirm the earlier picture, as the 
coefficients on the initial proportion low paid actually become slightly more negative 
(though reassuringly they remain insignificantly different from those in column (3)).
The nature of the data, on the same areas followed through time, means that one 
can also adopt an even more stringent test by including area-specific trends in the 
estimating equation. Therefore, the final column of the Table additionally includes 41 
area trend variables. The coefficients are reduced in this specification and, of course as 
one would expect, the standard errors rise. Yet the main findings remain robust to this.
are more likely to affect the total and violent crime rates whilst being relatively unimportant for property 
and vehicle crimes.
16 In practice, the reporting change means that we are unable to compute crime numbers for the financial 
year 1997/98 on the same basis as the 1998/99 and 1999/2000 financial years.
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Overall, it seems that benchmarking against earlier time periods acts to reinforce 
the findings presented earlier. There appears to be a stronger negative relationship 
between crime and low pay in the period surrounding the Minimum Wage introduction. 
This is a robust finding for most crimes (i.e. except for violent crime, where the data are 
much noisier) and is in line with the idea that the altering of economic incentives brought 
about by the introduction of the Minimum Wage may well have caused individuals on the 
margins of crime to desist.
Table 4.5 Benchmarking Against Earlier Time Periods
[Change in financial year 1998/99 to 1999/2000 benchmarked against change in financial year 1996/97 to 
1997/98 and change in financial year 1995/6 to 1996/7 in (1), (2), (3) and (5);
Change in financial year 1998/99 to 1999/2000 benchmarked against change in financial year 1997/98 to 
1998/99 (scaled by Home Office factors for reporting changes), change in financial year 1996/97 to 
1997/98 and change in financial year 1995/6 to 1996/7 in (4)]_________________________________________
( 1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) (5)
Basic
Specification
(1) + Clear Up 
and
Demographics
(2 ) + 
Unemployment
(3) + Add 
Definition 
Change 
Year
(3) + 
Area 
Trends
Change in Log (Total Crime Rate)
Proportion Paid Beneath 
Minimum Wage in Year 
Before Introduction in Period 
Surrounding Introduction
-.963***
(.317)
-.770***
(.255)
-.764***
(.257)
- 917***
(.270)
-.479
(.298)
R-Squared .372 .421 .437 .284 .615
Change in Log (Property Crime Rate)
Proportion Paid Beneath 
Minimum Wage in Year 
Before Introduction in Period 
Surrounding Introduction
-.962***
(.359)
-.806***
(.250)
-.809***
(.249)
-1.209***
(.388)
-.667***
(.214)
R-Squared .488 .591 .595 .540 .763
Change in Log (Vehicle Crime Rate)
Proportion Paid Beneath 
Minimum Wage in Year 
Before Introduction in Period 
Surrounding Introduction
-.850***
(.331)
-.657**
(.300)
-.656**
(.302)
-.853***
(.287)
-.596*
(.355)
R-Squared .461 .558 .558 .782 . 6 8 6
Change in Log (Violent Crime Rate)
Proportion Paid Beneath 
Minimum Wage in Year 
Before Introduction in Period 
Surrounding Introduction
-.962*
(.581)
-1.104*
(.645)
-1.098*
(.645)
-1.155*
(.599)
- 1 . 1 2 1
(.720)
R-Squared .186 .235 .245 .319 .480
17 Notice that the scaling factors are for total crimes and they are not available for the specific crimes 
considered in the lower panels of the Table. The scaling factors are applied to the other crimes but clearly 
one should focus more on the total crime equations in column (4) of the upper panel of the Table.
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Notes: Coefficients (heteroskedastic consistent standard errors) reported. Sample sizes are 123 for columns (1), 
(2), (3) and (5) and 164 for column (4). All regressions weighted by population. The demographic controls entered 
were -  change in average age, change in the population share of young (<25) men, change in population share 
with no educational qualifications, change in proportion female, change in share of public sector job. All 
equations include dummy variables for time period and the proportion low paid variable.
* significant at 10% level, ** 5%, *** 1%.
4.8 Concluding Remarks
The main focus of this Chapter is to identify empirically the links between crime 
and the labor market. To do so, a rather different approach to that taken in the existing 
literature is adopted. The key question posed is what happened to crime before and after a 
large regulatory change was made in the UK, namely when the government introduced a 
minimum wage floor to a labour market previously unregulated by minimum wage 
legislation. This Minimum Wage introduction benefited a sizable number of workers.
The Chapter examines whether the wage gains resulting from Minimum Wage 
introduction were able to alter incentives to participate in crime.
This is not only what one would expect from simple economic models of crime 
where shifting the relative monetary gains between legal and illegal activities can alter an 
individual’s likelihood of committing crime, but it is also what a number of 
criminological theories suggest will be the case. These predictions are tested by noting 
that there were more beneficiaries from the Minimum Wage introduction in some police 
force areas of England and Wales than in others and using these differences to examine 
changes in crime rates across police force areas in the period before and after Minimum 
Wage introduction to the proportion of workers beneath the Minimum Wage before its 
introduction.
The results uncover a statistically significant negative relationship, showing 
relative crime reductions in areas that initially had more low wage workers. This finding 
remains robust to controlling for other relevant determinants of crime, to benchmarking
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against earlier time periods and to using initial period wage measures that look at the 
types of individuals one thinks are more likely to be on the margins of crime. Overall the 
results are in line with theoretical predictions that crime and low wages are related and 
that by improving the position of the low paid one does see a reduction in crime.
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5. Rising Crime and Improvements in the 
Socio-Economic Position of Women: Are 
they Related?
5.1 Introduction
One of the most noticeable changes in the labour market in the last thirty or 
forty years has been the increased participation of women. Estimates from the Family 
Expenditure Survey show that in the UK only 38% of all employees between the age 
of 16 and 64 were female in 1970, by 2000 this figure had risen to almost 50%. In 
2000, only 19% of females were defined as economically inactive. This figure 
represents a significant decline in economic inactivity since 1970, when 41% of 
females were not active participants in the labour market.
If we believe that crime is related to labour market opportunities the 
movement of females into the labour market may have an effect on crime. In the past 
most theoretical and empirical work in this area has focused on the effect of this 
movement on female crime, arguing that increases in female labour supply should 
shift the total share of crime committed by women, either generating more or less 
female crime compared to male crime (Steffensmeier et al 1989). While this is an 
interesting area of research, females make up only a relatively small fraction of those 
who engage in crime (around 13% of those found guilty of indictable offences in 1997 
(according to convictions data on those found guilty at Magistrates and Crown
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Courts)1. Therefore, examining the effect female labour force participation has on 
female crime is likely to uncover only a very small part of the impact shifts in female 
labour supply have on crime. For example, if  increased female labour force 
participation in any way damages the labour market position of males, and there exists 
a connection between crime and the male labour market, this will imply a larger effect 
of female labour force participation on the overall crime rate.
Earlier Chapters have already shown that weak labour market positions are 
positively related to crime. This Chapter examines the effect of rising female 
employment on crime by assessing the impact it has on crime and examining the 
mechanisms through which any connection may work.
5.2 Traditional Explanations of why Improving the Labour Market Position 
of Women Should Affect Crime?
Typically work in this area has focused on female crime as the outcome of 
changes in female labour force participation (Steffensmeier et al 1989). 
Criminological theory predicts that if economic incentives are important for crime, 
changing patterns of female employment should affect women’s participation in crime 
and we should see a movement in the amount of crime committed by females.
5.2.1 Predictions from Traditional Theories
Many of the more traditional theories suggest that shifting the economic 
incentives of an individual or group is likely to affect decisions to engage in crime. 
Improving the labour market situation is usually associated with a decline in crime. 
Thus, many of the theories that have been discussed at length in previous Chapters, 
such as rational choice (Becker 1968, Ehrlich 1973), anomie (Durkheim 1938) and
1 Convictions data is used here as it is not possible to break down notifiable offences by gender as the 
perpetrator is unknown. Arrest data is not available consistently for the period under examination.
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strain (Merton 1957) for example, predict that a rise in female labour force 
participation should be associated with a decline in female crime.
However, many of these theories have been criticized in the past for their 
failure to address issues of female criminality. For example, it is argued that women 
place less emphasis on material success and feel less pressure to provide for their 
family. They are less exposed to delinquent peers, have stronger bonds and their 
behaviour is more supervised (see Steffensmeier and Allen 1996). As a result, there 
has been a call for theories aimed specifically at female crime (see discussion in 
Steffensmeier and Allen 1996).
However, Smith (1979) found that in general, the main criminological theories 
are able to account equally well for male and female crime. Moreover, 25 years after 
the Equal Pay and Pay Discrimination Acts (passed in December 1975), 
improvements in the position of women both in the labour market and society more 
generally have taken place which mean that many of these arguments are now 
outdated. Such changes include later age marriages, rising divorce rates and the rise of 
single mothers, which mean that many women are now the sole providers for families. 
Improvements in qualifications gained by females mean that females are now out­
performing males in terms of educational attainment (Epstein et al 1998). Highly 
skilled women are now more represented in higher ranking occupations (Blau and 
Kahn 2000). As generations progress, these changes will be reinforced by parenting, 
which will render these criticisms even more out of date.
Changes such as those described above are used by gender equality theory to 
predict that as the socio-economic position of women improves female crime will
2 Empirical evidence in support o f the idea that female crime is related to the marginalized position of  
women in the labour market can be seen in the work of Box and Hale (1983, 1984) who, using data 
from England and Wales between 1951 and 1979, find female unemployment to be positively related to 
female crime. See Steffensmeier (1978) for evidence from the US.
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increase (Adler 1975, Simon 1975). As women gain mobility, power and confidence 
these theories predict that they will develop attitudes traditionally thought to be more 
masculine, such as risk taking, which are positively related to crime. In addition, 
employment in the public sphere opens up crime opportunities outside the home; not 
just work related crimes, but also theft from shops and fraud, for example. 
Employment also allows women to develop networks and contacts outside of the 
home that may facilitate criminal interactions. Moreover, increased involvement in 
drug taking will bring women into contact with the illegitimate realm from which they 
have been excluded in the past.
Influenced by these ideas, power-control theory (Hagan 1993) emphasises 
how differences in labour market positions of males and females influence parenting 
patterns, thereby encouraging male and female children to develop different 
behaviours, which in turn lead to different rates of offending between males and 
females in later life. In more traditional families, which are headed by a working male 
where the wife does not work, household power is unevenly distributed. This 
inequality is reproduced among children so that male and female children are 
encouraged to develop different attributes, which lead to differences in levels of 
offending in later life. In more equal households, where both parents are employed in 
similar positions or both non-employed, differences in the way male and female 
children are brought up are minimised. Equality between the male and female role 
models is reproduced among the children so that gender differences in crime in later 
life are reduced. These ideas are based on the premise that equality of power for 
mothers results in greater equality for daughters (Singer and Levine 1988). This
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equality means that over time females will act in a similar way to males and 
differences in their rates of offending will be reduced.
Empirical support for these ideas can be seen in the work of Fox and 
Hartnagel (1979) who used Canadian data between 1931 and 1968 to show that 
measures of female liberation, such as labour force participation, were positively 
associated with female crime. This relationship was particularly strong for theft. 
Although in the UK Box and Hale (1983, 1984) find no evidence of a relationship 
between factors associated with female liberation and crime.
5.2.2 An Alternative Explanation
Each of the existing theories predict that increased participation of females in 
the labour market should affect the amount of crime committed by women. This 
Chapter argues that as the amount of crime committed by females is small relative to 
that committed by males, the effect of increased female labour force participation on 
crime may not just be limited to female crime. If increased female labour force 
participation has a detrimental effect on the labour market position of males then 
rising female employment may have a wider impact on the overall level of crime than 
previously thought.4
Historically, women’s involvement in the UK labour market was confined to a 
relatively small number of women working in a limited number of female dominated 
occupations (for example typists, nurses and primary school teachers) (see Blau and 
Kahn 2000). Women have been paid less than men and have been less likely to 
achieve promotion. As technologies were developed in the home, women’s time 
became freer and more women began to enter employment (Goldin 1999). Anti-
3 This suggests that the rise o f dual earner households is important and should be an area of future 
research.
4 This is not a unique idea. For earlier studies which examine the effect o f female labour force 
participation on total crime see Braithwaite et al 1992, Hale 1999 and Kapuscinski et al 1998.
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discriminatory legislation that was set in place,5 coupled with improvements in the 
education system, encouraged more and more women to train and enter traditionally 
male jobs in a wider range of occupations (Blau and Kahn 2000, Goldin 1999).
At the same time, economic restructuring6 shifted the focus of the economy 
away from manufacturing and toward the service sector where demand for physical 
strength was reduced and demand for female skills, such as computing, greatly 
increased (see Kreuger 1993). While, improvements in education meant that the 
supply of suitably qualified males and females was increasing, so women and men 
had to compete for jobs.
It is possible that if this is the case, improvements in the labour market 
position of females will have a negative effect on the labour market position of males 
(for example, by lowering wages). As previous Chapters have shown, if crime is 
related to low wages by reducing male wages increased female participation in the 
labour market will have a negative impact on crime (see additionally Hansen and 
Machin 2001, 2002 or Machin and Meghir 2000 for the UK. Grogger 1998 or Gould 
et al 2002 for the US). This mechanism is depicted below:
5 The Equal Pay Act and Sex Discrimination Act were passed in December 1975.
6 There are debates to the main cause of this restructuring. It is widely believed that technological 
change was the driving factor behind the movement (see Berman et al, 1998), other explanations 
include the reduction of international trade barriers, or institutional changes such as de-unionisation 
(Freeman, 1992).
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This mechanism works through substitution. This idea is discussed in more 
detail later in the Chapter, but basically this means that if males and females are 
competing for the same jobs, if they are both capable of doing the job as well as one 
another, they are substitutes. In other words an employer can hire either a male or a 
female to do a job. The advantage of hiring a male is that in general, males tend to 
have more labour market experience. However, on the other hand because females 
tend to have less labour market experience they are likely to receive slightly lower 
wages. If this makes females more attractive employees than males, females will be 
employed to do the job.
Alternatively, if  females are discriminated against in the labour market, they 
will receive lower wages than similar males. This means that an employer can hire a 
more productive female for the same wage as a less productive male. Again, the 
employer will usually opt for employing the more productive female in preference to 
the less productive male.
In these cases, females and males are not good substitutes. To re-address the 
balance at an individual level and allow men and women to compete for jobs more 
equally (making them better substitutes), males may have to take a job at a lower
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wage. This may mean that in the wider economy, in occupations, industries and areas 
where there has been a large increase in female employment, we would expect to see 
a relative fall in male wages, particularly among the less skilled men.
5.3 Data
5.3.1 Labour Market Data
This Chapter uses a variety of data to test these hypotheses. Firstly, numbers 
on female labour supply come from three sources. The main source (matched to the 
crime data) is the New Earnings Survey (NES). As discussed in Chapter 2, this is a 
1% sample of employees in employment who are members of Pay-As-You-Eam 
(PAYE) income tax schemes. Individuals are sampled according to the last two digits 
of their National Insurance number, which produces a random sample of around
160,000 individuals per year. In addition to labour market information, the NES 
contains a number of demographic and socio-economic variables that makes it 
possible to control for shifts in factors that may influence the relationship between 
female labour force participation and crime. Additional sources of labour market data 
include the Department of Work and Pensions Labour Market Trends tables (which 
are published quarterly and can be accessed on the web: www.dwp.gov.uk). And the 
Family Expenditure Survey (FES), which is a self-report survey of around 7,000 
households in the UK.
5.3.2 Crime Data
Unfortunately, there are no corresponding crime data at the individual level 
with which to examine the effect of female labour force participation on crime. 
Instead, official data at police force area level are matched to individual level labour 
market, socio-economic and demographic data aggregated to police force level.
183
The official crime data used are notifiable offences reported to and recorded 
by the police. Since, in most cases, there is no way to identify the perpetrator of the 
crime, notifiable offences include crimes committed by both males and females. As 
this Chapter is primarily concerned with the effect of female labour supply on male 
crime, sex-specific convictions data are also used to capture crime committed by 
males. Convictions data may reflect the level of crime in society less well than 
notifiable offences (since they not only depend on the accuracy with which crimes are 
reported to and recorded by the police, but also processing by the criminal justice 
system and the courts ability to find individuals guilty). On the other hand, they do
o
enable the examination of the differential participation in crime by gender , which 
using notifiable offences does not9. Using both crime data makes it possible to 
compare and contrast results from the notifiable offences with male convictions data.
While some authors find that economic factors are important for violent crime, 
(for example, see Crutchfield 1989, Messner 1980 or Blau and Blau 1982) the 
evidence presented in this thesis consistently finds labour market factors to have a 
greater effect on property crime than violent crime. This is supportive of other work 
on crime in the UK which has found an association between property crime and 
labour market variables but not violent crime (see for example Hansen and Machin 
2001).10
7 As discussed in earlier Chapters this is unlikely to cover all crimes as a number o f crimes are not 
reported to or recorded by the police.
8 Arrest rates are often used in the US, because these do not rely on court processes. In the UK 
however, arrest statistics are not available for the time period this Chapter examines.
9  Notifiable offences are those reported to and recorded by the police, so there is no information on the 
perpetrator o f those crimes such as gender.
0 This is not to deny that rising female labour force participation may affect violent crime. Indeed, 
Bourgois (1996) argues very convincingly that the rise in female labour force participation may very 
well lead to a rise in the incidence o f violent crimes against women such as rape and domestic abuse; as 
economically marginalized men try to reassert their authority by the physical domination o f women. A 
similar argument is posed by Kapuscinski et al (1998) who find a strong positive relationship between 
female employment and homicide. In addition Macmillan and Gartner (1999) show that in households 
where the female works but the male does not the risk of spousal abuse is higher than in households
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For this reason the crime data used are property crimes (burglary and theft and 
handling) reported to and recorded by the police and male property crime convictions 
(i.e. males convicted of theft and handling, burglary, fraud and forgery in Crown 
Court and Magistrates Courts). These convictions data are also used as a measure of 
deterrence when notifiable offences are used as the measure of crime. The number of 
police officers are also included as a measure of deterrence. All these data are 
compiled at police force area level between 1975 and 1997.
5.4 Descriptive Statistics
5.4.1 Fem ale Labour Force Participation
Table 5.1 shows clearly how female labour force participation has increased in 
the last thirty years. Between 1970 and 2000 the number of women in the workforce 
increased by 44%, from 9,444,000 in 1970 to 13,556,000 in 2000. The number of 
female employees show similar trends going from 8,962,000 in 1970 to 12,544,000 in 
200011 a rise of 40%. In 1970, females constituted 36% of the workforce and 38% of 
employees. By 2000, these proportions had increased to 46% and 49% respectively.
where both partners have the same employment status. However, these types o f  violent crimes are 
unlikely to be well represented in officially recorded crimes (for example, only 9,000 rapes were 
recorded by the police in 2001/2002, while the BCS (which is likely to be a much better indicator o f the 
extent o f these types o f crimes) estimated that around 635 cases o f domestic violence had occurred 
between 2001/2002). To test the effect on these types of crimes research would need to use a more 
qualitative approach in an attempt to enumerate the extent o f this type o f violence against women, even 
then it is likely that women would be reluctant to talk about such crime, especially when they are 
committed by people known to the victim (Home Office 2002).
11 The employees numbers are smaller than the labour force numbers as they exclude the self 
employed.
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Table 5.1. UK Employment (in thousands) 1970-2000
1970 1980 1990 2000 Change %  Change
Work Force
Total 26414 26997 28913 29280 2866 10.9
Female 9444 10856 12762 13556 4112 43.5
% Female 35.8 40.2 44.1 46.3 10.5
Employees
Total 23783 24322 24254 25513 1730 7.3
Female 8962 10347 11604 12544 3582 40.0
% Female 37.7 42.5 47.8 49.2 11.5
Source: La Dour Market Trends, Department of Work and Pensions
These results indicate that female employment has been rising, while male 
employment has been declining. However, for rising female employment to have an 
effect on the male labour market (and thus on crime), it is important to ensure these 
trends are not simply the result of demographic change. For example, a decline in the 
male population could also produce a fall in the numbers of employed males. This 
would be independent of the rise in female employment, or perhaps even be a causal 
mechanism encouraging the rise in female employment as women enter the labour 
market to fill the jobs left by the declining male population.
To explore this possibility, Table 5.2 compares trends in male and female
1 ^
employment rates over time. The results confirm the rise in female labour force 
participation identified above, showing an increase in the female employment rate 
from 61% in 1977 to 72% in 2000. This represents an 11 percentage point increase. 
On the other hand, the male employment rate actually declined by about 9 percentage 
points over the same period. These differing trends have led to a narrowing of the gap 
between the male and female employment rates. This evidence is in line with the 
possibility that in more recent times employers may be favouring women, thus 
leading to a rise in female employment rates relative to those of males.
This is only possible to do since 1977.
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The lower panels of Table 5.2 break male and female employment rates down 
by education level. This is important if  we believe that education is a proxy for labour 
market skill, as it allows us to see in which part of the labour market employment 
gains and losses have been made. Thus, the middle rows of Table 5.2 show male and 
female employment rates for those with no educational qualifications, while the lower 
rows show the employment rates of those educated to degree level or above.
It is clear that the largest decline in employment has been among the least 
skilled males. In 1977, the employment rate for males with no qualifications was 
88%. By 2000, it had decline to 60%, a fall of 28 percentage points. The employment 
rate for unskilled females with no qualifications also declined over this period, but the 
fall (of less than 9 percentage points) was nowhere near as marked as for males. This 
means that for those with no qualifications the gender gap in employment rates has 
narrowed.
The Table also shows that the employment rate of the most skilled men has 
fallen, but again by a fairly small amount compared to unskilled males. In 1977, the 
employment rate for males educated to degree level or above was 96%. By 2000, this 
had fallen to 91%. On the other hand, female employment at this educational level 
rose from 72% in 1977 to 87% in 2000. These employment shifts over time for those 
with a degree mean that by 2000, the employment rate for females was only slightly 
lower than for males.
These results reflect occupational shifts that favour a more highly skilled 
workforce and reward female type skills. It is clear that employment gains have been 
made by women, and at least to some extent, these have been at the cost of male 
employment, particularly unskilled male employment.
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Table 5.2. Male and Female Employment Rates 1977-2000
1977 1981 1985 1990 1995 2000 Percentage 
Point Change
All
Male 91.2 87.5 80.7 84.5 79.1 82.3 -8.9
Female 60.6 60.1 60.1 67.7 67.4 71.7 11.1
No Qualifications
Male 87.9 81.1 68.4 72.1 60.5 59.9 -28.0
Female 56.8 53.9 50.0 56.1 50.1 48.2 -8.6
Degree Leve
Male 96.0 96.1 92.7 93.4 89.4 91.0 -5.0
Female 71.5 72.5 74.5 81.9 84.8 86.5 15.0
Source: Labour Force Survey
However, it may be thought that because many women work part time and 
move between part time and full time employment looking only at the number of 
women in the labour market or the female employment rate is not a true reflection of 
the extent of female labour force participation. If true, a better measure may be 
provided by looking at the changes in the total hours worked by women (Hakim 1996) 
or the share of the total hours worked by women. Looking at the data in this way also 
makes it possible to break down the increase in female labour force participation into 
full-time and part-time employment. This is important because if as some people have 
argued (McRae 1997) female growth in employment has been concentrated in part 
time jobs it will be less likely that women will be competing with males for the same 
jobs.
Using data from the NES and FES, Table 5.3 shows an increase in the share of 
total hours worked by women between 1970 (1975 for NES) and 2000. A potential 
issue with the NES is that because it contains information on wages from employers, 
it only contains information on those who pay National Insurance contributions. As a 
consequence, it under-samples those with low paid or part-time positions, many of 
whom will be women. On the other hand, the FES contains self-reported information
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from everyone sampled. Thus, it will include more people, but because information is 
self-reported, they may contain measurement error. Despite these potential 
differences, both data produce very similar numbers. Both sources show an increase 
in the share of total hours worked by women from around 30% in the 1970s to 41% in 
2000. Moreover, while the Table shows very slight increases in the share of part-time 
jobs the data also show that the majority of the increase in hours worked (60%) has 
been in full time employment.
Table 5.3. Share of Total Hours Worked by Women 1970-2000
Total Hours Worked Part Time
NES FES NES FES
1970* 30.6 29.5 19.0 22.1
2000 41.1 41.4 23.7 25.8
Change 10.5 11.9 4.7 3.7
*1975 for NES
These findings, although only descriptive, show a number of interesting facts. 
Firstly they reveal an increase in female labour force participation witnessed in the 
economy over the last thirty years. Secondly, they show that the majority of the 
growth in female employment has been in full time work (historically the domain of 
males). Thus, all these results point to the possibility that progress made by females in 
the labour market has, at least to some extent, been at the expense of males.
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5.4.2 Crime
5.4.2.1. Notifiable Offences
Over this period, total notifiable offences rose from a relatively small base of 
around 1,568,000 in 1970 to a peak of 5,383,000 in 1992. After this time a decline 
occurred. This trend over time can be seen in Figure 5.1.
Property Crimes (measured as theft and handling and burglary), which make 
up a large number of total notifiable offences (88% in 1970, 80% in 1985 and 69% in 
1998)13 followed the aggregate trend, rising from 1,376,000 in 1970 to 4,207,000 in 
1992, before subsequently falling. This trend in property crime (as well as the 
breakdown of property crime into its constituent parts) can be seen clearly in Figure 
5.2.
Figure 5.1. Trends in Total Notifiable Offences in England and Wales between 
1970 and 1998
6,000
Year
Source: Home Office
13 Indicating a shift in the structure o f crime.
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Figure 5.2. Trends in Property Crime in England and Wales between 1970
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5.4.2.2 Convictions Data
Examining trends in notifiable offences offers no information on the share of 
crimes committed by males and females. For this we need to look at convictions data 
(the numbers of males and females processed by the criminal justice system).14 This 
is done in Table 5 .4, which shows the number of males and females found guilty o f all 
offences and the number males and females found guilty o f property crime offences 
in both Magistrates and Crown Courts. The Table shows quite clearly that patterns of 
convictions at Crown and Magistrates courts have evolved differently over time. The 
number of males and females found guilty o f all crimes at Crown Court has increased 
while there has been a decline in the number of males and females found guilty of all 
crimes at Magistrates Courts. This decline has been larger for property offences than 
others. This supports the idea that there may have been a compositional change across
14 We would like to use arrest data, as work in the US has done, but the arrest data has not been 
consistently collected in England and Wales by sex over time which would allow us to do this.
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crimes over this period already indicated by the notifiable offence data. This evidence 
may suggest that as crime rose over this period the criminal justice system was forced 
to focus its attention on the more serious crime (i.e. those dealt with by the Crown 
Courts rather than the Magistrates and more violent offences rather than property 
crimes).
The share of those convicted who are female is fairly constant over time and 
across the type of Court. Of those convicted, of all crimes at Magistrates Courts, the 
percentage who are female only shifts between 14 and 16% over all time periods 
considered. The proportion of those found guilty at Crown Courts who are female 
fluctuates by about the same amount, between 7 and 9%. The percentage of those 
found guilty of property offences varies even less over time. At Magistrates Courts, 
between 18 and 19% of those found guilty are female, while at Crown Courts, the 
percentage who are female is between 9 and 10%.
The fact that the share of those found guilty who are female has remained 
fairly constant over time and that the crime rates for males and females have followed 
a similar pattern suggests that the large increase in female labour supply (which as 
traditional criminological theories predict is highly likely to affect the amount of 
female crime), is also likely to be exerting some influence on male crime. Thus, the 
share of female crime remains relatively flat despite huge changes in factors predicted 
to determine crime. This is very much in line with the hypothesis that shifts in female 
labour supply may have an impact on crime by influencing male offending via labour 
market substitution effects.
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Table 5.4 Numbers found guilty at Crown and Magistrates Courts in
England and Wales Between 1975 and 1997
Total Found 
Guilty at 
Magistrates 
Courts
Total Found 
Guilty at 
Crown Courts
Found Guilty of 
Property Crime 
at Magistrates 
Courts
Found Guilty 
of Property 
Crime at 
Crown Courts
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
1975 293279 56615
(16.2)
48846 3741
(7.1)
224660 51424
(19.3)
29520 2549
(9.2)
1980 333013 62357
(15.8)
53560 5415
(9.2)
235254 54431
(17.8)
32992 3905
(9.8)
1985 307547 52032
(14.5)
74961 7007
(8.5)
213222 44632
(17.3)
47069 5038
(9.1)
1990 222401 37011
(14.3)
76265 6998
(8.4)
129093 28600
(17.1)
37735 4295
(9.8)
1997 212231 35696
(14.4)
64255 6544
(9.2)
114680 24758
(17.8)
25026 2685
(9.7)
Percentage who are female in parenthesis
5.4.23 Graphing Changes in Female Labour Force Participation and Crime
Having examined trends in female labour force participation and crime it is 
now possible to look at the effect of rising female participation on property crime by 
graphing the changes in these two variables over time. This is shown in Figure 5.3, 
which plots the change in the female share of employment between 1975 and 1997 
along the X axis and the change in the property crime rate along the Y axis. The line 
represents the fitted values, which are the predicted change in property crime given a 
change in female employment. The exact slope of this line is simply the regression 
coefficient on the female employment variable, which is .259. This means that there is 
a positive relationship between changes in female employment and changes in 
property crime between 1975 and 1997. In other words, the areas where the female 
share of employment rose, are also the areas where property crime increased.
Criminological theory suggests that if economic incentives matter for crime, 
then rising female labour market participation should reduce the amount of crime
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committed by females (see Chesney-Lind and Shelden 1992 or Steffensmeier 1980). 
That the results show a positive relationship suggests that rising female employment 
is positively related to male crime and that this relationship is the dominant force.
Figure 5.3. Changes in Female Employment and Property Crime between 
1975 and 1997
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Using the convictions data, it is also possible to examine the effect of rising 
female labour supply on property crime carried out by males. This is done in a similar 
way to that illustrated in the above graph. The same measure of the change in the 
share of female employment lies along the X axis, but this time the Y axis measures 
changes in the male property crime conviction rate (i.e. the number of males 
convicted of property crimes/all males). The results of this are shown in Figure 5.4. A 
similar picture to the aggregate crime rate emerges. A positive relationship between 
changes in female labour force participation and changes in male property crime is
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produced. Areas where female labour supply rose the most saw the largest rise in male 
convictions for property offences. The regression line is slightly steeper in this graph 
(compared to Figure 5.3), reflecting a larger coefficient on the independent variable 
(.364 compared to .259).
Figure 5.4. Changes in Female Employment and Male Property Crime 
Between 1975 and 1997
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The descriptive statistics not only demonstrate trends in female employment 
and crime over the period under examination, but also point to a possible negative 
relationship between female employment and the male labour market, and between 
female employment and property crime. Such relationships can be examined more 
rigorously by carrying out multivariate regression analysis. Multivariate analysis has
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an advantage over bivariate regression analysis (which has been used to produce the 
graphs), as it allows the model to take account of other changes that may be 
happening at the same time and that may affect the relationship between the variables 
of primary interest.
5.5 Statistical Regression Analysis
5.5.1 Crim e Equations
Statistical regression analysis makes it possible to establish more precisely the 
relationship between increases in female employment and crime, while controlling for 
other variables that may be correlated with the key variables of interest. In addition, 
because of the nested nature of the data (at police force area level across time), it is 
possible to control for factors that are constant across areas and over time that may not 
be measurable in other ways. This has been discussed in detail in previous Chapters 
but an example of the former would be macro-economic shocks that hit the economy 
as a whole, while the latter may include factors specific to areas such as those related 
to geography.
Thus, the aim is to regress crime rates on female employment while 
controlling for a number of other factors that may influence the relationship. The 
model which make this analysis possible is specified for area ‘a ’ and time *t* as 
follows:
Cat= a  + p,Fempat + P2Demoat + P2Deterat +Fa +Tt + eat
where C is the log(crime rate), Femp is a measure of female labour force participation 
(the female share of total employment), Demo is the controls for shifts in
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demographic characteristics of areas, and Deter is the controls for shifts in deterrence. 
F denotes controls for area fixed effects, measured by the inclusion of area dummies 
(excluding one due to the inclusion of the constant a  in the equation). T represents 
time specific effects (again measured by the inclusion of (t-1) dummy variables for 
year). £ is an error term which reflects the fact that although the model includes a 
number of independent variables as well as controls for area and time effects, it is still 
unlikely to fully explain all the variation in the dependent variable. The subscripts ‘a ’ 
and 7 ' indicate that the model uses data at police force area measured over time.
The results of this model are given in Table 5.5. There are five model 
specifications. The first (1) is simply the fixed effects regression of property crime on 
the share of female employment, controlling only for time and area effects. The 
second specification (2) also controls for the demographic structure of the area 
(specifically the proportion of young people in the area aged under 25), that may 
influence the relationship of primary interest. The third (3) and fourth (4) model 
specifications add in deterrence measures: (3) controls for the proportion of the 
population found guilty of a crime; while specification (4) controls for the number of 
policemen in the area. The final specification (5) controls for demographics and 
includes both deterrence measures.
In the basic model (1), the coefficient on female employment attracts a 
positive, fairly sizable coefficient of .287, which is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. Because this is an area fixed effects model, the results can be interpreted as a 
change relationship. In other words, in those areas where female employment has 
risen, there has also been an increase in property crime. This supports the idea that 
despite the possibility that female employment reduces female crime, the overall 
effect of rising female employment has been to increase crime.
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This finding is robust to the inclusion of controls for the demographic make­
up of the area. When this is taken into account in specification (2), the coefficient on 
the share of female employment is slightly reduced (.242), but remains statistically 
significant at the 5% level.
Adding in additional controls for the proportion of the population found guilty 
of a property crime (specification (3)) does not alter the coefficient on the female 
share of employment from model (2). It remains .242, although in (3) it is only 
significant at the 10% level. The coefficient on the variable measuring the proportion 
found guilty attracts a negative coefficient of -.057, but is statistically insignificant.
The picture is somewhat different in specification (4), when the second 
deterrence measure, the number of police officers in the area, is added to the model. 
The inclusion of this variable actually increases the magnitude of the coefficient on 
the female share of employment to .256. This is statistically significant at the 10% 
level. Like the coefficient on the proportion found guilty, the number of police 
officers attracts a negative sign of similar magnitude (-.056). But unlike the previous 
deterrence measure, this result is strongly statistically significant at a greater than 1% 
level.
These results indicate that areas where female employment has risen have seen 
increases in property crime, even after controlling for the fact that areas where the 
number of police officers has risen have seen relative declines in the property crime 
rates.
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Table 5.5 Property Crime Rates and Female Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female
Employment
.287**
(.136)
.242**
(.135)
.242*
(.135)
.256*
(.134)
.255*
(.134)
No. of Police 
Officers
-.056***
(.018)
-.055***
(.019)
Proportion 
Found Guilty
-.057
(.063)
-.039
(.072)
Controls for 
Demographics
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time
Controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Area Fixed 
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R Squared .958 .958 .959 .959 .959
Observations 943 943 943 943 943
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, *** significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%
5.5.2 Male Crime Equations
In the previous model, notifiable offences for property crime were related to 
the share of female employment (and other factors). Thus, the results produced 
include any effect female employment has on crimes committed by females as well as 
males. As already noted, while females only constitute a small fraction of individuals 
who commit crimes (between 15% and 17% for property crimes) and this is stable 
through time, there remains the possibility that their inclusion may be affecting the 
results.15 To investigate this issue, it is possible to carry out a similar regression to the 
one above using only male crime as the dependent variable (with the convictions data) 
and including other male specific controls and population weights. The model now 
becomes:
15 Indeed, it is likely that female employment by improving the position o f women will decrease their 
involvement in crime (Chesney-Lind and Shelden 2000). If this is the case by including female crime 
the model will underestimate the true effect that shifts in female employment has on male crime.
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MCat = a  + Fempat + 52MDemoat + S3Deterat + Fa +Tt + eat
where MC is the male-specific log(conviction rate) for property offences, Femp is the 
same measure of female labour force participation, MDemo controls for shifts in 
demographic characteristics of males in the area, and Deter controls for the number of 
police officers. Again, F denotes controls for area fixed effects, T controls for time 
specific effects and e is the error term. The subscripts ‘a ' and V' indicate that the 
model is calculated using data across police force areas measured over time.
The results of this model are shown in Table 5.6. There are three different 
model specifications. The first (1), like the previous model, is a simple regression of 
the male property crime rate on female convictions with area and time fixed effects. 
The second (2), additionally controls for the demographic structure of areas; while the 
third (3), includes the number of police officers in an area as a measure of deterrence.
As with the notifiable offences, the basic convictions model uncovers a 
positive coefficient on the share of female employment. This is statistically significant 
at the 5% level. The magnitude of the coefficient is slightly larger when the male- 
specific crime rate is the dependent variable rather than all notifiable offences for 
property crimes (.331 compared to .288 in the previous model).
The inclusion of controls for area demographics causes the coefficient on the 
share of female employment to increase slightly, moving from .331 in the basic model 
(1) to .361 in the model that controls for demographics (2). This remains statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Additionally, controlling for deterrence by including the 
number of police officers to the model in (3), again leads to a slight increase the 
coefficient on the share of female employment, which is now significant at the 10% 
level. The coefficient on the number of police officers is -.029, which is significant at 
the 5% level. A possible reason for the smaller magnitude of the coefficient
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(compared to that of the previous model) may be related to bias (produced if the 
number of police in an area is negatively correlated with the convictions in an area).16
Thus, the results from this model, as shown in Table 5.6, very much reconfirm 
the earlier picture. Areas where the share of female employment showed a higher 
increase saw a higher increase in male property crime.
Table 5.6 Male Property Crime Rates and Female Employment
(1) (2) (3)
Female Employment .331**
(.108)
.361**
(.107)
.369*
(.107)
No. of Police Officers -.029**
(.014)
Controls for 
Demographics
No Yes Yes
Time Controls Yes Yes Yes
Area Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
R Squared .987 .987 .987
Observations 943 943 943
Robust standard errors in parenthesis *** significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%
5.5.5 Interaction between the Male and Female Labour Markets: Male Wages 
and Female Employment
Having established a positive relationship between rising female labour force 
participation and crime across areas and time we now need to establish why this 
relationship exists. We can try to do this by examining a possible mechanism through 
which higher female labour force participation increases crime. Earlier Chapters have
16 If the number o f police is negatively related to convictions (i.e. more police officers, less crime, 
therefore fewer convictions) the bias will be downwards and the coefficient on the number o f police 
officers will be an underestimate of the true effect. It may be possible that the two variables are 
positively related. In this case the bias would work in the opposite direction. There may be some 
concern about the possible relationship between the number o f police officers and the convictions and 
as a result the number of police would be an endogenous measure. However, we can see from Table 5.6 
that the inclusion o f the variable that measures the number of police officers does not alter the 
coefficient on the measure o f female employment
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already identified low wages to be positively associated with crime. If increasing 
female labour supply lowers male wages, and low wage men are more likely to 
commit crime, this is may to lead to an increase in crime. One way to examine this is
17by regressing male wages on female employment. A model which allows us to do 
this is:
MWat = a  + °\FemPat + 02Demoat +Fa +Tt + s at
where MWat is the Log (Male mean wage), Femp is a measure of female labour force
participation (the female share of total employment) and Demo controls for shifts in 
demographic characteristics of areas. As with the previous models, F denotes controls 
for area fixed effects, T represents a control for time-specific effects and e is the error 
term. Again the subscripts ‘a ’ and Y  indicate that the model is to be estimated for 
each area and each time period.
Table 5.7 reports two specifications that examine this question. The first is the 
basic area and time fixed effects model (1). The second (2) additionally controls for 
the demographic make-up of an area. The first specification produces a negative 
relationship between female employment and male wages (-.405) which is statistically 
significant at a greater than the 1% level. Additionally controlling for the 
demographic structure of an area slightly reduces the coefficient to -.368, but it 
remains statistically significant at a greater than 1% level. These results strongly 
indicate that areas where female employment has risen most have also seen the 
greatest fall in average male wages.
17 This is important because we want to establish that female labour force participation is positively 
related to crime because it lowers male wages. There are other ways female labour force participation 
may increase crime by simply increasing the stock o f goods or reducing the guardianship o f property 
for example (see routine activity theory (Felson 1994).
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Table 5.7 Male Mean Wages and Female Employment
(1) (2)
Female Employment -.405***
(.079)
_ 368***
(.072)
Controls for 
Demographics
No Yes
Time Controls Yes Yes
Area Fixed Effects Yes Yes
R Squared .996 .996
Observations 943 943
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%
5.5.4 Interaction between the Male and Female Labour Markets: Focus on Low 
Skilled Occupations
The previous sub-section shows average male wages grew by less in areas 
where female employment rose by more. This suggests a deterioration in the male 
labour market. However, it may well be the case that it is males in less good jobs (i.e. 
paid beneath average wages) who are more likely to engage in crime (Farrington
1 ft1986). If this is the case, increasing female labour supply should have a greater 
effect on crime in these low skilled occupations than in other occupations.
This analysis becomes more important if, as a number of researchers argue 
(Topel 1997, Grant and Hamermesh 1981, Boijas 1986) more educated women, 
substitute for less skilled men since they tend to have less labour market experience 
than their male counterparts (or because they face labour market discrimination). If 
this is the case, increased female labour supply will lead to competition for jobs 
performed by less skilled males. As the females are more educated than the males 
they are competing with for jobs, employers are likely to favour the women,
18 This was shown to be the case in Chapter 4.
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particularly given they may receive lower wages (either as a result of having less 
labour market experience or on account of discrimination). For the males to compete 
favourably with the females, they may have to accept lower wages. In this way, the 
increase of females in the labour market will have a disproportionate effect on males 
at the bottom end of the labour market, who (as previous Chapters of this thesis have 
shown) are already more likely to be on the margins of crime.
To examine whether this is the case, Table 5.8 replaces the original measure of 
the female share of employment with the proportion of females in occupations where 
the male wage in the initial time period (1975) was below the 25th percentile of the 
male wage distribution. The first specification (1) is simply the fixed effects 
regression of property crime on the share of female employment, controlling only for 
time and area effects. The second specification (2) additionally controls for the 
demographic structure of the area (specifically the proportion of young people in the 
area aged under 25) that may influence the relationship of primary interest. The third 
(3) and fourth (4) model specifications add in deterrence measures: (3) controls for the 
proportion of the population found guilty of a crime; while specification (4) controls 
for the number of policemen in the area. The final specification (5) controls for 
demographics and includes both deterrence measures.
As with the original measure of the share o f female employment (in Table 
5.5), the basic specification produces a positive relationship between the share of 
female employment in low skilled occupations and property crime. In this case, the 
coefficient is slightly larger in magnitude at .333 (compared to .287) and is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. This supports the hypothesis that it is the 
males at the bottom of the earnings distribution who are most affected by the increase 
in female labour force participation.
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When the model additionally controls for the demographic structure of areas 
(specification (2)), the coefficient increases to .353 and remains statistically 
significant at the 5% level. The coefficient further increases to .366 in specification 
(3), with the inclusion of the proportion of people found guilty of a crime. This result 
is statistically significant at a level greater than 1%. However, as with the previous 
model, while the coefficient on the proportion found guilty attracts a negative sign 
(which seems intuitive), it remains statistically insignificant.
Adding in a control for the number of police in model (4) slightly reduces the 
coefficient on the share of female employment in low skilled occupations, but it 
remains statistically significant at the 5% level. The coefficient on the number of 
police officers attracts a negative coefficient of -.051 which is significant at a greater 
than 1% level (reassuringly, this is very close to the magnitude of the same coefficient 
in Table 5.5 which is -.055). In the full model, in specification (5), the coefficient on 
the female share of employment is .328, which remains significant at the 1% level. 
The number of police officers also remains significant at the 1 % level, attracting a 
negative sign of -.050.
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Table 5.8 Property Crime and Female Employment in Low Wage
Occupations19
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female 
Employment 
in Low Skill 
Occupations
.333**
(.137)
.353**
(.137)
.366***
(.138)
317**
(.135)
328***
(.136)
No. of Police 
Officers
_ 051*** 
(.018)
-.050***
(.018)
Proportion 
Found Guilty
-.066
(.063)
-.048
(.063)
Controls for 
Demographics
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time
Controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Area Fixed 
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R Squared .958 .959 .959 .959 .959
Observations 943 943 943 943 943
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, *** significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%
Because wages tend to be lower in female dominated occupations this 
measure, which identifies low paid males, is likely to include a number of males 
working in female dominated occupations. If these men differ in any way from males 
working in non-female dominated occupations, it is important to construct another 
measure of low paid occupations, which will not pick up males working in 
traditionally female occupations.
Therefore, Table 5.9 reproduces Table 5.8, replacing the existing definition of 
low skilled occupations, with one that measures the share of females in occupations 
where the average male wage was beneath the 50 percentile of the male wage
19 Occupations where the average male wage was beneath the 25th percentile male wage distribution in 
1975.
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distribution in 1975 and where at least 50% of the workforce was male in the initial 
period.
The results produced by this model are very similar to those in Table 5.8. A 
strong positive association between the share of female employment and crime is 
discovered in all five model specifications. As we would expect, this model produces 
coefficients on the share of female employment that have larger magnitudes than in 
previous models (.406 in the final specification compared to .328 in the low skilled
t l i25 percentile measure and .255 using the original share of females in all 
occupations). This is to be expected since traditionally the occupations examined here 
are strongly male dominated (see Appendix A for the percentage of males and females 
in these occupations over time). The increase of females is likely to have the greatest 
effect on the males within such occupations than in other occupations where female 
presence is more commonly observed.
As with the other models, the proportion found guilty attracts a negative, but 
statistically insignificant coefficient. The coefficient on the number of police officers 
is negative and strongly significant. It is very similar in magnitude to all the other 
models. The robustness of these findings is reassuring given the different ways the 
share of female employment is measured across models.
These results are supportive of other findings in earlier Chapters of this thesis 
(Chapters 2, 3 and 4) that also indicate that males at the lower end of the employment 
structure are the most vulnerable to crime.
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Table 5.9 Property Crime and Female Employment in Low Wage
20Occupations
a ) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female 
Employment 
in Low Skill 
Occupations
382***
(.067)
415***
(.066)
.419***
(.066)
402***
(.065)
406***
(.065)
No. of Police 
Officers
_ 046*** 
(.018)
-.044**
(.018)
Proportion 
Found Guilty
-.074
(.061)
-.058
(.061)
Controls for 
Demographics
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time
Controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Area Fixed 
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R Squared .960 .961 .961 .962 .962
Observations 943 943 943 943 943
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, *** significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%
5.6 Concluding Remarks
This Chapter has examined the effect increased female labour force 
participation has on crime. Traditionally, work in this area has focused almost 
exclusively on the effect of female labour supply on female crime. However, the 
results here indicate this approach has only touched on a small proportion of the 
impact increasing female labour supply has on crime. Because the amount of crime 
carried out by females is relatively small compared to that done by males, examining 
the outcome of increased female labour supply on male crime uncovers a much larger 
overall impact on crime than previously thought.
2 0  Occupations where the average male wage was beneath the 50* percentile male wage distribution in 
1975 and where at least 50% of the workforce were male in the initial period.
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The results show that in areas where female employment rose, crime also rose. 
This result is robust to crime measured as all notifiable offences for property crimes 
and when measured as male property crime convictions. The results are stronger for 
male-specific crimes, probably due to the fact that including even a small number of 
female crimes is likely to bias the coefficient downwards, as female employment and 
female crime are likely to be negatively related.
Findings suggest that the positive relationship between female labour supply 
and crime may be produced as a result of the influence of higher female employment 
in reducing male wages. The fact that results are stronger when female employment is 
measured as the share of women in low skilled male occupations suggests that it is the 
wages of the least skilled males that are most affected. This is supportive of the idea 
that women substitute for less skilled men, thus increasing pressure on males who are 
already likely to be on the margins of crime and thereby leading to an increase in 
crime.
While a positive relationship between female labour supply and crime has 
been shown, this does not mean that female employment necessarily produces bad 
outcomes. And policy makers interested in reducing crime would be misled if they 
thought that reducing female employment would solve the problem. The results 
suggest that the real issue may be that females entering the labour market are 
substituting for low skilled males. It is likely that as females continue to improve their 
educational qualifications and accumulate labour market experience, they will 
compete for jobs with males who are further up the employment ladder and who are 
thus less likely to be on the margins of crime. It is likely that as women substitute for 
males higher up the employment ladder the effect of increasing female labour supply 
on crime will become weaker.
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6. Age Differences in Crime: Are They 
Explained by Education?
6.1 Introduction
The peaking of aggregate crime in adolescence or early adulthood and its 
subsequent decline with age has become an established pattern.1 Whilst this is fairly 
uncontentious, the exact nature of the crime-age relation, and whether there are 
potential differences across different groups of people, is much more controversial. 
For example, Hirshi and Gottfredson (1983) argue that the relationship between crime 
and age is not only invariant across time and place, but is also independent of other 
correlates of crime. For Hirshi and Gottfredson, age has a direct influence on crime 
which cannot be explained by other variables.
Others (such as Kercher 1987) argue age is related to crime because it is 
associated with particular stages in an individual’s life cycle, which influence 
attitudes and behaviour and act to encourage or discourage criminal involvement. But 
such factors have differential effects on individuals or groups, which means that 
crime-age profiles will not be the same across different groups of people. Greenberg 
(1977) points out that changes which have taken place in the family, education and 
the labour force since the 1940s have made it increasingly difficult for young people 
to make the transition to adulthood. Thus, current crime-age profiles are different 
from crime-age profiles produced in earlier time periods. Profiles also vary for 
different types of crime (Steffensmeier et al 1989), as property crimes peak earlier
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than violent crimes, which themselves peak earlier than sexual crimes. We also see 
differences in the crime-age profiles between different ethnic or social groups 
(Greenberg 1977), or between males and females (Graham and Bowling, 1995) 
because the factors which encourage and discourage criminal activity amongst these 
groups are likely to be different.
This Chapter addresses Hirshi and Gottfredson’s invariance thesis in a 
different way from previous studies, by examining the distribution of crime and age 
for two groups of young males: those who have more education and those who have 
less. As a critical part of the childhood years is children’s exposure to the education 
system, the focus of this Chapter is on potentially different crime-age profiles for 
people with different levels of educational attainment.
6.2 Education and offending
According to a report by HM Chief Inspectorate of Prisons (1998) there were 
10570 young people under the age of 22 in the custody of the prison services in 
England and Wales in 1997. This represents a 5% increase on the previous year. The 
report points out ‘most of the youngsters had been failed by the education system’ 
(Chapter 3, paragraph 3.12). Around two thirds of these youths had no formal 
qualifications, many had regularly truanted from school and over 50% had been 
excluded (or left voluntarily) before the age of 16.
These findings highlight an important link between education and offending 
which has been found in many empirical studies (e.g. Rutter 1979, Thomberry et al 
1985). For example, in an analysis focusing on the importance of completing school,
1 Although there are authors who disagree such as Cain (2000).
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Lochner (1999) found that high school graduation2 reduced criminal participation 
among young males in the US, even after differences in ability were controlled for. 
He also found that young male high school graduates were 30% less likely to earn an 
income from crime than those who did not graduate. Moreover, high school 
graduation reduced the probability of being arrested by around 60% and incarceration 
by between 85-95%. In the UK Farrington et al (1986) found offending was slightly 
lower amongst youths still at school.
There are a number of ways education can be thought to affect offending. The 
most pessimistic is that whilst youngsters are at school, they are being kept off the 
streets . This separates them from their more delinquent peers (who are likely to be 
absent from school) and enforces some level of discipline upon them. At the same 
time, they are encouraged by the idea of meritocracy to have aspirations, and to create 
goals which, by working hard at school, they will be able to achieve. This encourages 
children to develop a stake in their own future and in society more generally. All of 
these act to minimise offending by youngsters in education.
Perhaps more importantly, education allows children to develop skills and 
acquire knowledge and training which will affect their future success in life. Their 
ability to communicate and forge relationships, their post compulsory educational 
choices, the jobs they will do and the wages they will receive over the life cycle 
potentially depend on skill formation and human capital accumulation whilst still at 
school. If children want to maximise their future success, they will be less likely to 
offend as youngsters. If they secure successful jobs with good wages as a result of 
their educational success, they will also be less likely to offend as adults.
2 In the US high school graduation signifies the successful completion o f 12 years compulsory 
schooling and usually takes place when individuals are 17 years old.
3 Although this is not to deny that children can, and do, offend at school by bullying for instance.
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However, not all youngsters have positive experiences of their time spent at 
school. It has been argued that problems at school increase delinquency for some 
young people (Cohen 1955, Greenberg 1977). This is likely to be particularly true for 
working class children who tend to be less well prepared for school because of the 
lack of educational stimulation and resources at home. Moreover, working class 
children often do not have the role models that encourage them to do well at school. If 
the people they see around them are unemployed or insecurely employed in unskilled 
jobs, they may see little point in investing in their future through education if that is 
all the future holds. Thus, for working class children these factors affect not only their 
ability to learn but also their motivation to succeed at school. Their experience of 
school can just serve to alienate working class children from the educational system. 
They may develop an anti-school culture, involving misbehaviour or playing truant, 
as a way of dealing with their alienation and lack of educational success (Willis, 
1977). This brings them into conflict with the school authorities and often with the 
police as their delinquency extends beyond the school setting into wider society.
6.3 Crime and Age
There are a number of theories which predict that crime will vary by age. 
Some even predict specific age variations, like the fact that crime will rise and peak in 
the late teens and early twenties before subsequently declining. Whilst these theories 
may not be able to fully explain the crime-age variation, or the exact shape of the 
crime-age profile, they do at least inform the way we think about crime and age.
Whilst they are young most individuals have no strong sense of self-identity; 
much of their behaviour is based on achieving short term desires. Delinquency in this 
sense is a way of getting ‘kicks’, having a laugh or relieving boredom. Strain theory
213
predicts that this may be accentuated if youngsters feel that their opportunities of 
achieving these short term aims legally are blocked (Merton 1938). According to sub­
cultural theory young people may develop their own subcultures as a way of dealing 
with the strain of blocked opportunities which may well encourage the illegal pursuit 
of short term desires (Cloward and Ohlin 1960, Cohen 1955). Additionally, peer 
pressure may increase delinquency in youth as youngsters are encouraged to prove 
themselves and show loyalty to their peers by partaking in delinquent acts.
At this stage, most youngsters feel little pressure to conform to societal norms. 
Because of this, social controls are unable to deter them from breaking the law. At the 
same time youths are protected, by their dependent status, from harsh punishment in 
the criminal justice system.
All these factors predict a higher involvement in public crime for young 
people. According to labelling theory (Becker 1960), this may lead to young people in 
general being labelled as delinquent, though many of them are not. Because young 
people may be more affected by labels that are given to them this may in itself 
encourage young people to conform to the deviant label that is attached to them (or 
give them less of an opportunity to escape such categorisation) and thus increase 
youth involvement in crime.
As youngsters grow up, they are influenced by a series of factors that 
discourage them from breaking the law. Maturation theory (see Farrington 1986) 
predicts that as individuals mature, they begin to think of much delinquent behaviour 
as childish. As they move from dependence to independence, leaving school and the 
parental home and entering the labour market, getting married and starting families of 
their own, young people begin to develop ties to society and attachments to social 
institutions such as the family, the labour market and the community. These factors
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coupled with the possibility of severe legal sanctions all encourage a lower crime rate, 
at least in public, as young people move towards adulthood.
Whilst many of these theories offer plausible explanations of the crime-age 
distribution, not all offer an account of why we might expect to see potential variation 
in the crime-age profiles of two youths of the same age. Thus, some can be thought of 
as pure age theories, explaining differences between age groups but shedding little 
light on within age group variation. For example, social controls and treatment by the 
criminal justice system do not differentially affect different groups of young people 
once age is taken into account.
As this Chapter is concerned with how crime-age profiles vary by education, 
theories which offer an account of this potential variation are of the most interest. For 
example, if opportunities depend on educational attainment, strain theory may predict 
that the less educated are more likely to be involved in crime than the more educated 
as they are more likely to experience blocked opportunities. Equally, if less educated 
youngsters are more easily influenced by their delinquent contemporaries, or if  they 
have larger peer groups, peer group theories predict they are more likely to be 
involved in crime.
As far as this Chapter is concerned, maturation theory is perhaps the most 
useful theory. It predicts that we should see the crime-age profiles for the more and 
less educated groups peaking at different times as the two groups make the transition 
from childhood to adulthood at different ages depending on what age they left school. 
Maturation theory also predicts that we might expect the less educated group to be 
more involved in crime as they potentially find it more difficult to make the transition 
to adulthood. Thus, since they leave school earlier, the less educated group move to 
adulthood before those who stay at school, but this transition may be more difficult.
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For example, a key element of adulthood involves finding employment. However, 
having invested in only basic human capital those with less education may have more 
difficulty securing a job with good remuneration and working conditions than those 
who stay on at school and invest in extra human capital.
It is clear that some theories not only help us to explain why the crime-age 
distribution peaks in the mid to late teens and early twenties and then declines, but 
may also suggest that we are likely to see potential differences in the crime-age 
profiles for different educational groups, for different societies, different time periods, 
different sections of society and for different crimes.
6.4 Empirical Work
Some empirical work supports the idea that the crime-age profiles may differ 
with observable characteristics. For example, Steffensmeier et al (1989), working 
with US data from Uniform Crime reports across three different periods and using a 
number of statistical measures, find variation in the distribution of crime and age 
across crime groups in 1980 (the peak age for property crimes being younger than for 
other crimes) and also across time between 1940 and 1980 (the offenders were older 
and more varied in age in 1940 than 1980). In Laub’s (1983) study, using data which 
asks the victims the age of the perpetrator, differences in the crime-age profiles of 
those living in urban areas compared to non-urban areas, blacks compared to whites 
and males compared to females are discovered. Rowe and Tittle (1977) find that much 
of the relationship between crime and age is explained by other variables such as 
social integration, fear of sanctions, moral commitment and utility of crime when 
these variables were examined together. Kercher (1987) re-analyses the data used by 
Rowe and Tittle and finds that the relationship between age and crime is an indirect
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one, mediated through other explanatory variables such as moral commitment and 
having criminal associates.
However, other research contradicts these findings. Hirshi and Gottfredson 
(1983, 1985) argue that the crime-age distribution does not vary across time and 
space. They argue that different groups in society may differ in their levels of 
involvement in crime, but not in the way they vary with age. Thus, the number of 
crimes committed per person at any given age as a proportion of that age group 
should be the same for all groups. For Hirshi and Gottfredson, age has a direct 
influence on crime, which cannot be explained by other variables. This leads them to 
argue that existing theories cannot be used to explain crime, as variables predicted by 
these theories to have a causal impact on crime vary both temporally and spatially.
Hirshi and Gottfredson use data on indictable offences of theft and personal 
violence crimes in England and Wales in 1842 to 1844, total convictions in England 
in 1913, and, total arrests from the US Uniform Crime Reports in 1979 to show that 
crime-age profiles are invariant. However, the evidence used to support their theses is 
somewhat limited and Hirshi and Gottfredson provide no statistical tests to validate 
their argument.
Britt (1994) examines arrests for 7 different types of crime in the US for a 
number of years between 1952 and 1987. His findings support those of Hirshi and 
Gottfredson, that crime-age profiles are invariant across time and offence category.4
Tittle (1980) uses self-reported data and finds that the crime-age distribution is 
not affected by controls for sex, ethnicity, marital status, family background or labour 
market status. However, Tittle uses age bands 15-24, 25-44, 45-64, 65+ which would 
only pick out extreme differences in the crime-age profile for different offences. Also
4 Although Greenberg (1994) examining arrests in the US between 1952 and 1957 found no trend over 
time in the crime-age distribution.
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Tittle’s definition of criminal involvement incorporates anyone who has committed a 
crime in the past five years, which is not likely to be an accurate measure for 
examining the crime-age profile.
Shavit and Rattner (1988) use self-reported data in the form of life histories of 
2144 Jewish Israeli men bom in 1954. Interviews were conducted with the men when 
they were 26-27 years old. The authors find a similar crime-age distribution across 
social groups and conclude that the distribution cannot be explained by age variations 
in other variables such as schooling. However, the research looks at all crimes 
combined, which may well mask differences between different crime categories. 
Moreover, by their own admission, some of the life course variables used in their 
research are fairly cmde.
6.5 Data
The data used in this Chapter were collected by Market and Opinion Research 
International (MORI) for the Home Office in 1992/3. The data were originally used 
by Graham and Bowling (1995) in an examination of self-reported offending, to 
establish the correlates of criminal onset and desistence amongst 14 to 25 year olds in 
England and Wales.
The data are derived from a nationally representative sample of (893) 14-25 
year olds in England and Wales, with a secondary sample of (823) 14-25 year olds in 
high crime areas, and booster samples of ethnic groups (808): Afro-Caribbeans, 
Indians and Pakistanis/Bangladeshi. In total 2529 young people were interviewed. 
The overall response rate was 69%, 70% for the national sample and 68% for both the 
high crime sample and ethnic booster. The response rate was lower in London than 
elsewhere.
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The interviews began with face-to-face questions asking for socio­
demographic and lifestyle information. Respondents were then asked to complete 
booklets asking questions on four areas: drug use, offending behaviour and more 
detailed questions on offending behaviour and police contact. This was followed by 
an interviewer assessment of background details such as the area where the 
respondent lived.
Because the survey collected self-reported data it is not affected by bias 
associated with the selection and processing of individuals by the criminal justice 
system.5 One of the problems with much of the work done on the crime-age 
distribution is that it has used aggregated official statistics and thus may be more a 
reflection of police activity than any real trends in the crime-age distribution. 
However, as some of the discussion in Chapter 1 showed, there are also some 
problems associated with self-report surveys: respondents may conceal or exaggerate 
their involvement in crime, or may answer in a way that they think the interviewer 
wants them to. Moreover, because some of the information is being asked 
retrospectively, respondents may not remember accurately events that have happened 
in the past or may say they happened at a specific time which the researcher is asking 
about when in reality they happened before or after that date (Brantingham and 
Brantingham, 1984).
This survey contains no information on individuals who refused to take part in 
the survey. However, we do know that the non-response rate was higher in the poorly 
maintained areas6 (Graham and Bowling, 1995). If the occupants of these areas are 
more or less likely to commit crimes than individuals who did take part in the survey 
an element of bias may be introduced into empirical work based on the sample.
5 This is not to deny the possibility that such selection and processing has already taken place 
informally through labeling or stigmatization.
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Additionally, the data exclude young people who live in institutions: hospitals; 
prisons or young offender institutions; residential care homes; army barracks; nurses’ 
accommodation, and colleges and public schools. It also excludes the homeless. These 
groups only make up a tiny proportion of young people living in England and Wales, 
so whilst their exclusion may introduce additional bias into the sample, as it is 
possible that those youngsters in prison or living rough are likely to be (or to have 
been) more involved in crime (Carlen 1996, Hagan and McCarthy 1997), the numbers 
involved are so small this is unlikely to be the case.
Despite the potential problems, these data offer a unique source of information 
on individual crime at a national level not found elsewhere in the UK. But, because of 
the possible sample selection bias discussed above it may be better to think of the 
study as shedding light on the nature of crime-age profiles for the sample of young 
men studied as opposed to a nationally representative study.7
6.6 Descriptive Statistics
Table 6.1 shows that, of all respondents, 15% reported committing a property 
offence in the last year, 13% reported committing a violent offence and 11% said 
that they had committed a handling offence. These Figures vary by age, just under a 
sixth of 16 and 17 year olds and just over a fifth of 18-22 year olds reported 
committing a property offence in the last year, compared to only 7% of 23-25 year 
olds. 16% of 18-21 year olds said they had committed a handling offence in the last 
year, while only 5% of 22-25 year olds said they had committed the same kind of
6  Derived from the interviewer’s classification o f the respondent’s home and surrounding area.
7 Although to try to ensure the sample was representative and to correct for sampling variance and any 
bias produced by the inclusion o f the booster samples, both household and individual weights were 
used.
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crimes. 17% of 16-17 year olds reported committing a violent offence in the last year,
while just over 5% of 23-25 year olds said they had committed similar offences.
Table 6.1. Percentage of Males who Committed Offences in the last 12 
Months
Property ol fences Handling offences Violent offences
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
All 15.0 .357 10.6 .308 12.7 .333
16-17 14.7 .354 7.9 .271 16.9 .376
18-21 20.5 .404 16.0 .367 15.0 .357
22-25 7.0 .255 4.9 .217 5.3 .224
6.7 Methodology and Preliminary Data Analysis
This Chapter examines different age profiles for people with different 
educational attainment. However, for the age groups in these data the usual 
educational variable used, educational qualifications, is not suitable. It does not allow 
identification of those who genuinely leave the education system with the lowest 
qualifications (1 CSE grade 5 for example) from those who have left with 5 or more 
GCSEs. Nor is it possible to distinguish between different levels of vocational 
qualifications, which vary greatly in terms of standards. It is possible to identify those 
people who have no qualifications at all, but very few people leave the education 
system today with no qualifications. Moreover, the fact that many people are now 
gaining qualifications in later life cannot be ignored. For these reasons this Chapter 
looks at the distribution of crime and age for those who have left school compared to
o
those who stay on after 16.
More specifically, this Chapter examines the probability that a youth who left 
school at 16 will commit an offence (as compared to not committing an offence) and 
compares this to the probability that a youth who stayed on at school will commit an
8 This includes people in Further Education colleges as well as schools.
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offence (as compared to not committing an offence). The parametric model that 
enables this comparison is a maximum likelihood probit9 model (Gujarati 1995). This 
model is based on the assumption that the probability distribution in question (i.e. the 
probability of committing an offence) is normal and predicts probability Y=1 (i.e. a 
youth who left school at 16 [stayed on] committing an offence) compared to Y=0 (not 
committing an offence).
When thinking about the best way to model the crime-age distribution we first 
have to identify the most appropriate functional form. Figure 6.1, shows males found 
guilty or cautioned for indictable offences in 199710 (as a percentage of the 
population). We can see from this that there is a maximum peak in the data at age 18. 
And for the age range 16-25 the profile is approximately quadratic in shape.
Figure 6.1 The Crime-Age Profiles of Males aged 10-71« 1997
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Source: Home Office
9 The analysis was also carried out using a maximum likelihood logit model, which gave very similar 
results. Logit models are closely related to probits but are based on a logistic distribution rather than a 
normal distribution.
10 This is different from the data I use which examines separate crime types.
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Along with the quadratic, the functional forms considered in this Chapter are 
the linear, cubic and age dummy profiles, which can be seen in Figures 6.2A-6.2C. 
The statistical tests (shown in Appendix C) indicate that the linear profile is not 
appropriate as it predicts that crime declines with age. This is surprising given the 
findings of other studies. Of the non-linear functional forms both the quadratic and 
cubic follow similar patterns, with a maximum peak in the data. The inclusion of the 
age dummies produce a similar pattern, though they jump around a lot, which may be 
a reflection of sampling error rather than any real trends in the data as the number of 
those involved in crimes is quite small. Despite this, the age dummies display a 
similar crime relationship across age groups.
Using dummies may be thought a truer reflection of the data than other 
methods which impose a functional form to the data. Because of the small sample 
sizes involved in this analysis perhaps a better way to look at patterns in the data 
without imposing a functional form is to use a Nadaraya-Watson non-parametric 
regression estimator.11 This is done in Figures 6.3A-6.3C, which show a very similar 
crime-age distribution to the quadratic even more so to the cubic profiles in Figures 
6.2A-6.2C.
For violent crimes (Figures 6.2C and 6.3C), the relationship between crime 
and age appears to be linear, declining with age and producing no peak in the data for 
the ages examined. In part, this may reflect the lack of any of the most violent crimes 
in these data, such as rape and murder. Including such offences may create a peak in 
the data at a later age than observed here. However, in a sample of this size there 
would be too few of these crimes to produce meaningful analysis, even if  they were 
included in the data.
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Figure 6.2A Crime-Age Profiles for Property Crime
°  Linear 
n  Cubic
&  Quadratic 
Dummies
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Figure 6.2B. Crime-Age Profiles for Handling Crime
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Figure 6.2C. Crime-Age Profiles for Violent Crime
°  Li n e a r  
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A Q u a d ra tic 
D urn m i e s
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11 H ere no assum ption  is m ade about the functional form  o f  the crim e-age d istribution . U nlike p rob it 
regressions w hich assum e a norm al d istribu tion  and logistic regressions w hich  assum e a logistic 
distribution.
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Figure 6.3A Crime-Age Profiles using Non-Parametric Methods for Property
Crime
Figure 6.3B Crime-Age Profiles using Non-Parametric Methods for Handling 
Crime
1 5
Figure 6.3C Crime-Age Profiles using Non-Parametric Methods for Violent 
Crime
Despite the slightly different pattern produced by violent crimes, to enable
comparisons across crime categories, the inverse U quadratic crime-age profile is the
12preferred model for this Chapter. Of the non-linear profiles, only the quadratic
1 “X •coefficient on the age variable is significant. This may be because the data (curtailed 
at 25 year olds) has only 10 years of observations, which is not ideally suited to a 
functional form that allows for two or more turning points in the data.
6.8 Reverse Causality?
It may be thought that there are inherent problems with trying to make causal 
statements about schooling and crime. Is the lower involvement in crime by the more 
educated caused by the fact that these individuals have more education? Are the more 
educated individuals also those with higher ability anyway, who will be rewarded for 
their ability in later life with better jobs and so do not need to engage in crime? Or is 
it more the case that young people who are already involved in crime, or expect to 
become involved in crime in the future, decide not to invest in education, or are 
unable to invest in education because they are excluded or because they are less able?
Although it is rather difficult to answer all of these questions I have attempted 
to reduce any bias resulting from the potential problem of the endogeneity of 
education in a number of ways. Firstly, the focus is on criminal activity after 
individuals have made the decision about whether or not to stay on at school after the 
age of 16. Secondly, because education varies across the population in terms of 
observable factors such as school quality and parental education by using a nationally 
representative sample it is likely that there will be enough variation in the education
12 Although a similar pattern is produced using both the cubic and age dummies.
13 The same pattern was found when probits were replaced by logits. For property offences using 
logits the linear coefficient was -.568 and the standard error (3.38), the quadratic .056 (.179) and the 
cubic-.001 (.003).
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variable to reduce any possible bias. Thirdly, controlling for other variables such as 
neighbourhood and family background will also reduce any potential bias.
Lochner’s (1999) work in the US directly addresses the potential endogeneity 
of education with respect to crime. He argues that individuals who expect to spend 
time committing offences must expect to spend less time in the labour market, so 
therefore will invest less in their education. Thus, Lochner tests the causal effects of 
additional schooling on crime by looking at whether individuals who report illegal 
earnings spend less hours in legal employment. He finds that differences in hours 
worked between the groups is less than 4%, making it unlikely that observed 
variations in education are the result of labour market returns. It is, he concludes, 
‘safe to interpret our estimated effects of schooling on crime as causal: education 
reduces crime’ (p30).
A final point is that it is possible to draw an analogy between the education 
and crime debate and the debate between education and earnings. Research in this 
field has found that any bias due to reverse causation is small and if anything is likely 
to understate the causal effect of education (Card 1999, Griliches 1977). Moreover, 
different methods that try to establish a causal relationship between schooling and 
earnings which are not associated with the problems of the endogeneity of an 
individual’s education do not produce substantially different results (Card 1999).
6.9 Results
6.9.1 The basic m odel
If the age at which an individual leaves school is unrelated to criminal activity 
we would expect the crime-age profiles of the two groups to be essentially the same. 
We can see from Figures 6.4A-6.4C that this does not appear to be the case. For all
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three types of crime, the profiles for the two groups of young people are different. 
Furthermore, looking at the regression tables in Appendix C we can see that when we 
carry out a chi-square test, the profiles for property and handling crimes are 
significantly different for the two groups (at 10% significance level for property 
crimes, and 1% for handling crimes). For violent crimes, the profiles are not 
significantly different from one another.14
For both property and handling offences, the crime-age profiles of those who 
left school at 16 declines from a peak at the age of 16, while the profiles of those who 
stayed on rise gradually from age 16 to form a peak between the ages of 19-21, before 
declining at a slightly faster rate than the pre-age 16 increase. For violent offences, 
both groups of youngsters decline from a peak at age 16, but the decline is faster for 
those who stay on at school as apposed to those who leave school at age 16.
For property and handling offences, these patterns support the idea of 
maturation. Crime appears to peak when each group makes the transition to adulthood 
and the age at which an individual leaves school (or the period shortly after) can be 
used as a proxy for this transition. If this were the only difference in the offending 
patterns of the two groups, there would not be much cause for concern. However, for 
all offences, the level of crime committed by the less educated group is much higher 
at all ages than the crime committed by the more educated group. Moreover, for all 
three offences the profile for the more educated looks like crime is close to dying out 
by the age of 25. For the less educated, this is not the case. In fact there is no real 
decline in the crime rate from age 22 onwards for property crimes and handling 
crimes. For violent crimes the decline for the less educated is slower than for the more 
educated young people and so the gap widens with age.
14 If we focus on 18-25 year olds the profiles are significantly different from one another.
228
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 
pr
iv
io
ien
t 
Cn
m
ej
 
pr
ed
ict
ed
 
pr
tH
an
on
ng
 
cr
im
ej
 
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 
Pr
lP
ro
pe
rty
 
Cr
im
e]
Figure 6.4A Crime-Age Profiles by Education. Basic Model for Property
Crime
A g e  P r o f i l e :  D i d  N o t  S t a y  O n A g e  P r o f i l e :  S t a y e d  O n
1 6  1 7  1 8  1 2 0 2 1 age 2 3 2 4
Figure 6.4B Crime-Age Profiles by Education. Basic Model for Handling 
Crime
Figure 6.4C. Crime-Age Profiles by Education. Basic Model for Violent Crime
° A g e  P r o f i l e :  D i d  N o t S t a y O n  ^  A g e  P r o f i l e :  S t a y e d  O n
2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 51 7 1 8 1 91 6
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These results do not seem to support the invariance hypothesis. On the 
contrary, they indicate that the two groups of young people have significantly 
different crime-age distributions. Moreover, by the age of 25, whilst crime has 
declined to almost insignificant levels for the more educated people, it remains 
relatively high for the less educated, with little probability that it will decline to the 
level of the more educated group in the foreseeable future.
This finding has potentially important policy implications as crime and age are 
related to education which can be affected by the implementation of policy. However, 
from a policy perspective, it is not sufficient to highlight the difference in the crime- 
age profiles of these two groups. What is needed is an explanation of why the profiles 
are different. In order to do this, this Chapter now goes on to examine a whole range 
of variables that theory and past empirical work informs us may be able to explain the 
observed difference in the two profiles.
Thus, the procedure is to move away from the original model by progressively 
controlling for each set of new variables that may influence the crime-age distribution 
for the two groups, each time testing that the curves remain significantly different, 
and also testing for the joint significance of the additional variables. We would expect 
that if any of these variables are correlated with crime, age and education in an 
appropriate direction by accounting for a proportion of the difference in the crime-age 
distributions between the two groups we will see the two distributions move together. 
If the variables completely explain the difference in the profiles, then the gap will be 
completely reduced and the two groups will have the same crime-age profiles.
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6.10 Explanatory variables
The data are rich with regard to explanatory variables so the focus is on 
variables related to neighbourhood/area, school, family, individual and the labour 
market.
6.10.1 Neighbourhood/area variables
The 1998 British Crime Survey identified locality to be an important indicator 
of risk of crime. Over half of all property crime and a third of all victims of property 
crime are found in a fifth of communities in England and Wales (Home Office 
Statistical Bulletin 21/98). Areas most at risk are inner city areas, areas with a high 
proportion of social housing and areas of high physical disorder. These are the same 
types of areas that are associated with offending. Rutter (1979) found delinquency to 
be much higher in disadvantaged areas at 36% compared to 19% in what he referred 
to as ‘favoured areas’. This is supported by police force statistics, which reveal that 
between April 1999 and March 2000 Metropolitan Forces (Metropolitan, City of 
London, West Midlands, Merseyside, Greater Manchester, West Yorkshire, South 
Yorkshire and Northumbria) recorded rises in crime of over 7%, while the non­
metropolitan forces recorded increases of less than 1%. The West Midlands saw the 
greatest increase of 16%, followed by the Metropolitan force which saw crime 
increase by 13%. On the other hand, in Lancashire crime decreased by around 8% 
(Home Office 2000).
With these findings in mind area/neighbourhood variables (ACORN groups15 
and whether individuals live in social housing) were introduced into the crime-age 
model. For property crime (Figure 6.5A) this does not alter the profile of the two 
groups very much at all. Indeed the two profiles do not look like they have shifted
15 A Classification of Residential Neighbourhoods (ACORN) classifies households using demographic, 
and housing characteristics o f the neighbourhood.
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from the basic profiles in Figure 6.4A. This suggests that area/neighbourhood 
variables do not account for much of the variance in the crime-age profiles of the two 
groups of young people. The regression results (in Appendix C) show that with the 
inclusion of area/neighbouhood variables the chi-square test that the two profiles are 
different remains significant at the 10% level. Neighbourhood variables also have 
little effect on handling crimes (Figure 6.5B). The two profiles come together slightly 
for 20 and 21 year olds, but the profiles remain significantly different at the 1% level 
(see regressions results). For violent crimes, the inclusion of the neighbourhood/area 
variables (Figure 6.5C) moves the profile for the more educated above the less 
educated at age 16. After age 16 the profiles cross and become very similar in shape 
to the basic profile.
Figure 6.5A Crime-Age Profiles with Neighbourhood Variables for Property 
Crime
o Age Profile: Did Not Stay On a Age Profile: Stayed On
.3
.2
1
0
16 18 19 20 21 22 2517 23 24
age
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Figure 6.5B Crim e-Age Profiles with Neighbourhood Variables for H andling
Crime
a  A g e  Profile: S t a y e d  On
Figure 6.5C Crime-Age Profiles with Neighbourhood Variables for Violent 
Crime
1 6 1 7 2 0 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5
a g e
6.10.2 School variables
In 1979, Rutter pointed out that ‘schools may influence children’s behaviour 
outside as well as inside the school’ (p i9) particularly in relation to delinquency. The 
age an individual leaves school (Thomberry et al 1985, Lochner 1999), their 
attendance (Rutter 1979, Nagin and Land 1993, Home Office 1998c), whether they
a  A g e  P r o f i l e :  S t a y e d  O n
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have truanted (Graham and Bowling 1995) or been excluded (Home Office 1998c) 
and the qualifications they gain (ibid) are all differentially associated with offending.
Here truancy and exclusions are introduced as school variables into the model. 
For property crimes (Figure 6.6A), this lowers the profile of the less educated and 
raises the profile for the more educated. This causes the profiles to cross for 19 to 22 
year olds, when the more educated group have a higher predicted probability of 
committing property offences than the less educated groups for these ages. Despite 
this, the two profiles still look different. This is confirmed in the regression results 
which show that with the introduction of school variables, the two profiles remain 
significantly different from one another at the 10% significance level. A very similar 
pattern is seen when school variables are introduced to the basic model for handling 
crimes (Figure 6.6B). The two profiles remain significantly different at the 1% level. 
For violent crimes, the introduction of school variables means that at the age of 16 the 
profile of the more educated is above the less educated where it remains, until the age 
of 19, when the two profiles cross and follow a similar decline (Figure 6.6C).
Figure 6.6A Crime-Age Profiles with School Variables for Property Crime
o Age Profile: Did Not Slay On a Age Profile: Stayed On
.3
.2
.1
0
20
Age
234
Figure 6.6B Crime-Age Profiles with School Variables for Handling Crime
°  A ge  Profile: Did Not S tay  On A A ge  Profile: S ta y ed  On
19
a g e
Figure 6.6C Crime-Age Profiles with School Variables for Violent Crime
A ge Profile: Did Not Stay On a A ge  Profile: S ta y ed  On
16 17 19 20
age
21 22  23  24 25
6.10.3 Individual variables
Empirical work has shown that a number of individual characteristics are 
associated with offending. The first individual risk factor incorporated into the model 
is whether an individual is non-white. In 1993 around 7% of black men over the age 
of 18 and 12% of black men aged 25-34 were in prison in the US (Freeman 2000). In 
1997 the prison population of England and Wales consisted of 18% non-white men, 
although non-whites only made up 6% of the entire population of England and Wales 
(Home Office 1998a). Another important individual characteristic related to offending
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is family commitment. Farrington (1995) finds marriage often encourages desistence 
from offending. This Chapter looks at the presence of children, which it could be 
argued, more accurately reflects family ties than marriage (see Graham and Bowling, 
1995). Families of origin, as well as formation, have also been found to be linked to 
offending. Those youths who have good relationships with their parents are less likely 
to be involved in offending (Farrington, 1995), while those youths who have run away 
from home are more likely to be offenders (Freeman, 2000). This is concurrent with 
Farrington’s work that finds that delinquents who were convicted by the age of 18 are 
more likely to be living away from home. These factors are taken into account here by 
controlling for whether an individual voluntarily lives in the parental home after the 
age of 16.
Inclusion of individual variables (being non-white16, religious, having 
children, living with parents) affects the profiles of property crimes (Figure 7A) by 
lowering the profile for the less educated, which becomes almost linear. At the same 
time, the profile of the more educated is raised and between the ages of 20 and 21, the 
two profiles nearly meet. The profiles remain significantly different at the 5% level. A 
very similar pattern is seen in Figure 6.7B, which examines handling offences. The 
only exception is that the cross over between the two profiles happens between the 
ages of 20 and 22. Again, the regression results in Appendix C show the two profiles
16 For all crime types non-white people have a lower probability o f committing offences than whites. 
This may indicate that the higher rates o f crimes committed by non-whites which appear in the official 
statistics may be more a result o f selection and processing bias by the criminal justice system or it may 
indicate that non-whites under report their involvement in crime (Hindelang, Hirshi and Weiss 1981). 
To ensure that the regression is not biased in any way I also calculated the individual variable 
regression excluding the non-white dummy, which made no significant difference to the results at all. 
For acquisitive property crimes the test age left school=age_stayed on, age2_left school=age2_stayed 
on moved from 7.11 to 5.47, the first significant at 5%, the second at 10%. The joint test on the 
individual variables was 21.24 with the non-white dummy included, and moves to 19.76 without it, 
both are significant at >1%. For handling crimes the age test goes from 13.59 to 9.90, both significant 
at >1%. And the individual variables test moves from 21.15 to 22.09, again both significant at >1%. 
The age test on violent offences increases from 3.22 to 3.26 once the non-white dummy is dropped. 
And the individual tests moves from 2.44 to 2.07.
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remain significantly different at the 1% significance level. For violent crimes, the 
introduction of individual variables reduces the gap slightly for the youngest ages 
(Figure 6.7C). Otherwise the profiles are little altered by the inclusion of the 
individual variables.
Figure 6.7A Crime-Age Profiles with Individual Variables for Property Crime
0  A g e  P r o f i l e :  D id  N o l S t a y O n  A A g e P r o f i l e  : S ta y e  d O n
3
2
1
0
1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 age 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 5
Figure 6.7B Crime-Age Profiles with Individual Variables for Handling Crime
°  A g e  P r o f i l e :  D id  N o t  S t a y  O n  A A g e  P r o f i l e :  S t a y e d  O n
.3
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Figure 6.7C Crime-Age Profiles with Individual Variables -  Violent Crime
* > A g e P r o f i l e :  D i d N o t S t a y O n  ^  A g e  P r o f i l e :  S t a y e d  On
1 6  17  18  1 9  2 0  21  2 2  2 3  2 4  2 5
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6.10.4 Fam ily variables
Freeman (2000) finds that many incarcerated young men have parents who 
were in low paid, blue collar jobs. This supports Farrington’s (1996) work which 
finds that delinquents are likely to come from lower class families and delinquents 
who are convicted by age 18 are likely to come from low income families. Research 
has also found that delinquents are more likely to have convicted parents or 
delinquent older siblings (Farrington 1996, Nagin and Land 1993).
Both father’s class17 and whether an individuals family has had contact with 
the police are introduced into the model as family variables. When this is done for 
property crimes (Figure 6.8A) the profile of the less educated becomes more like the 
profile of the more educated. The gap remains considerable for the younger people, 
but by the age of 23 the profiles are exactly the same. Thus, family variables explain 
most of the gap for the older people. This is reflected by the fact that once family 
variables are introduced, the gap between the two profiles becomes insignificant.
17 The im portance o f  class was d iscussed in the section  on education  and offending.
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When handling crimes are examined (Figure 6.8B), we find that even with the 
inclusion of family variables, there remains a considerable gap between the two 
profiles for the younger ages. However, by the age of 20 the two profiles begin to 
come together, meeting by the age o f 22, then widening out slightly for the older ages. 
The two profiles remain significantly different at the 10% level.
For violent crimes (Figure 6.8C), the profile for the less educated remains 
above that of the more educated at all ages, even after the inclusion of family 
variables. The gap is widest at the age o f 16. The two profiles move together at age 
17, and by age 18 and 19 the profiles are almost the same, although after age 20 the 
gap does begin to widen out again.
Figure 6.8A Crime-Age Profiles with Family Variables for Property Crime
o  A ge  Profile: Did Not Stay On ^ A ge  Profile: S tayed  On
19 20
a g e
Figure 6.8B Crime-Age Profiles with Family Variables for Handling Crime
°  A g e  Profile: Did Not Sta y On ^  A ge  Profile: S tayed  On
3
2
1
0
1 6 17 18 19 2 0 21 22 23 24 25
a 9 e
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Figure 6.8C Crime-Age Profiles with Family Variables for Violent Crime
°  Age Profile: Did Not Stay On ^  Age Profile: Stayed On
3
2
1
0
16 18 20 21 22 23 24 2517 19
age
6.10.5 Labour market variables
There have been a number of studies that examine the labour market and 
crime (including previous Chapters of this thesis, for additional sources see reviews in 
Freeman 1983, 1999, Chiricos 1987, Box 1987). Although there is no consensus many 
studies find that, at least to some extent, crime is related to unemployment (Cook and 
Zarkin 1985, Land, McCall and Cohen 1990), inequality (Lee 1993) and wages 
(Machin and Meghir 2000, Gould, Weinberg and Mustard 2002). In this Chapter 
unemployment, full time employment and weekly income are added to the model as 
labour market variables. For property crime (Figure 6.9A) this inclusion slightly 
flattens the profile of the more educated for the younger ages, but has little impact on 
the profile of the less educated. Despite this, the two profiles are not significantly 
different once labour market variables are introduced to the model, as can be seen 
from the regression results in Appendix C.
For handling offences the profile of the more educated is again flattened with 
the inclusion of labour market variables to the basic model (Figure 6.9B). For the less 
educated, labour market variables cause the profile to decline quicker in the early
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years and then flatten out at a lower rate than the basic model. This suggests that for 
both groups, the probability of committing handling crimes is lower once labour 
market variables are controlled for. Despite this, the two profiles remain significantly 
different at the 10% level.
For violent crimes, the inclusion of labour market variables closes the gap 
between the two profiles at the age of 16, but does little else (Figure 6.9C). This 
indicates that labour market variables are more important determinants of property 
and handling offences than violent crimes.
Figure 6.9A Crime-Age Profiles with Labour M arket Variables for Property 
Crime
°  A g e  Profi le:  Did Not  S t a y  On A A g e  Profi le:  S t a y e d  On
4
3
2
1
0
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a g e
Figure 6.9B Crime-Age Profiles with Labour Market Variables for Handling 
Crime
O A g e  Prof i l e:  Did N o t  S t a y  On ^ A g e  Prof i l e :  S t a y e d  On
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Figure 6.9C Crime-Age Profiles with Labour Market Variables for Violent
Crime
°  A g e  P r o f i l e :  D i d  N o t  S t a y  O n  ^  A g e  P r o f i l e :  S t a y e d  O n
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6.10.6 All variables
Having examined the effect of introducing a number of different variables into 
the equation, we now need to consider what happens when we examine all the 
variables together.
When all these factors are taken into account, the crime-age profiles are 
indeed substantially altered. For property crimes (Figure 6.10A) there is essentially no 
difference between the profiles of the two educational groups at ages 16, 24 and 25. 
Here, differences in the other variables completely explain the gap in offending rates 
between those who stayed on at school and those who left at age 16. There remains 
only a slight gap between the two profiles from age 17 to 23. Interestingly, with all 
variables included a chi-square test indicates the two profiles are no longer 
statistically significantly different across all ages.
For handling offences, the two profiles remain different for the youngest ages 
despite the inclusion of all the variables (Figure 6.1 OB). However, at age 18 the two 
profiles begin to come together, by 20 the two profiles cross very slightly and by age
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22 the two groups have the same profiles. This indicates that in the case of handling 
offences the inclusion of other variables accounts for the gap between the two profiles 
for the older groups, but not for the younger ages. Overall, the gap between the two 
profiles becomes insignificant with the inclusion of all variables.
Figure 6.IOC shows that the inclusion of all variables into the violent crime 
model shifts the profile of the more educated above that of the less educated until the
age of 21 when it falls beneath the less educated profile. Despite the crossing of the
18profiles, the two distributions look very similar .
Figure 6.10A Crime-Age Profiles with All Variables for Property Crime
°  A ge  Profile: Did Not Stay  On Age Profile: S ta y ed  On
.15
16 17 18 19 20  21 22 23 24  25
a g e
Figure 6.1 OB Crime-Age Profiles with All Variables for Handling Crime
o  Age Profile: Did Not Stay On Age Profile: Stayed On
1
.05
0
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
18 These findings w ere m irrored  w hen this exercise  w as repeated  using age dum m ies, linear and cubic 
form s. T he crim e-age profiles are on the w hole significan tly  d ifferen t from  one ano ther in the basic 
m odel. H ow ever, in the full m odel the d ifference betw een  the profiles becom es insignificant.
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Figure 6.10C Crime-Age Profiles with All Variables for Violent Crime
°  Age Profile: Did Not Stay On ^  Age Profile: Stayed On
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6.11 Examining the variables together
When all variables are included in the model, we are interested in which ones 
are more important. This can be considered in two different ways: The first way is to 
look at the individual explanatory contributions each group of variables make in 
explaining the gap between the two profiles. Table 6.2A shows that for property 
offences, the most important set of variables explaining the gap on average are: school 
variables which account for approximately 46% of the gap overall; family variables 
26% of the gap, and; individual variables which account for 27%19. All the variables 
combined account for 90% of the gap overall, indicating that on average by 
combining the variables, most of the variation in the two profiles can be accounted 
for. But we can also see from table 6.2A that there are variations across ages. For 
example, individual variables explain very little of the gap for the younger ages (4% 
of the gap at age 16), but between the ages of 20 and 22 individual variables account
19 T hese w ere also the variables that accounted  for the largest p roportion  o f  the gap betw een  the tw o 
p ro files w hen this exercise w as repeated  using  age dum m ies, cubic and linear functional form s.
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for most of the gap. This perhaps highlights the movement away from the parental 
home and towards setting up new families and having children in the early twenties.
Table 6.2A Proportion of the Gap in the Crime-Age Profiles Accounted for by 
the Inclusion of Additional Variables for Property Offences
Age 16 17 18 19 2 0 2 1 2 2 23 24 25 Mean
Gap .226 .159 .103 .063 .043 .036 .046 .064 .085 . 1 0 2 .092
% explained by 
area
1 0 . 2 11.9 15.5 17.5 17.1 8.3 0 0 1 . 2 6.9 9.0%
% explained by 
school vars.
21.7 30.2 44.7 69.8 1 0 0 . 0 105.6 97.8 56.3 44.7 42.2 45.7%
% explained by 
family vars.
25.2 -1.3 -34.0 -68.3 -75.6 -16.7 65.2 1 0 0 . 0 122.4 105.9 26.1%
% explained by 
individual vars.
4.0 6.9 17.5 39.7 70.7 83.3 65.2 45.3 38.8 40.2 27.2%
% explained by 
labour market 
vars.
11.9 1 0 . 1 0 -2 2 . 2 -58.5 -69.4 -37.0 -7.8 14.1 23.5 - 1 .2 %
% explained by all 
variables
104.4 96.9 82.5 60.3 39.0 50.0 80.4 95.3 1 0 1 . 2 1 0 0 . 0 90.2%
For handling offences (Table 6.2B) the most important sets of variables in 
accounting for the gap between the two profiles are: school variables, which on 
average explain around 33% of the variation in the two profiles; family variables 
(24%), and; individual variables (30%).20 All variables combined, on average, account 
for 86% of the gap, slightly less than the property crimes. Again we see variations by 
age, both school and individual variables account for a much greater proportion of the 
gap between the ages of 20 to 22 than any other age.
2 0  These were also the variables that explained the largest proportion o f the gap using the age 
dummies, the cubic and linear functional forms.
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Table 6.2B Proportion of the Gap in the Crime-Age Profiles Accounted for by
the Inclusion of Additional Variables for Handling Offences
Aee 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Mean
Gap .237 .169 .106 .057 .027 .019 .031 .054 .081 .102 .088
% explained by 
area
7.2 13.0 19.8 26.3 33.3 2 1 . 1 9.7 5.5 9.9 po bo 12.5
% explained by 
school vars.
13.1 18.3 29.2 52.6 1 0 0 . 0 126.3 129.0 40.7 29.6 29.4 33.0 %
% explained by 
family vars.
26.2 2.4 -25.5 -63.2 - 1 0 0 . 0 -31.6 74.2 92.6 93.8 95.1 23.9 %
% explained by 
individual vars.
7.2 5.9 12.3 38.6 103.7 157.9 93.5 53.7 43.2 46.1 29.5%
% explained by 
labour market 
vars.
-3.0 - 1 . 2 -9.4 -43.9 -129.6 -184.2 -77.4 - 1 1 . 1 19.8 30.4 -11.4%
% explained by 
all variables
78.5 78.1 79.2 82.5 88.9 94.7 96.8 98.1 1 0 0 . 0 99.8 86.4%
In the case of violent crimes (Table 6.2C) the variables that by far account for
the largest proportion of the gap between the two profiles are school variables, which 
on average account for 70% of the gap. Again this varies by age, school variables are 
more important for explaining the gap for the youngest ages (16 to 19), than for the 
older groups. Like property offences and handling offences, family variables and 
individual variables also account for large proportions of the gap between the two 
profiles , 44% and 19% respectively. Family variables account for more of the gap 
between the ages of 19 and 21, while individual variables account for more of the gap 
for 17 and 18 year olds.
Table 6.2C Proportion of the Gap in the Crime-Age Profiles Accounted for by 
the Inclusion of Additional Variables for Violent Offences
Ace 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Mean
Gap .015 .028 .041 .054 .064 .071 .074 .073 .068 .061 .054
% explained by 
area
106.7 42.9 2 2 . 0 13.0 6.3 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.4 8 . 2 10.4%
% explained by 
school vars.
366.7 178.6 109.8 74.1 53.1 42.3 70.3 35.6 38.2 44.3 69.6%
% explained by 
family vars.
-233.3 -14.3 43.9 61.1 65.6 62.0 59.5 56.2 52.9 50.8 44.4%
% explained by 
individual vars.
33.3 50.0 43.9 35.2 28.1 19.7 14.9 9.6 5.9 3.3 18.5%
% explained by 
labour market 
vars.
2 2 0 . 0 14.3 -31.7 -35.2 -26.6 14.1 -1.4 6 . 8 13.2 19.7 -1.9%
% explained by 
all variables
193.3 185.7 153.7 120.4 96.9 83.1 77.0 78.1 83.8 86.9 100.9%
21 See above.
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6.12 Examining the Full Model
The second way to look at all the variables together is to examine which 
variables remain statistically significant in the full model (column 7 in the regression 
Tables in the Appendix C). Only the variables that remain statistically significant at 
the end can account for the gap between the profiles. For property offences, the 
quadratic age profile remains significant, as does whether an individual lives in the 
parental home. Those living in the parental home are 8 percentage points less likely to 
commit crimes than others. Those with family members who have had contact with 
the police are 19 percentage points more likely to commit offences. Those who have 
truanted are 14 percentage points more likely to commit property crimes.
For handling crimes, those individuals who live in the parental home are 5 
percentage points less likely to commit offences Those with families who have had 
contact with the police are 20 percentage points more likely to commit offences, as 
are those who have truanted from school.
The Table for violent offences shows those who live in the parental home are
* • 22 6 percentage points less likely to commit offences; those with fathers in SES V are
11 percentage points more likely to commit violent crimes; those whose family have
had contact with the police are 16 percentage points more likely more likely to
commit offences; those who have truanted 11 percentage points more likely; and,
those who live in social housing 7 percentage points more likely to commit violent
offences.
2 2  State pensioners or widows (no other earners), casual or lowest grade workers, or long term 
unemployed.
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6.13 Frequency
It is possible that using a variable that records whether an individual 
committed a crime in the last year ignores the fact that some people may have 
committed only one crime, while others may have committed a large number. This 
may potentially be important if the frequency of criminal activity, not just whether an 
individual breaks the law, but how many times they do so is differentially related to 
age. We can see what difference taking the frequency of criminal offences into 
account makes to the basic crime-age profiles in Figures 6.11 A-6.11C.
For property crimes the profiles produced by the frequency count variable in 
the poisson regression24 (Figure 6.11 A) differ little from the profiles produced using 
the binary variable in the probit regression (Figure 6.4A). For handling crimes the 
profiles are slightly altered (Figure 6.1 IB) with the profile of the more educated rising 
above that of the less educated between the ages of 19 and 22. This is similar to the 
pattern produced when school variables were added to the basic probit model (Figure 
6.6B). Taking into account the frequency with which violent crimes are committed 
(Figure 6.11C), the profiles for violent crimes appear to be marginally different from 
the original profiles. The profile of the less educated declines more rapidly, while the 
profile of the more educated becomes more of an inverse U shape with a peak at age 
18 and a long tail off from age 22 onwards.
2 3 To do this we use a poisson maximum likelihood regression which regresses the dependent variable 
on independent variables, where the dependent variable is a non-negative count variable, in this case, 
the frequency o f criminal offences in the last year. No assumption is made about the functional form o f  
the distribution.
2 4  See above and the discussion in Appendix B.
2 5 Chi-square tests (age left school=age_stayed on and age2_left school=age2_stayed on) using the 
poisson model were significant at > 1 % level for all three types o f crimes.
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Figure 6.11 A Crime-Age Profiles by Education using Poisson Regressions -
Property Crime
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Figure 6.1 IB Crime-Age Profiles by Education using Poisson Regressions -  
Handling Crime
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Figure 6.11C Crime-Age Profiles by Education using Poisson Regressions -  
Violent Crime
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There are some problems associated with using the frequency of crimes 
committed in the last year, rather than just whether or not an individual had 
committed a crime. The main problem is that a single extreme observation could 
possibly distort the profiles. Moreover, in this study, 60% of those who had 
committed a property crime in the last year did so on only 1 or 2 occasions; 27% had 
committed more than 5 crimes; and only 10% of all those who had committed a 
property crime in the last year had done so more than 10 times. 61% of those who had 
committed a handling offence in the last year had done so only once or twice; 24% 
had done so on more than 5 occasions; and only 5% had done so more than 10 times. 
These patterns are similar to those produced by violent offences, 50% of those who 
had committed a violent offence in the last year had done so just once or twice, while 
only 19% had done so more than 10 times.
The fact that most individuals only commit a small number of offences 
confirms the idea that most crimes are committed by a small group of individuals. Of 
all property crimes that were committed in the last year, 18% were committed by only 
3 people, 26% by 6 people, and 34% by 10 individuals. 18% of handling offences 
were committed by 4 people and 48% by 13 people. O f the violent crimes committed, 
11% were carried out by 1 individual, 32% by 4 and 54% by 10 individuals.
Despite this, the profiles produced by the count variable are similar to those 
produced using the binary variable. Therefore, I can be reasonably confident that I 
have adopted an accurate measure of the crime-age distribution, even though I am not 
measuring frequency in the empirical models presented earlier in this Chapter.
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6.14 Concluding Remarks
This Chapter examines the crime-age profiles of two groups of young males in 
England and Wales in 1992: those who have more education and those who have less. 
It then goes on to try to account for observed differences in the two profiles using a 
number of other variables which may be related to crime and age: 
neighbourhood/area, school, individual, family and labour market. Although in this 
Chapter a binary variable (whether an individual committed a crime in the last year) is 
used it also looked at the basic crime-age profiles produced taking account of the 
frequency with which young people committed crime in the last year.
The results show that the crime-age profiles for the less educated (those who 
left school at 16) seem to be different from the profile for the more educated group 
(those who stayed in education past the compulsory leaving age). Whilst the 
probability of the more educated group committing offences had been reduced to 
negligible levels by the age of 25, the profile for the less educated group showed little 
sign of decline from around the age of 22. By age 25, the latter group had a much 
higher probability of committing all three types of offences examined here than the 
more educated group.
Once other variables were introduced into the equation, the gap between the 
two profiles was reduced. In some cases, for particular ages or offences, the gap was 
completely removed. Overall the most important sets of variables in accounting for 
the gap in the profiles for all three crime types were school, family and individual 
variables. These variables differentially accounted for more or less of the gap at 
particular ages. The individual variables which remained significant in the full model 
were: whether individuals live in the parental home (negative for all offences); 
whether their family had previous contact with the police (positive for all offences);
whether the individual played truant from school (positive for all offences); whether 
the individual’s father was SES V (positive for violent offences), and; whether an 
individual lived in social housing (positive for violent offences). These are the 
variables that bring the profiles together in the full model. They are also the variables 
which act as individual determinants of crime, regardless of age.
This Chapter has shown that age, although correlated with crime, is also 
correlated with other variables such as schooling, individual and family 
characteristics, which are differentially associated with the probability of young 
people of the same age committing crimes. Once we take into account the fact that the 
two groups vary in terms of other observable characteristics (such as whether they 
truanted or were excluded from school, where they live, who they live with and what 
they do), we see a reduction in the gap between the two groups and the profiles are 
brought together.
This research suggests a number of possible policy implications for someone 
who is interested in bringing the youth crime rate down. The first, which is probably 
the most obvious and easy to target, is to encourage youths to stay on at school, which 
would, in the context of this research, facilitate a jump across education profiles. The 
recent introduction of the Educational Maintenance Allowance for children staying 
on at school may go some of the way to encourage children, particularly those from 
lower income families to stay in education (Dearden et al 2001). Unfortunately, the 
data used here are not appropriate to elaborate on this idea in terms of educational 
qualifications, but it would seem that this is an area worth investigating in future 
research. What research (quantitative and qualitative) needs to establish, is whether it
2 6 An allowance o f up to £30-£40 paid to the young person during term time if  their annual family 
income is less than £30,000.
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is the acquisition of qualifications or merely the act of staying on at school that 
achieves this protective factor against crime.
Alternatively, some policies designed to affect the variables that close the gap 
in the crime-age profile between the less and the more educated may have the 
potential to reduce crime. This would include policies to reduce truanting such as the 
publication of truancy league tables and the provision of facilities for less academic 
children to maintain their interest in the education system. The recent emphasis placed 
on reducing child poverty by the Labour government, such as the ‘Sure Start’ 
programme, is also likely to help reduce differences between children by improving 
conditions for the poorest children in a number of key areas such as health, social and 
emotional development, children’s ability to learn, and family and community bonds. 
These measures are likely to equip and motivate children better for education as well 
as reducing the financial burden placed on families where children remain living in 
the parental home and continue in education past the age of 16. However, these are 
likely to be much more long term policy measures that may only have the potential to 
affect future generations of school leavers.
Through a combination of policies aimed at improving conditions in a number 
of areas, it is likely that differences in criminal profiles shown in this Chapter can be 
reduced over time. The implementation of such policies generates a role for future 
research to evaluate their success on a number of important outcomes including crime 
and education.
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7. Conclusion
7.1 The Contributions of this Thesis
The focus of the research presented in this PhD was to examine the relationship 
between crime and the labour market. Although this is by no means a new research 
agenda, the work presented herein makes a number of original contributions to the area, 
both substantively and methodologically.
7.1.1 Substantive Contribution
Despite the large literature that exists within the field of crime and the labour 
market, the existing evidence points to a general lack of consensus as to which labour 
market variables are most strongly related to crime. By examining shifts that have 
occurred in the labour market and the effect these have had on crime, this thesis set out to 
provide new evidence on the most robust labour market determinants of crime.
The findings of this thesis are, that of the labour market variables considered, 
wages are the most consistent and robust predictor of crime. Property crime is found to be 
higher in areas where wage inequality is higher (Chapter 2) and where wages at the 
bottom end of the distribution are lower (Chapter 3). Perhaps the most compelling 
evidence for the existence of a link between property crime and low wages is found in 
Chapter 4, where the existence of a crime-wage link is tested by looking at a situation 
where people on the margins of criminal participation receive a wage increase. This 
Chapter shows that the introduction of the National Minimum Wage to the UK labour 
market in April 1999 affected some areas more than others depending on the initial
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proportion of people in the area paid less than the minimum before the Minimum Wage 
was introduced. Those areas most affected saw relative reductions in crime compared to 
other areas. Moreover, the relationship between property crime and low wages was 
shown to be stronger for young males and males working in low-skilled occupations. 
This is not surprising given the expectation that such people are among the most 
marginalized in the workforce.
While Chapter 4 identifies a link between crime and low wages by focusing on 
the protective factor of increasing the wages of those at the bottom of the wage 
distribution, Chapter 5 identifies a process that decreases wages at the bottom of the wage 
structure and thus increases crime. Chapter 5 provides evidence showing that increased 
female labour force participation tends to reduce male wages at the bottom end of the 
distribution, and this has a knock-on effect, which leads to a rise in crime. Again, this 
effect is shown to be stronger when considering males in low skilled occupations.
The fact that low wages seem to be a critical determinant of property crime 
indicates that perhaps motivation is the driving factor associated with crime. Thus, 
increasing wages reduces crime because it reduces the motivation for crime. This 
supports other work (Chiricos 1987) that identifies a negative motivational effect as the 
most important factor in explaining crime.
Explaining violent crime in terms of wages proved more difficult. Violent crime 
was found to be positively related to average wages in Chapter 2, yet Chapter 3 failed to 
uncover a statistically significant relationship, while Chapter 5 shows the introduction of 
the Minimum Wage to have a similar crime reducing effect on violent crime as property 
crime (albeit one that is much less statistically precise). The lack of consistency in
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identifying the wage determinants (or indeed, as will be shown, any determinants) of 
violent crime is not surprising given the relative infrequency with which violent crimes 
appear in the criminal statistics. Indeed, in 2001/2002 less than 15% of all notifiable 
offences were violent crimes (Home Office 2002).
Like much of the existing literature the relationship between unemployment and 
crime is fragile at best and much less robust than the relationship between crime and 
wages. Evidence presented in Chapter 2 shows a positive relationship between 
unemployment and both property and violent crime when analysed using cross-sectional 
data. However, this type of analysis is shown to be statistically and conceptually weak, in 
particular results produced from cross-section data are likely to suffer from omitted 
variable bias. When using the methodologically more appealing longitudinal data, the 
effect of unemployment on both property and violent crime is shown to be statistically 
insignificant. This is congruent with evidence from Chapter 4, which fails to uncover a 
statistically significant effect of unemployment on either property or violent crime.
However, Chapter 3 identifies unemployment as being negatively related to both 
property and violent crime, although only the relationship with property crime is 
statistically significant. Thus, in areas where unemployment is higher, crime is lower. 
This makes sense if we think that people who are unemployed are less likely to go out, 
making them less likely to be victims of violent crime and also less likely to be victims of 
property crime, as their presence in the home will increase the guardianship of their 
property. However, I am reluctant to attach a great weight to this result given the 
conflicting and contradictory evidence on the relationship between crime and 
unemployment in other Chapters of this thesis.
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While the labour market determinants of crime were the key focus of this thesis a 
number of other demographic or socio-economic variables were found to be related to 
crime. For example, a number of measures of deterrence were shown to be related to 
measures of crime. The numbers of police officers are found to be negatively related to 
property crime (Chapters 2 and 5) and violent crime (Chapter 2). The proportion of 
individuals found guilty is also shown to have a negative effect on property crime 
(Chapter 2). Evidence on the effect of the crime clear-up rate is more contradictory. 
Chapter 4 finds the crime clear-up to be negatively related to both property and vehicle 
crime, but not violent crime, while Chapter 3 fails to find a statistically significant effect 
of crime clear-ups on any crime type.
The most robust evidence on the importance of demographic and background 
factors is provided in Chapter 6. This shows that education is an extremely important 
predictor of youth crime and delinquency. Youths who leave school at 16 are shown to 
have, on average, higher levels of all types of crime that those who stay on past the 
compulsory school leaving age. Other factors identified in this Chapter as having a 
significant effect on youth crime are: whether individuals lives in the parental home 
(negative for all offences); whether their family had previous contact with the police 
(positive for all offences); whether the individual had played truant from school (positive 
for all offences); whether the individual’s father was SES V (positive for violent 
offences), and; whether an individual lives in social housing (positive for violent 
offences).
In summary, this research identifies wages, in particular low wages, as the most 
robust labour market determinant of crime. However, labour market variables are not the
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only ones to affect crime. Evidence presented here indicates a range of deterrence and 
demographic variables also have an impact on crime. Demographic and lifestyle variables 
are particularly important in accounting for youth crime.
In addition to identifying which determinants are most important for crime, this 
thesis also offers evidence concerning data and methodological issues, a discussion of 
which is now turned to.
7.1.2 Methodological Contribution
In the past much of the work on the labour market determinants of crime in the 
UK has relied on economy wide time series data. This current work improves on that by 
using area level data at various levels of aggregation, as well as individual level data, to 
look for relationships that may be obscured in the more aggregate data. It also uses new 
methodological tools, like looking for quasi-experimental situations that allow one to 
more accurately look at the key hypotheses of interest.
The strengths of using individual level data have been illustrated in Chapter 6. 
Individual level data such as the Youth Lifestyles Survey, offer a rich depth of 
information in terms of both crime and delinquency, and also background variables 
relating to demographic, socio-economic and lifestyle factors. This makes it possible to 
both elaborate on the relationship between crime and its determinants for individuals, and 
also to uncover the more subjective characteristics associated with criminal behaviour 
such as family criminal associations.
However, individual level data should not be seen as some kind of 
methodological panacea. It does have limitations. As pointed out in Chapter 1, the 
relatively small sample size and the cross-sectional nature of the data provided by many
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self-report studies, such as that used in Chapter 6, do raise issues of representativeness. 
Moreover, as Chapter 2 showed, models using cross-sectional data are more likely to 
suffer from omitted variable bias (or unobserved heterogeneity) than other studies, which 
may cause results to be biased. Chapter 2 also pointed out that crime is heavily persistent 
over time and that the failure to be able to account for this persistence by using data 
measured at only one point of time may mean that some of the factors which help to 
explain crime are ignored.
Although often criticised for their failings, this research has shown that whilst the 
official statistics do have limitations, they also provide a rich source of data with which to 
analyse the relationship between crime and the labour market, not found elsewhere in the 
UK. Their strength lie in the ability they give the researcher to construct longitudinal data 
with which it is possible to follow the same units or areas over time. There are a number 
of methodological advantages of using this kind of data. For example, under certain 
conditions, they allow the researcher to examine changes in the trends and patterns of 
crime, despite the existence of the ‘dark figure’ of unreported and unrecorded crime.
Moreover, as Chapter 3 identified, there are likely to be a number of factors which 
affect crime that we are unable to measure. Using area level data measured over time 
makes it possible to control for characteristics which differ across police force area, but 
are constant over time through the use of an area fixed effects model. In addition those 
characteristics which vary over time, but are constant across areas (such as the macro 
economic shocks which hit the economy as a whole), can also be controlled for by 
including a measure of each time period in the model.
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Another methodological advantage of these area level data measured across time 
is that they allow the incorporation of lagged measures of variables. This is extremely 
important because as Chapter 2 illustrated (and as discussed above), both property crime 
and violent crime are strongly persistent over time. This enables one to say something 
about dynamic, and not just static, processes.
In terms of addressing hypotheses, examining changes over time allows the 
researcher to ask the methodological question that corresponds best to theory: What 
happens to crime across areas if the hypothesised determinants of crime change? This 
makes it easier to establish causality.
In the natural sciences causality is routinely established through experiment, 
where a group of people are randomly assigned into two groups. Fcj example, in medical 
trials one group receives a new drug, the other a placebo. Both groups are monitored and 
if the first group have a change of condition compared to the second group, this change 
can be attributed to the new drug.
Experimental data in the social sciences are very rare. Quasi-experimental data 
(which themselves are rare), offer the best opportunity for social scientists to establish the 
causal affect of a particular determinant (Achen 1986, Schutt 2001). Chapter 4 showed 
that such a situation was offered by the introduction of the National Minimum Wage in 
April 1999 to the UK labour market. By utilising the fact that areas differ in the 
proportion of people paid beneath the Minimum Wage before it was introduced and using 
this as a quasi-natural experiment, Chapter 4 carried out a before and after analysis of the 
crime rate. The results show that areas with a higher proportion of people paid less than 
the minimum (i.e. those areas most affected by the Minimum Wage introduction) saw
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greater crime reductions relative to areas less affected. The only factor which varied 
across these areas was the extent to which they were affected by the introduction of the 
Minimum Wage. Thus, differences in criminal outcomes can clearly be attributed to the 
Minimum Wage increasing the wages of the low paid.
A further methodological strength of the quasi-experimental nature of the data 
used in Chapter 4 is that the Minimum Wage is an exogenous independent variable. One 
of the problems with previous work that looks at the relationship between crime and low 
wages is that these two variables can be thought of as being jointly determined. Low 
wages can affect crime, but crime can in turn affect the level of wages an individual 
receives. However, Chapter 4 avoids this problem by using the Minimum Wage as a type 
of instrumental variable for low wages.
7.2 Placing the Findings into Policy Context
One of the strengths of the work presented in this thesis is that it is based on 
nationally representative data.1 This means that the results produced should be 
representative of society as a whole. This is important for any criminologist interested in 
linking quantitative research to criminal policy.
This research produces a number of possible policy suggestions, the first set of 
which are aimed at reducing crime by targeting the determinants of crime as identified in 
this thesis; the second group relate to the need to improve the quality of the existing 
crime data in the UK.
1 Even with the small sample size of the Youth Lifestyle Survey used in Chapter 6, these data should be 
representative of 16-25 year olds.
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7.2,1 The Determinants o f  Crime
As discussed above, the most robust and consistent labour market determinant of 
crime is shown to be wages, in particular low wages and wage inequality. Thus, anyone 
interested in reducing crime should look to reduce wage inequality and to raise the wages 
of those at the bottom of the wage distribution. In doing so, one should however, be 
careful to set the findings in their proper context.
The results presented in Chapter 4 show the positive effect the introduction of the 
Minimum Wage had on reducing crime. As yet, we do not have enough data to examine 
whether this is a one-off effect or whether the effect will be longer lasting. Although 
perhaps rather obvious, the likelihood the effect will be longer lasting will be higher if the 
levels at which the minimum is set continue to be reviewed regularly and to keep up with 
the level of inflation.
Given the importance of raising the wages of those at the bottom, perhaps the UK 
could learn something from ‘The Living Wage Movement’ which has been adopted in 
many areas in the US. The Living Wage Campaigns seek to pass local ordinances 
requiring private businesses that benefit from public money to pay their workers a living 
wage (see Pollin and Luce 1998). Unlike the Minimum Wage, which is set and controlled 
centrally, the living wage is organised locally by coalitions of community, union, and 
religious leaders. This means that living wages can be set differently from place to place, 
often taking into account differences in living costs across these areas. Moreover, many
2 For example, the UK Minimum Wage was raised to £4.10 in October 2001 for adults and £3.50 for 
younger people.
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living wage coalitions are proposing other community standards in addition to a wage 
requirement, such as health benefits, vacation days and community hiring goals.
The importance of increasing wages for those at the bottom of the wage 
distribution (as demonstrated in this thesis) supports changes that have been made to 
means tested benefits. For example, a policy change seen in recent years which is likely 
play an important role in helping those with low wages is the Working Families Tax 
Credit that was phased in between 1998 and April 2000. This is an extension of the old 
Family Credit but is more generous in terms of income support and the rate at which 
support is reduced as family income rises.
Other policies aimed at encouraging low wage workers to gain more education 
may not only have the potential to increase the earnings power of the low paid but also 
improve the state of overcrowding in the low skilled occupations, by allowing them to 
compete for better jobs. Thus, this evidence would suggest that recent moves to allocate 
additional resources to ‘life long learning’ schemes after the publication of the Moser 
Report (1999) may help to alleviate the problem by improving the basic skill levels of
l
those who are disadvantaged in the labour market.
The importance of education in reducing crime is also identified in Chapter 6, 
from which a number of policy measures that may help in reducing youth crime present 
themselves. The first is to encourage youths to stay on at school. As more and more 
youths obtain educational qualifications, the stigma of having less education grows. 
Moreover, the increasing wage returns to education means that those with less education
3 Although there is a dilemma expressed by Willis (1977) that if  everyone were well qualified, no-one 
would be well qualified, and, moreover, there would be fewer people to fill the unrewarding positions.
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are likely to end up in low paid employment, which as the rest of the thesis has shown, is 
itself a strong determinant of crime.
As discussed in Chapter 6 the recent introduction of the Educational Maintenance 
Allowance (EMA) for children staying on at school may go some of the way to 
encourage children, particularly those from lower income families to stay in education. 
Indeed, the evaluation of the EMA reports very positive results (Dearden et al 2001). As 
it is usually the less academically able children from the poorer backgrounds who leave 
school, policies to improve facilities for less academic children and to maintain their 
interest in the education system may go some way to encouraging these types of children 
to stay in the education system. The recent emphasis placed on reducing child poverty by 
the Labour government, such as ‘Sure Start’, is also likely to help reduce differences 
between children by improving conditions for the poorest children in a number of key 
areas such as health, social and emotional development, children’s ability to learn, and 
family and community bonds. These measures are likely to equip and motivate children 
better for education as well as reduce the financial burden placed on families where 
children remain living in the parental home and continuing in education past the age of 
16.
There are a great number of suggestions for policies or support for existing 
policies discussed above, all of which may be effective in reducing crime. However, 
many of these are long term policy measures that may only have the potential to affect 
future levels of crime.
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7.2.2 Crime Data
The second set of policy recommendations which stem from evidence presented 
in this thesis concerns the systematic and consistent collection and provision of good 
quality crime data. It is only with good quality data that researchers are able to carry out 
robust examinations of the factors that determine crime.
Evidence presented in this thesis support the argument that what is needed is the 
collection of data which incorporates some kind of longitudinal design. Indeed, one of the 
most powerful findings to result from this research is the methodological advantage 
associated with the use of longitudinal data. Ideally, we would like to follow the same 
people over time, but where this is not possible data following consistently defined areas 
allows the construction of area level longitudinal data.
One of the key advantages of using official statistics is that they are available 
across areas and over time. In the future, when data collected at the smaller area levels 
(such as Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership areas used in Chapter 3) are available 
over longer periods of time, the official statistics will provide an even richer source of 
area data.
A clear recommendation from this research is to allow the BCS to release area 
identifiers.4 At present, the Home Office remains reluctant to do this for fear that 
particular individuals may be recognised. This argument appears weak against the 
evidence presented here for the need to examine crime across areas. Perhaps researchers 
could be entrusted with the area identifiers, and forced to sign an anonymity disclaimer.
4 This would not strictly be new but rather a return to previous practice. As has been noted throughout this 
thesis the BCS released area code in the early years o f the survey and a number of researchers have taken 
advantage o f this (see Hale et al 1994, Osbom et al 1992 or Trickett et al 1995). However, the area codes in 
the early data sets have subsequently been removed.
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This would allow the construction of longitudinal victimisation data, which could be 
compared to the official statistics.
However, a problem that is brought to light by the need for data consistently 
measured over time and area, is that both the official statistics (measured both at police 
force area and Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership level) and the victimisation 
data collected by the BCS are based on area boundaries that are not consistently defined. 
Evidence provided by this thesis strongly supports the recommendation for keeping area 
boundaries consistent over time to allow the construction of longitudinal data measured 
over area and time.
Another policy suggestion which could be made from the evidence presented in 
this thesis is to incorporate some kind of experimental design into the data. Although 
experiments are generally frowned upon in the arena of the social sciences for ethical (as 
well as financial) reasons, the evidence presented here has highlighted the 
methodological advantages of work that uses experimental or quasi-experimental data.
While it is generally thought unfair (on ‘ethical’ grounds) to randomly assign 
individuals into control and treatment groups, because this means that one group is 
privileged over the other in the short term, doing so may produce better quality research 
that would benefit all groups in the long run. While it may never be possible to have a 
fully experimental design, current government initiatives such as Sure Start or some 
regional initiatives may offer quasi-experimental opportunities in the future in much the 
same way as the Minimum Wage introduction (used in Chapter 4), where they have a 
differential effect across areas.
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While the evidence presented in this thesis points to these types of design as 
providing the best data, there are still ways that existing data could be improved upon 
even where it is not possible to incorporate a longitudinal or experimental element. For 
example, carrying out surveys regularly will allow researchers to take pooled cross- 
sections to look at differences in crime over time. Since 2001, the BCS has started to 
sample continuously (Home Office 2001) and evidence presented in this thesis suggests 
this is a good move, particularly in the future when this regular data will be available for 
a longer period of time.
Another way to improve the data is to ensure some consistency across surveys. 
The depth and richness of the data from the Youth Lifestyle Survey that was shown in 
Chapter 6 could be put to greater use if it is carried out again in the future.5 Asking the 
same question or group of core questions across different surveys or using the same 
survey carried out in different time periods will allow comparisons to be made between 
different surveys.
Data could also be improved by trying to increase the representativeness of 
samples. Surveys should endeavour to sample a large enough population to ensure the 
data they collect are representative of the entire population, or at least a particular 
population of interest. In particular, special effort should be made to contact hard to reach 
groups such as the homeless and ‘off record’ youths.
Surveys are very costly and it is easy to make suggestions which would improve 
the quality of data but which could never be implemented because of the huge expense 
likely to be incurred. However, many of the suggestions above involve reforming existing 
data sources such as the BCS. Other methods may include adding questions on crime to
5 Two surveys have been carried out to date, the first in 1992/3, the second in 1998/9.
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existing surveys such as the Labour Force Survey which, as discussed in this thesis, is a 
nationally representative survey of around 60,000 households carried out on a quarterly 
basis.6
In terms of finances, it should be borne in mind that between 2000 and 2001 the 
government spent some 13 billion pounds on the criminal justice system. The bulk of this 
was spent on policing (61% of the total) and prisons (which accounted for an additional 
15%). If better crime data were collected, researchers might be able to more accurately 
pinpoint the causes of crime. Criminal policy, in turn, may be better able to accurately 
target the causes of crime and thus may have more success in reducing crime. In the long 
run this could reduce the expenditure needed to maintain the police force and prison 
system.
7.3 Potential Limitations
Whilst this thesis has made a number of contributions there are some potential 
limitations to the work presented herein, which need to be considered. The first 
cautionary note is related to the methodology utilised throughout much of this thesis, 
namely fixed effects models to analyse longitudinal data. The strengths of using such a 
technique have been repeatedly given in previous Chapters and the advantages over cross 
section and time series analysis are clear. However, some of the strengths of fixed effects 
models also produce weaknesses. For example, one of the advantages of this 
methodology is that the model is able to control for unobserved factors that may effect 
crime, which other types of methodologies (particularly those associated with cross
6Other possibilities include using the General Household Survey which already asks about burglary to 
extend its range of crime questions. Or the British Household Panel Survey which already contains a young 
persons supplement asking about delinquency.
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sections) cannot. However, while such factors can be controlled for they cannot be 
identified nor estimated. Moreover, while many factors are likely to be either constant 
across areas or time, there may still be some other factors which do not fit this criteria, 
and are thus not included in the model.
Another cautionary note relates to issues surrounding the ‘ecological fallacy’. 
When interpreting the findings of this research it must be borne in mind that chapters 
using area level longitudinal data inform us only of relationships that work at the area 
level, while individual level data (Chapter 6) only inform the reader of individual risk 
factors. And even individual level data are unable to elaborate on how risk factors operate 
for particular individuals, for this, qualitative interviews with particular individuals would 
be needed.
A final point relating to potential issues or weaknesses with the work presented in 
this thesis relates to the interaction of empirical investigation and theory. While this work 
draws heavily from a wide range of theories to build hypotheses, construct empirical 
models and help interpret certain findings it remains unable to provide evidence as to 
which of the sociological and criminological theories are preferable. Indeed, many of the 
theories offer similar predictions for relationships between crime and the labour market. 
One issue with hying to provide evidence with which to differentiate between theories is 
that some theories are not created for being tested (Gibbs and Martin 1966), while a 
number of others offer few, if any, distinctive predictions by which they can be tested 
against other theories.
Moreover, in order to differentiate between theories the data would need to 
include variables which could act as proxies for specific aspects of different theories.
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While this is not impossible (see for Box and Hale 1984 for example) it is often very 
difficult to find suitable proxy variables with which to actually test the predictive 
strengths of one or a number of different theories. While failure to provide evidence as to 
which is the most appropriate theory does not pose a particular problem for this work (as 
the main focus is to offer a quantitative empirical examination of the relationship 
between crime and the labour market drawing on theory rather than a more theoretically 
oriented thesis) its existence should be acknowledged nevertheless.
7.4 Future Directions
This research has produced evidence relating both to the substantive debates 
concerning factors most associated with crime and technical concerns surrounding the 
appropriate data and methodological tools with which to examine these relationships. 
However, as well as answering questions, the work presented here raises questions and 
issues which should be addressed in future research.
Many of these future projects depend on data becoming available over time. For 
example, Chapter 3 showed the advantages of using the smaller area data available at 
Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership level to look at how the relationship between 
crime and the labour market works at the more localised level. However, as yet data at 
this level are not available over very long periods of time. When these data do become 
available, this will make it possible to look at the importance of dynamic effects or long 
run changes in crime over time.
Another question which deserves future attention when more data become 
available is whether the Minimum Wage effect on crime identified in this thesis produces
270
a one-off reduction in crime or whether the effects are longer lasting. In future, it will 
also be possible to examine whether additional increases in the level of the Minimum 
Wage also have the potential to reduce crime.
If the British Crime Survey ever releases its area codes, this will open up the 
possibility for future research to examine whether some of the results shown in this thesis 
hold true for victimisation data. If the results produced from the BCS are congruent with 
those described here, this will add additional weight to the overall findings. This is true 
not only of the BCS, but any other type of data used to examine these same issues, both 
qualitative and quantitative. If two or more different studies using different data and 
different techniques reach the same conclusions, it is harder to ignore or dismiss the 
findings.
The final area of future research brought to light by this current study is the 
possibility of evaluating the effect of policy initiatives aimed at reducing crime. Chapter 
4 showed that a policy, not directly aimed at reducing crime, could nevertheless have an 
indirect effect on crime. Systematic evaluation of policies that have the potential to 
influence crime would seem to be a very important research agenda for the future.
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8. Appendices
Appendix A: Data Appendix
Chapter 2: Looking fo r  A Relationship Between Crime and the Labour Market: Some Exploratory
Research
Police Force Areas
There are 43 police force areas in England and Wales. Most correspond to counties or an 
aggregation of counties. These can be seen clearly from the Table below.
Police Force Areas of England and Wales
Police Force A rea County
Greater Manchester Greater Manchester
Merseyside Merseyside
Cheshire Cheshire
Cumbria Cumbria
Lancashire Lancashire
Cleveland Cleveland
Durham Durham
Northumbria Northumberland, Tyne and Wear
South Yorkshire South Yorkshire
West Yorkshire West Yorkshire
Humberside Humberside
North Yorkshire North Yorkshire
West Midlands West Midlands
Staffordshire Staffordshire
Warwickshire Warwickshire
West Mercia Hereford, Worcester, Shropshire.
Derbyshire Derbyshire
Leicestershire Leicestershire
Lincolnshire Lincolnshire
Northamptonshire Northamptonshire
Nottinghamshire Nottinghamshire
Cambridgeshire Cambridgeshire
Norfolk Norfolk
Suffolk Suffolk
City of London and Metropolitan London
Bedfordshire Bedfordshire
Essex Essex
Hampshire Hampshire
Hertfordshire Hertfordshire
Kent Kent
Surrey Surrey
Sussex East Sussex, West Sussex, Isle o f Wight
Thames Valley Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire.
Avon and Somerset Avon, Somerset.
Devon and Cornwall Devon, Cornwall.
Dorset Dorset
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Gloucestershire Gloucestershire
Wiltshire Wiltshire
Dyfed Powys Dyfed, Powys.
Gwent Gwent
North Wales Clwyd, Gwynedd.
South Wales Glamorgan, South Glamorgan, West Glamorgan.
The data are analysed using 41 police force areas. The Metropolitan and City of London police 
forces have been amalgamated because the low residential population in the City of London produces 
artificially high crime rates. Also South Wales and Gwent have been analysed together because of 
boundary changes that took place in 1996 which mean that these areas can only be examined consistently 
over time together.
Crime Variables
The crime data are crimes reported to and recorded by the police and are produced by the Home 
Office as an annual publication Criminal Statistics. They can also be found as statistical bulletins on the 
Home Office web page (www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/). Because of the different evolution of different 
types of crime this Chapter looks at total, property, vehicle and violent offences separately.
As discussed in Chapter 1 notifiable offences are unlikely to be a totally accurate picture of the 
true level o f crime because not all crimes are reported to the police and o f those that are, not all are 
recorded by them. However, increased pressure on both the public to report crimes (because o f insurance 
requirements) and the police to record crime trends in notifiable offences closely mirror trends in 
victimisation reported in the British Crime Survey (which is generally thought to capture the ‘dark figure’ 
of crime more accurately). Moreover, findings from the British Crime Survey suggest that most crimes that 
are not recorded are mostly trivial offences. Nevertheless, if  reporting or recording varies in some 
systematic way across the police force areas this Chapter examines this is a form of measurement error (see 
Appendix B), the existence of which may produce bias in the results. However, generally we are less 
concerned about measurement error in the dependent variable.
273
Property Crime and Violent Crime by police force area -  1992 and 1998
(Crime/popul ati on)
Property Crime Violent Crime
Police Force Area 1992 1998 1992 1998
Avon and 
Somerset
10.0 6.7 .36 .44
Bedfordshire 8.6 5.1 .35 .44
Cambridgeshire 7.8 5.9 .41 .44
Cheshire 6.3 4.2 .29 .37
Cleveland 11.7 8.5 .47 .47
Cumbria 7.0 4.4 .40 .62
Derbyshire 7.0 5.5 .42 .45
Devon and 
Cornwall
5.9 4.0 .26 .28
Dorset 6.0 4.6 .23 .22
Durham 8.0 5.0 .40 .31
Dyfed-Powys 4.1 2.1 .47 .44
Essex 5.9 3.8 .29 .30
Gloucester 9.3 6.0 .30 .28
Greater
Manchester
11.5 8.8 .39 .86
Gwent and South 
Wales
8.5 6.1 .47 .60
Hampshire 6.9 4.4 .31 .36
Hertfordshire 5.3 3.6 .22 .28
Humberside 11.3 10.1 .56 .58
Kent 7.8 5.0 .37 .43
Lancashire 6.9 5.3 .23 .26
Leicestershire 8.4 5.9 .39 .56
Lincolnshire 6.2 4.6 .37 .36
London 9.0 6.5 .51 .54
Merseyside 7.6 6.0 .49 .60
Norfolk 7.1 4.5 .24 .37
North Wales 5.6 3.7 .40 .36
North Yorkshire 6.2 4.7 .27 .26
Northamptonshire 7.2 6.3 .42 .42
Northumbria 11.1 6.3 .44 .37
N ottinghamshire 12.1 8.2 .81 .66
South Yorkshire 8.2 7.0 .38 .28
Staffordshire 7.1 5.4 .52 .64
Suffolk 5.1 3.4 .32 .32
Surrey 5.4 3.1 .26 .31
Sussex 6.7 5.1 .22 .42
Thames Valley 7.6 5.5 .24 .30
Warwickshire 7.3 5.1 .26 .29
West Mercia 5.6 4.3 .31 .21
West Midlands 9.6 7.2 .44 .44
West Yorkshire 11.4 8.2 .46 .43
Wiltshire 5.3 3.7 .44 .34
Labour Market Variables
Despite the body of work that exists within the area o f crime and the labour market there is no 
consensus as to which labour market measure has the greatest impact on crime. In Chapter 2, which largely 
involved exploratory research the effect o f both unemployment and wages on crime were examined. All
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labour market variables were constructed from the Labour Force Survey and the New Earnings Survey. The 
unemployment measure is ILO unemployed, and was constructed as those unemployed/the active 
population (from the LFS). The wage measures used (from the NES) are the median wage in the area, the 
25th and 75th percentile o f the wage distribution and a measure of wage inequality (75th -  25th percentile).
Unemployment by police force area 1992 and 1998
Police Force Area 1992 1998
Avon and Somerset 9.2 4.6
Bedfordshire 9.5 5.0
Cambridgeshire 8.9 3.8
Cheshire 8.0 5.6
Cleveland 14.4 10.2
Cumbria 7.8 6.5
Derbyshire 9.1 5.0
Devon and Cornwall 10.3 6.2
Dorset 10.7 4.7
Durham 10.4 7.9
Dyfed-Powys 9.3 7.4
Essex 9.9 5.2
Gloucester 8.1 3.7
Greater Manchester 11.7 6.5
Gwent and South Wales 11.1 7.5
Hampshire 9.0 4.2
Hertfordshire 7.9 3.5
Humberside 10.0 7.3
Kent 8.2 6.2
Lancashire 8.4 5.2
Leicestershire 9.6 4.6
Lincolnshire 6.9 5.3
London 13.0 8.0
Merseyside 13.9 11.6
Norfolk 9.0 6.1
North Wales 8.6 7.2
North Yorkshire 6.1 3.7
Northamptonshire 8.0 4.0
Northumbria 13.3 9.0
Nottinghamshire 10.1 6.7
South Yorkshire 13.3 9.2
Staffordshire 9.6 5.7
Suffolk 6.8 4.9
Surrey 7.0 2.9
Sussex 9.7 4.8
Thames Valley 8.1 3.4
Warwickshire 9.9 3.7
West Mercia 8.6 4.8
West Midlands 12.8 7.2
West Yorkshire 9.0 6.9
Wiltshire 7.9 3.2
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Median Wages and Wage Inequality bv police force area -  1992 and 1998
Median Wages Wage Inequality
Police Force Area 1992 1998 1992 1998
Avon and 
Somerset
5.83 7.16 4.06 5.45
Bedfordshire 6.15 7.41 4.25 5.54
Cambridgeshire 5.79 7.27 3.83 5.11
Cheshire 5.81 7.06 4.38 5.67
Cleveland 5.72 6.39 4.08 5.32
Cumbria 5.52 6.36 3.95 4.91
Derbyshire 5.54 6.62 3.64 4.55
Devon and 
Cornwall
5.00 5.90 3.35 4.12
Dorset 5.35 6.54 3.77 5.21
Durham 5.20 6.30 3.53 4.68
Dyfed-Powys 5.09 6.50 3.67 5.08
Essex 5.81 6.86 4.04 4.95
Gloucester 5.75 7.11 3.90 4.97
Greater
Manchester
5.61 6.85 3.98 5.03
Gwent and South 
Wales
5.47 6.70 3.77 5.01
Hampshire 5.89 7.17 4.38 5.59
Hertfordshire 6.58 8.00 4.93 6.44
Humberside 5.21 6.50 3.66 4.98
Kent 5.76 6.81 3.89 5.18
Lancashire 5.36 6.61 3.75 4.74
Leicestershire 5.24 6.63 3.28 4.63
Lincolnshire 4.95 5.98 3.35 4.03
London 7.85 9.39 5.40 7.57
Merseyside 5.61 6.71 3.86 5.15
Norfolk 5.32 6.24 3.18 4.33
North Wales 5.42 6.24 3.77 4.57
North Yorkshire 5.01 6.16 3.03 4.62
Northamptonshire 5.53 6.98 3.44 4.51
Northumbria 5.42 6.58 3.46 4.73
Nottinghamshire 5.42 6.36 3.97 4.74
South Yorkshire 5.54 6.45 3.68 4.91
Staffordshire 5.02 6.50 3.05 4.38
Suffolk 5.37 6.05 3.55 3.81
Surrey 6.65 8.44 4.77 7.14
Sussex 5.76 6.95 4.02 5.47
Thames Valley 6.53 8.05 4.85 6.09
Warwickshire 5.65 7.40 3.97 5.51
West Mercia 5.10 6.41 3.37 4.28
West Midlands 5.80 7.09 3.87 5.18
West Yorkshire 5.40 6.55 3.57 4.94
Wiltshire 6.01 7.04 4.49 4.99
Criminal Justice System Data
Although this thesis is mainly interested in the relationship between crime and the labour market it 
is also important to look at the effect of deterrence. This makes it not only possible to compare the effect of 
the labour and deterrence on crime. But also if  deterrence is related to crime failing to include it in the
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model will mean that the model will be under specified and will suffer from omitted variable bias (see 
Appendix B for further discussion of bias). The variables used to capture deterrence effects in Chapter 2, 
(the number o f people found guilty, the numbers placed in immediate custody, the average sentence length 
(for all crime as well as crime specific measures) and the number o f police officers) were provided by the 
Home Office.
Proportion Found guilty of property and violent offences bv police force area -1 9 9 2  and 1998
(per 100 of the population)_______________________________________________________________
Property Crime Violent Crime
Police Force 
Area
1992 1998 1992 1998
Avon and 
Somerset
.32 .29 .14 .14
Bedfordshire .32 .29 .13 .16
Cambridgeshire .31 .25 .14 .16
Cheshire .38 .33 .16 .23
Cleveland .58 .60 .29 .18
Cumbria .51 .39 .25 .35
Derbyshire .32 .26 .19 .20
Devon and 
Cornwall
.29 .26 .14 .17
Dorset .32 .28 .10 .12
Durham .39 .34 .23 .32
Dyfed-Powys .32 .29 .20 .33
Essex .32 .28 .11 .16
Gloucester .33 .28 .15 .15
Greater
Manchester
.55 .68 .22 .26
Gwent and South 
Wales
.26 .21 .13 .16
Hampshire .33 .32 .12 .22
Hertfordshire .28 .24 .12 .13
Humberside .43 .40 .24 .25
Kent .25 .38 .09 .18
Lancashire .50 .52 .26 .31
Leicestershire .33 .36 .17 .22
Lincolnshire .34 .34 .16 .22
London .44 .36 .17 .16
Merseyside .54 .47 .18 .20
Norfolk .37 .28 .15 .25
North Wales .36 .32 .23 .28
North Yorkshire .35 .28 .19 .24
N orthamptonshire .31 .32 .19 .20
Northumbria .49 .50 .22 .29
Nottinghamshire .54 .38 .26 .26
South Yorkshire .48 .46 .17 .17
Staffordshire .32 .31 .18 .22
Suffolk .34 .26 .17 .15
Surrey .28 .17 .11 .12
Sussex .32 .25 .12 .12
Thames Valley .31 .25 .10 .11
Warwickshire .27 .24 .11 .18
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West Mercia .31 .24 .16 .16
West Midlands .45 .43 .20 .22
West Yorkshire .56 .58 .21 .21
Wiltshire .29 .28 .19 .20
Proportion jailed for property and violent offences bv police force area -  1992 and 1998
(per 100 of the populaton)__________________________________________________________
Property Crime Violent Crime
Police Force Area 1992 1998 1992 1998
Avon and 
Somerset
.032 .057 .011 .017
Bedfordshire .045 .087 .015 .038
Cambridgeshire .038 .048 .011 .022
Cheshire .054 .082 .019 .036
Cleveland .066 .116 .016 .026
Cumbria .054 .067 .019 .031
Derbyshire .042 .063 .021 .037
Devon and 
Cornwall
.039 .048 .015 .025
Dorset .027 .054 .008 .027
Durham .054 .069 .015 .030
Dyfed-Powys .026 .042 .012 .022
Essex .033 .065 .011 .035
Gloucester .027 .047 .008 .013
Greater
Manchester
.088 .126 .024 .041
Gwent and South 
Wales
.029 .040 .012 .021
Hampshire .027 .045 .011 .030
Hertfordshire .030 .037 .010 .022
Humberside .057 .088 .019 .034
Kent .038 .067 .011 .025
Lancashire .068 .117 .018 .036
Leicestershire .045 .065 .018 .039
Lincolnshire .032 .053 .013 .022
London .057 .088 .023 .037
Merseyside .061 .099 .017 .037
Norfolk .041 .045 .012 .025
North Wales .039 .057 .015 .034
North Yorkshire .035 .063 .010 .023
N orthamptonshire .040 .062 .017 .027
Northumbria .059 .083 .019 .032
Nottinghamshire .065 .082 .031 .057
South Yorkshire .049 .093 .016 .034
Staffordshire .043 .069 .020 .026
Suffolk .031 .045 .014 .023
Surrey .023 .028 .008 .015
Sussex .036 .052 .012 .023
Thames Valley .026 .033 .009 .014
Warwickshire .036 .057 .014 .024
West Mercia .043 .049 .013 .024
West Midlands .057 .093 .023 .034
West Yorkshire .050 .010 .017 .031
Wiltshire .025 .039 .011 .018
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Average Sentence length for property crimes and violent crimes bv police force area -1 9 9 2  and 1998
(in months)
Property Crime Violent Crime
Police Force Area 1992 1998 1992 1998
Avon and 
Somerset
7.54 8.70 19.40 21.28
Bedfordshire 7.43 7.48 22.35 18.66
Cambridgeshire 10.55 10.03 28.77 17.85
Cheshire 9.57 8.92 19.95 19.27
Cleveland 10.14 10.75 22.34 24.57
Cumbria 7.99 8.59 24.19 12.75
Derbyshire 9.83 9.53 20.87 14.13
Devon and 
Cornwall
7.26 8.01 19.93 18.66
Dorset 7.24 8.00 22.63 16.77
Durham 9.00 10.50 22.42 17.78
Dyfed-Powys 8.14 9.72 26.29 15.40
Essex 10.07 7.06 27.86 14.72
Gloucester 9.09 9.58 28.47 17.95
Greater
Manchester
6.88 7.83 21.88 21.39
Gwent and South 
Wales
9.00 8.61 22.08 18.13
Hampshire 9.73 8.51 20.89 15.71
Hertfordshire 9.53 9.50 25.22 19.81
Humberside 9.38 10.41 23.59 17.44
Kent 7.88 8.35 28.09 18.91
Lancashire 7.81 8.12 19.12 17.20
Leicestershire 8.80 9.95 25.88 16.77
Lincolnshire 8.36 8.94 16.55 19.92
London 9.52 9.76 26.43 19.35
Merseyside 7.53 7.50 25.01 22.06
Norfolk 9.92 7.54 23.54 13.07
North Wales 9.31 8.45 17.79 16.81
North Yorkshire 8.47 9.17 25.91 16.14
N orthamptonshire 9.75 9.99 23.20 20.31
Northumbria 9.12 9.44 23.81 24.92
Nottinghamshire 8.62 12.61 17.93 15.82
South Yorkshire 8.52 9.51 23.66 18.04
Staffordshire 8.98 9.59 16.74 15.71
Suffolk 9.90 7.37 23.67 16.61
Surrey 8.93 10.46 27.83 16.28
Sussex 9.32 8.89 26.30 20.58
Thames Valley 8.91 9.99 24.65 19.13
Warwickshire 9.68 11.62 17.97 20.35
West Mercia 10.74 12.13 23.42 20.65
West Midlands 8.70 10.14 23.68 21.72
West Yorkshire 8.88 9.60 4.43 22.18
Wiltshire 7.55 8.39 18.68 18.20
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Number of police officers bv police force area -  1992 and 1998
Police Force Area 1992 1998
Avon and Somerset 3061 2999
Bedfordshire 1121 1041
Cambridgeshire 1237 1274
Cheshire 1901 2071
Cleveland 1501 1416
Cumbria 1196 1133
Derbyshire 1810 1759
Devon and Cornwall 2915 2887
Dorset 1318 1298
Durham 1376 1575
Dyfed-Powys 957 1026
Essex 2917 2900
Gloucester 1148 1109
Greater Manchester 7055 6810
Gwent and South Wales 4161 4230
Hampshire 3285 3486
Hertfordshire 1688 1728
Humberside 2033 1981
Kent 3106 3208
Lancashire 3205 3245
Leicestershire 1830 1993
Lincolnshire 1191 1140
London 27934* 26734
Merseyside 4653 4211
Norfolk 1426 1394
North Wales 1356 1415
North Yorkshire 1408 1337
Northamptonshire 1203 1143
Northumbria 3583 3840
Nottinghamshire 2321 2236
South Yorkshire 3000 3168
Staffordshire 2169 2238
Suffolk 1236 1192
Surrey 1657 1665
Sussex 2979 2847
Thames Valley 3763 3766
Warwickshire 980 909
West Mercia 2060 1998
West Midlands 6960 7320
West Yorkshire 5067 4982
Wiltshire 1167 1085
* 1993
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Population Variables
Population is obviously an important factor when talking about crime. Crime varies greatly across 
differently populated areas. For example, crime is much higher in urban compared to rural areas and higher 
still in the metropolitan areas (Home Office, 2000). Indeed, to make crimes comparable across areas we 
must use population as the denominator in crime rates (i.e. number of crimes/population). Even then rates 
are higher in the more heavily populated areas. Potential explanations for this are not difficult to conceive. 
More highly populated areas have a higher supply of potential crime targets, more people, more properties 
and more goods. In an area with a higher population any particular individual will be more anonymous, 
potentially making it easier to commit and crime without detection. It is also possible that areas with more 
people provide greater opportunities to form networks and associations which may be beneficial to crime. 
The population data for Chapter 2 comes from the Home Office.
Population numbers bv police force area -1 9 9 2  to 1998
Police Force Area 1992 1998
Avon and Somerset 1440866 1488575
Bedfordshire 536560 556628
Cambridgeshire 677689 719767
Cheshire 966878 984280
Cleveland 560013 556344
Cumbria 490193 492884
Derbyshire 947317 970087
Devon and Cornwall 1520457 1558758
Dorset 664232 691215
Durham 607056 607770
Dyfed-Powys 470405 479368
Essex 1484089 1533255
Gloucester 541330 557257
Greater Manchester 2573497 2577434
Gwent and South Wales 1773811 1796506
Hampshire 1713049 1770947
Hertfordshire 846209 878368
Humberside 881423 883117
Kent 1538254 1574561
Lancashire 1413522 1426839
Leicestershire 902340 928716
Lincolnshire 596847 623130
London 7391139 7688699
Merseyside 1445653 1409371
Norfolk 762926 790275
North Wales 654323 657450
North Yorkshire 723051 742404
Northamptonshire 590157 615796
Northumbria 1441619 1425486
Nottinghamshire 1025287 1031587
South Yorkshire 1304328 1304136
Staffordshire 1051835 1061280
Suffolk 648003 671095
Surrey 769901 786729
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Sussex 1433163 1499028
Thames Valley 1990879 2098760
Warwickshire 491941 506713
West Mercia 1103206 1136332
West Midlands 2630540 2628196
West Yorkshire 2093532 2113252
Wiltshire 579367 605511
Demographic Variables
Because crime varies so greatly by ethnicity and education, both these variables were included in 
the models in Chapter 2. Constructed from the LFS, the ethnicity variable was defined as the proportion of 
people in the area who identified themselves as non-white/all those who answered the ethnicity question. 
The educational variable was also constructed from the LFS and defined as the number 16 to 19 years olds 
in the area who are in full time education as a proportion of all 16 to 19 year olds in the area.
Ethnicity and education bv police force area -  1992 and 1998
Proportion Non-White Proportion o f 16 to 19 year olds in Full 
Time Education
Police Force Area 1992 1998 1992 1998
Avon and 
Somerset
2.1 1.6 49.8 63.0
Bedfordshire 8.5 9.2 51.6 57.2
Cambridgeshire 3.0 3.6 53.9 53.7
Cheshire 0.7 0.7 55.2 63.1
Cleveland 1.3 1.9 41.4 49.6
Cumbria * * 40.7 55.1
Derbyshire 2.3 2.5 45.9 52.5
Devon and 
Cornwall
0.1 0.5 46.7 57.6
Dorset 0.6 0.5 53.2 53.2
Durham 0.3 0.8 41.3 47.3
Dyfed-Powys 0.6 1.2 53.0 74.5
Essex 1.2 1.8 46.7 59.8
Gloucester 1.7 0.6 52.0 59.5
Greater
Manchester
5.1 6.0 45.1 53.1
Gwent and South 
Wales
1.6 1.4 50.6 60.7
Hampshire 1.7 1.8 55.4 60.3
Hertfordshire 3.5 4.2 57.1 62.7
Humberside 3.5 4.2 43.5 49.6
Kent 2.4 1.7 52.8 54.4
Lancashire 3.9 4.4 46.7 55.1
Leicestershire 10.7 8.5 55.4 59.9
Lincolnshire 0.8 1.0 44.4 57.4
London 18.7 22.1 56.8 66.5
Merseyside 1.4 1.7 51.5 54.2
Norfolk 1.0 0.5 37.7 55.1
North Wales 0.4 0.7 52.3 57.7
North Yorkshire 0.7 1.3 50.5 61.1
Northamptonshire 2.4 2.1 47.9 65.0
Northumbria 1.0 1.8 41.0 54.0
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Nottinghamshire 3.1 3.0 40.9 53.9
South Yorkshire 2.3 2.4 38.7 44.6
Staffordshire 2.1 1.9 48.8 53.1
Suffolk 1.5 1.2 48.8 42.6
Surrey 2.2 4.0 61.4 72.5
Sussex 1.4 1.5 55.1 61.8
Thames Valley 5.4 4.4 57.4 56.9
Warwickshire 3.7 3.2 51.6 60.1
West Mercia 1.2 1.3 44.3 59.9
West Midlands 8.7 10.7 49.0 54.1
West Yorkshire 6.2 7.9 46.0 50.3
Wiltshire 1.4 1.2 53.9 57.5
* Too Few Observations
Chapter 3: Spatial Patterns o f  Crime: Can Labour Market Variables Account fo r
Them?
Crime Variables
The crime data are crimes reported to and recorded by the police at Crime and Disorder Reduction 
Partnership, which correspond to Local Authorities. They can be found as statistical bulletins on the Home 
Office web page (www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds). Because o f the different evolution o f different types of 
crime this Chapter looks property and violent offences separately.
Labour Market Variables
Despite the body of work that exists within the area o f crime and the labour market there is no 
consensus as to which labour market measure has the greatest impact on crime. In Chapter 3, the effect of 
both unemployment and income on crime were examined. The unemployment measure is ILO unemployed, 
and was constructed as those unemployed/the active population from the Labour Force Survey. The income 
measures used come from the income data collected in 1999 by the marketing company CACI (formerly 
known as California Analysis Centre Inc) from a survey question which asks “What is your approximate 
family income per year?” CACI calculate income data at post code sector for around 4 million 
observations. For Chapter 3 the post code sector data were aggregated to Local Authority level. The data 
contain a measure of the mean level of income in each area as well as a measure of the distribution of 
income in that area measured by standard deviations away from the mean.
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Deterrence
The variables used to capture deterrence effects in this Chapter are crime specific clear up rates 
which were obtained from Home Office Publication “Crime in England and Wales” which can be obtained 
from the web site: www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds.
Population Variables
Because areas vary greatly in terms of their population numbers a spatial analysis o f crime must 
incorporate controls for population size. The population data for Chapter 3 comes from the Home Office 
and are produced in the same publication as the crime and deterrence numbers.
Demographic Variables
Crime not only varies by population size but also the make up of the population in different areas. 
Therefore, Chapter 3 includes a measure of the population in the area who are male (defined as the number 
of males as a proportion of the entire population in the area); people under the age of 25 (as a proportion of 
the entire population); the 16-19 year olds in full time education (as a proportion of all 16 to 19 year olds) 
and the number of non-whites in the area (as a proportion of the entire population). All of these variables 
were constructed from the Labour Force Survey. Also included in the data were a measure of social 
housing in the area (measured as the number of social housing properties as a proportion of all property 
types); the number of lone parents (as a proportion o f all family types) and the number of people claiming 
lone parent income support (as a proportion of the entire population). These variables were constructed 
from the Family Resources Survey (FRS) which is a quarterly survey of around 26,000 households per 
year, carried out by the Office o f National Statistics and the National Centre for Social Research for the 
Department of Work and Pensions (originally the Department o f Social Security).
Chapter 4: Crime and the Minimum Wage: A Quasi-Natural Experiment
Minimum Wage Variable
The police force areas are delineated into four areas depending on the proportion of the population 
in each area who earned less than the Minimum Wage before its introduction. The groups are given below: 
Least Low Pay Areas (where less than 7.5% of workers are paid beneath the minimum):
• Essex
• Northamptonshire
• Hampshire
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• Wiltshire
• Sussex
• London
• Surrey
• Thames Valley
• Hertfordshire
• Warwickshire
Second Least Low Pay Areas (where between 7.5% and 10.2% of workers are paid beneath the minimum):
• Gloucestershire
• Avon and Somerset
• West Yorkshire
• West Midlands
• Dorset
• Cambridgeshire
• Cheshire
• Bedfordshire
• Kent
• North Yorkshire
Second Most Low Pay Areas (where between 10.2% and 11.7% of workers are paid beneath the 
minimum):
• West Mercia
• Suffolk
• Derbyshire
• Staffordshire
• Greater Manchester
• Lancashire
• North Wales
• Merseyside
• Gwent and South Wales
• Leicestershire
Most Low Pay Areas (where over 11.7% of workers are paid beneath the minimum):
• Humberside
• Dyfed-Powys
• Lincolnshire
• Devon and Cornwall
• Durham
• Northumbria
• Norfolk
• Nottinghamshire
• Cleveland
• Cumbria
• South Yorkshire
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Percentage of Workers Paid less than the Minimum prior to the Introduction of the National 
Minimum Wage bv Police Force Area
Police Force Area April 1998-March 1999
Avon and Somerset 8.5
Bedfordshire 7.4
Cambridgeshire 9.1
Cheshire 10.1
Cleveland 16.6
Cumbria 13.4
Derbyshire 11.1
Devon and Cornwall 16.3
Dorset 9.5
Durham 13.1
Dyfed-Powys 15.7
Essex 6.5
Gloucester 7.9
Greater Manchester 10.2
Gwent and South Wales 11.4
Hampshire 6.7
Hertfordshire 5.1
Humberside 13.9
Kent 9.7
Lancashire 11.4
Leicestershire 10.2
Lincolnshire 13.3
London 5.0
Merseyside 10.8
Norfolk 13.4
North Wales 10.6
North Yorkshire 9.4
Northamptonshire 6.2
Northumbria 14.3
Nottinghamshire 12.4
South Yorkshire 11.7
Staffordshire 10.6
Suffolk 11.3
Surrey 4.6
Sussex 6.5
Thames Valley 5.2
Warwickshire 6.2
West Mercia 10.8
West Midlands 10.0
West Yorkshire 9.4
Wiltshire 7.2
Other measures o f Low Pay
Not all low paid individuals are involved in crime. Indeed, evidence suggests that those on the 
margins of crime are more likely to be males, young males in particular, and those in the lowest skilled 
occupations working for the lowest pay. For these reasons the measure o f low pay is refined to focus on 
these groups. Low skilled males are defined as males working in occupations where the average pay is 
beneath the 25th percentile pay for all males. The young males pay measure is defined as the initial low pay
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proportion for males under the age of 25 only, while the wage bill measure is defined as how far the wage 
bill would need to be raised to take all people initially beneath the minimum up to the Minimum Wage.
The Initial Percentage in each Low Pay Category prior to the Introduction of the Minimum Wage
Police Force Area Low Skilled Males Young Males Wage Bill Measure
Avon and Somerset 6.8 7.5 0.83
Bedfordshire 5.6 12.3 0.83
Cambridgeshire 7.5 9.1 0.96
Cheshire 9.0 9.2 1.00
Cleveland 13.3 23.1 1.72
Cumbria 11.1 27.9 1.40
Derbyshire 9.2 17.9 1.19
Devon and Cornwall 13.8 27.0 1.76
Dorset 8.2 7.3 0.95
Durham 10.7 21.2 1.31
Dyfed-Powys 13.4 21.7 1.59
Essex 5.8 4.4 0.59
Gloucester 6.5 7.8 0.73
Greater Manchester 8.3 22.4 1.05
Gwent and South Wales 9.7 10.2 1.10
Hampshire 5.2 16.4 0.64
Hertfordshire 4.1 15.4 0.40
Humberside 11.6 18.1 1.34
Kent 8.8 10.8 0.82
Lancashire 9.5 21.1 1.14
Leicestershire 8.7 24.2 0.95
Lincolnshire 11.3 21.7 1.33
London 4.1 7.2 0.43
Merseyside 8.4 17.8 1.18
Norfolk 11.0 18.3 1.42
North Wales 9.3 15.2 1.03
North Yorkshire 7.6 12.9 0.83
N orthamptonshire 5.3 7.2 0.50
Northumbria 11.6 27.5 1.45
Nottinghamshire 10.4 16.4 1.17
South Yorkshire 10.2 18.5 1.27
Staffordshire 8.9 13.6 1.01
Suffolk 9.0 18.1 1.15
Surrey 3.8 7.0 0.39
Sussex 5.7 7.2 0.53
Thames Valley 4.3 6.7 0.46
Warwickshire 5.1 11.8 0.58
West Mercia 9.6 13.7 1.09
West Midlands 8.8 10.8 0.97
West Yorkshire 7.5 18.8 0.96
Wiltshire 5.7 9.3 0.69
Crime Variables
The crime data are crimes reported to and recorded by the police and are produced by the Home 
Office as an annual publication Criminal Statistics. They can also be found as statistical bulletins on the 
Home Office web page (www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/). Because o f the different evolution o f different 
types of crime this Chapter looks at total, property, vehicle and violent offences separately.
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Total Crime (per 1000 of the population)
Police Force Area April 1998-March 1999 April 1999-March 2000
Avon and Somerset 104.7 102.6
Bedfordshire 92.2 100.7
Cambridgeshire 100.6 102.8
Cheshire 67.4 66.8
Cleveland 119.8 116.5
Cumbria 82.2 77.1
Derbyshire 89.6 90.8
Devon and Cornwall 73.1 72.9
Dorset 80.1 79.4
Durham 83.2 80.6
Dyfed-Powys 52.5 50.6
Essex 64.9 69.6
Gloucester 89.4 94.5
Greater Manchester 141.0 146.7
Gwent and South Wales 109.4 105.7
Hampshire 75.1 79.1
Hertfordshire 58.8 62.9
Humberside 149.0 138.4
Kent 84.4 81.5
Lancashire 83.8 77.2
Leicestershire 104.4 105.7
Lincolnshire 79.1 78.2
London 127.5 143.6
Merseyside 97.2 102.3
Norfolk 75.3 78.3
North Wales 67.2 68.3
North Yorkshire 76.9 74.5
Northamptonshire 111.6 104.4
Northumbria 105.4 99.1
Nottinghamshire 132.7 134.3
South Yorkshire 102.4 101.3
Staffordshire 87.6 94.2
Suffolk 61.0 66.3
Surrey 55.7 60.7
Sussex 91.3 95.6
Thames Valley 89.4 97.2
Warwickshire 78.7 78.9
West Mercia 74.6 77.4
West Midlands 119.8 139.0
West Yorkshire 131.4 124.9
Wiltshire 66.8 67.3
Changes in Total, Property, Vehicle and Violent Crime -  Average across all Police Force Areas
(Per 1000 of the population)
April 1998-March 1999 April 1999-March 2000
Total Crime 91.1 92.4
Property Crime 57.2 55.9
Vehicle Crime 26.5 26.0
Violent Crime 8.3 9.3
Deterrence
The likelihood of detection and the severity of punishment are factors along with labour markets 
and demographics which are likely to be related to crime. Here the crime clear-up rates are used to gauge 
differences in deterrence. However, as it is only a very short period of time being examined, it is unlikely 
that there will have been substantial shifts in crime clear-up rates.
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Proportion of Crimes Cleared Up
Police Force Area April 1998-March 1999 April 1999-March 2000
Avon and Somerset .24 .22
Bedfordshire .33 .25
Cambridgeshire .29 .25
Cheshire .37 .31
Cleveland .23 .22
Cumbria .44 .39
Derbyshire .31 .28
Devon and Cornwall .36 .35
Dorset .31 .26
Durham .33 .32
Dyfed-Powys .69 .65
Essex .29 .30
Gloucester .31 .30
Greater Manchester .25 .23
Gwent and South Wales .44 .38
Hampshire .35 .32
Hertfordshire .34 .27
Humberside .22 .19
Kent .34 .33
Lancashire .34 .29
Leicestershire .34 .30
Lincolnshire .40 .28
London .22 .16
Merseyside .31 .26
Norfolk .37 .30
North Wales .43 .36
North Yorkshire .33 .31
Northamptonshire .33 .33
Northumbria .30 .31
Nottinghamshire .25 .21
South Yorkshire .32 .25
Staffordshire .32 .22
Suffolk .41 .36
Surrey .40 .32
Sussex .25 .25
Thames Valley .25 .20
Warwickshire .26 .22
West Mercia .34 .29
West Midlands .30 .27
West Yorkshire .27 .25
Wiltshire .38 .33
Unemployment
When the Minimum Wage was first introduced, there were concerns that it would effectively price 
workers out of jobs, thereby increasing the number o f unemployed who may then turn to crime. For this 
reason, it is important to control for changes in unemployment that may have occurred differentially across 
areas, in case we are biasing the coefficient on the low pay proportion by neglecting another route in which 
crime may be affected by the labour market.
289
Unemployment Rate bv Police Force Area
Police Force Area April 1998-March 1999 April 1999-March 2000
Avon and Somerset 4.3 3.8
Bedfordshire 4.5 4.7
Cambridgeshire 3.4 4.2
Cheshire 5.2 3.9
Cleveland 9.7 11.4
Cumbria 6.1 5.9
Derbyshire 4.6 4.6
Devon and Cornwall 5.9 5.8
Dorset 4.1 4.0
Durham 7.4 6.0
Dyfed-Powys 7.4 7.2
Essex 4.9 4.1
Gloucester 3.6 2.7
Greater Manchester 6.1 6.0
Gwent and South Wales 6.6 7.1
Hampshire 3.7 3.8
Hertfordshire 2.9 3.4
Humberside 8.2 8.5
Kent 5.4 4.8
Lancashire 4.8 4.3
Leicestershire 4.4 5.4
Lincolnshire 4.8 4.7
London 7.5 7.1
Merseyside 10.7 8.7
Norfolk 5.6 4.1
North Wales 6.9 5.3
North Yorkshire 3.4 3.3
Northamptonshire 3.4 3.5
Northumbria 8.6 9.5
Nottinghamshire 6.0 5.9
South Yorkshire 8.3 6.6
Staffordshire 5.5 4.9
Suffolk 4.3 3.9
Surrey 2.6 2.1
Sussex 4.4 4.2
Thames Valley 3.2 3.0
Warwickshire 3.6 4.0
West Mercia 4.7 4.9
West Midlands 7.8 8.2
West Yorkshire 6.5 5.2
Wiltshire 2.9 2.5
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Demographic Variables
The models in Chapter 4 also control for changes in a number of demographic variables which 
theory and past empirical work inform us may be related to crime and which may be occurring over the 
time period o f examination. However, once again, as the period under examination is relatively short, we 
are unlikely to see large shifts in the demographic structure o f areas. All demographic variables are 
constructed from the Labour Force Survey.
The first demographic variable examined is the mean age in the area, which is important as age is 
such a strong demographic predictor of crime (see Chapter 6 ). Changes in the proportion o f young males 
(males under the age of 25) in the area are also controlled for because a high volume of crime is carried out 
by young males. The analysis also controls for the proportion o f females in the area, because the Minimum 
Wage does affect females more than males as they tend to be lower paid. In terms of the minimum wage 
effect the models also controls for the proportion o f people in the area working in the public sector. This is 
important as public sector jobs are unlikely to pay beneath the Minimum Wage, even before its 
introduction. The final variable controlled for is the proportion of people in the area who have no 
qualifications. Those people who fall into this category are not only likely to be in the low paid jobs but are 
also disproportionately involved in crime.
Demographic Variables -  Mean across all Police Force Areas
April 1998-March 1999 April 1999-March 2000
Age 39.26 39.33
Percentage Young Male 7.0 7.0
Percentage Female 47.4 47.4
Percentage with no 
Qualifications
16.6 15.7
Percentage Public Sector Jobs 22.3 22.5
Chapter 5: Rising Crime and Improvements in the Socio-Economic Position o f
Women: Are they Related?
Notifiable Offences
These are crimes reported to and recorded by the police and are produced by the Home Office as 
an annual publication Criminal Statistics. They can also be found as statistical bulletins on the Home Office 
web page (www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/).
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Mean Crime Rates 1975-1997
Year Property Crime Rate Total Crime Rate
1975 .0282 .0303
1976 .0283 .0306
1977 .0328 .0352
1978 .0317 .0342
1979 .0310 .0335
1980 .0326 .0352
1981 .0361 .0388
1982 .0398 .0427
1983 .0395 .0425
1984 .0421 .0451
1985 .0433 .0465
1986 .0460 .0494
1987 .0470 .0501
1988 .0441 .0482
1989 .0456 .0501
1990 .0549 .0596
1991 .0642 .0691
1992 .0677 .0730
1993 .0664 .0718
1994 .0620 .0677
1995 .0587 .0643
1996 .0562 .0624
1997 .0501 .0563
Crime Rates Changes bv Police Force Area 1975-1997
Police Force Area 1975 1997
Property Crime 
Rate
Total Crime Rate Property Crime 
Rate
Total Crime Rate
Avon and Somerset .0242 .0255 .0617 .0699
Bedfordshire .0278 .0301 .0512 .0593
Cambridgeshire .0333 .0354 .0528 .0586
Cheshire .0200 .0214 .0347 .0394
Cleveland .0325 .0351 .0715 .0777
Cumbria .0233 .0250 .0392 .0456
Derbyshire .0230 .0255 .0434 .0499
Devon and 
Cornwall
.0207 .0225 .0364 .0414
Dorset .0285 .0301 .0397 .0434
Durham .0238 .0264 .0433 .0473
Dyfed-Powys .0150 .0163 .0170 .0222
Essex .0225 .0241 .0330 .0366
Gloucester .0207 .0222 .0558 .0595
Greater
Manchester
.0371 .0392 .0692 .0777
Gwent and South 
Wales
.0622 .0666 .1068 .1229
Hampshire .0278 .0297 .0399 .0454
Hertfordshire .0232 .0245 .0294 .0322
Humberside .0316 .0348 .0771 .0859
Kent .0216 .0231 .0452 .0509
Lancashire .0224 .0240 .0486 .0525
Leicestershire .0206 .0225 .0518 .0592
Lincolnshire .0185 .0205 .0396 .0453
London .0971 .1022 .1289 .1536
Merseyside .0485 .0514 .0523 .0601
Norfolk .0197 .0209 .0395 .0441
North Wales .0250 .0272 .0304 .0352
North Yorkshire .0206 .0223 .0419 .0458
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Northamptonshire .0237 .0259 .0504 .0565
Northumbria .0396 .0419 .0542 .0587
Nottinghamshire .0449 .0499 .0609 .0789
South Yorkshire .0252 .0279 .0607 .0655
Staffordshire .0177 .0199 .0467 .0544
Suffolk .0183 .0199 .0291 .0335
Surrey .0155 .0168 .0214 .0243
Sussex .0240 .0261 .0443 .0494
Thames Valley .0243 .0260 .0490 .0532
Warwickshire .0173 .0187 .0430 .0462
West Mercia .0167 .0182 .0390 .0427
West Midlands .0322 .343 .0637 .0705
West Yorkshire .0377 .0406 .0699 .0758
Wiltshire .0272 .0291 .0328 .0377
Convictions Data:
The main focus of Chapter 5 is the impact of increased female labour supply on male criminal 
activities. Notifiable offences, where the perpetrator is not known, contain crimes committed by both males 
and females. While this is unlikely to pose a substantial problem as women commit relatively few crimes 
(and the share of crimes committed by females has remained relatively constant over time) the inclusion of 
even a small number of crimes committed by women may produce bias in the results (see Appendix B for 
more details). To focus solely on crimes committed by males, this Chapter also utilises male convictions, 
that is the number o f males found guilty of property crimes (theft and handling, burglary and fraud and 
forgery) in both Crown (where crimes are mainly indictable offences (which roughly correspond with 
notifiable offences) and Magistrates Courts (which usually deal with more minor indictable offences, 
summary and non-summary (including driving) offences.
Numbers found guilty in England and Wales between 1975 and 1997
(as percentage of the population in parenthesis)______________________
Total Found 
Guilty at 
Magistrates 
Courts
Total Found 
Guilty at 
Crown Courts
Found Guilty of 
Property Crime 
at Magistrates 
Courts
Found Guilty 
of Property 
Crime at 
Crown Courts
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
1975 293279 56615 48846 3741 224660 51424 29520 2549
1976 298507 60763 51717 4450 225902 53928 32014 3237
1977 308278 63228 52514 4710 234699 56106 33697 3412
1987 315457 62931 50919 4663 238280 56997 32272 3355
1979 302859 58416 46335 4325 217873 51617 27978 3056
1980 333013 62357 53560 5415 235254 54431 32992 3905
1981 340379 60062 57547 5393 241688 52464 36215 3913
1982 343784 60622 61962 5432 244592 52717 39742 4016
1983 330196 56580 66790 6072 226807 48763 43121 4661
1984 319105 53496 68309 6355 223367 46142 43621 4616
1985 307547 52032 74961 7007 213222 44632 47069 5038
1986 258813 43498 72904 6540 176694 37052 44172 4408
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1987 257112 40584 79321 6933 168127 34235 46620 4636
1988 253747 38834 83769 7227 152572 31217 45848 4752
1989 217647 35999 76072 6978 128292 28295 39285 4376
1990 222401 37011 76265 6998 129093 28600 37735 4295
1991 222109 35403 71350 6532 132798 27414 36608 3980
1992 213457 33915 69464 6092 127566 25979 34848 3646
1993 209205 32695 58968 5102 124299 24228 28045 2811
1994 212734 34426 60505 5105 122535 25048 27786 2594
1995 200933 31864 62425 5578 115435 23195 27315 2702
1996 200310 32166 60752 5898 113690 23012 23745 2522
1997 212231 35696 64255 6544 114680 24758 25026 2685
Changes in Conviction Rates for Property Crimes bv Police Force Area 1975-1997
(A s percentage o f  population)________________________________________________________
Police Force Area 1975 1997
Avon and Somerset .90 .44
Bedfordshire 1.00 .46
Cambridgeshire .92 .42
Cheshire .96 .55
Cleveland 1.72 .94
Cumbria 1.04 .75
Derbyshire .74 .43
Devon and Cornwall .89 .43
Dorset .80 .41
Durham 1.01 .56
Dyfed-Powys .58 .50
Essex .73 .42
Gloucester .83 .43
Greater Manchester 1.58 .75
Gwent and South Wales 1.44 .65
Hampshire .93 .50
Hertfordshire .74 .28
Humberside 1.29 .65
Kent .72 .53
Lancashire 1.29 .85
Leicestershire .75 .49
Lincolnshire .77 .54
London 1.28 .57
Merseyside 1.50 .72
Norfolk .68 .44
North Wales 1.09 .52
North Yorkshire .88 .51
Northamptonshire 1.01 .44
Northumbria 1.35 .75
Nottinghamshire 1.22 .65
South Yorkshire 1.08 .61
Staffordshire .82 .46
Suffolk .74 .44
Surrey .44 .22
Sussex .79 .46
Thames Valley .75 .32
Warwickshire .71 .47
West Mercia .71 .40
West Midlands 1.04 .59
West Yorkshire 1.34 .69
Wiltshire .69 .35
Mean - All Police Force Areas .97 .53
294
Number o f Police Officers
In Chapter 5 the number of police officers is calculated from the occupation codes available in the 
NES. Prior to 1991 theNES soc code for police officers is 248, from 1991 onwards it becomes 610.
As a sample the NES will not include all police officers, but it is nationally representative, so the 
number of police officers are taken over the number o f all who report an occupation in the NES, to give the 
share o f police officers in areas, this measure should allow consistent comparison o f police presence across 
police force areas.
There is a potential problem that the number of police officers may be an endogenous measure, in 
other words there is the possibility that the number o f police officers is correlated with crime. However, it 
is not obvious which way the bias would go in this case. It may be the case that areas with more police have 
a lower crime rate producing a negative bias. Equally it may be the case that areas with a larger crime 
problem respond to this by hiring more police officers in which case the bias will be in the opposite 
direction (see Appendix B for further discussion of bias). However, Levitt (1997) examined the issue of 
causation with regard to police officers and found that the relationship between the number of police had an 
effect on crime rather than the other way around.
Changes in the share of Police Officers bv Police Force Area 1975-1997
(As a percentage of all occupations)
Police Force Area 1975 1997
Avon and Somerset .27 .88
Bedfordshire .37 .90
Cambridgeshire .07 .37
Cheshire .04 .70
Cleveland .27 .72
Cumbria .33 1.26
Derbyshire .51 .62
Devon and Cornwall .68 .88
Dorset .62 .50
Durham .56 .81
Dyfed-Powys .29 1.06
Essex .47 .79
Gloucester .66 .42
Greater Manchester .53 .81
Gwent and South Wales .54 1.16
Hampshire .77 .76
Hertfordshire .43 .46
Humberside .39 .81
Kent .64 1.38
Lancashire .82 1.19
Leicestershire .39 1.18
Lincolnshire .75 .89
London .73 1.20
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Merseyside .54 1.40
Norfolk .35 .76
North Wales .46 1.01
North Yorkshire .81 .88
Northamptonshire .68 .52
Northumbria .41 .81
Nottinghamshire .64 .84
South Yorkshire .62 .77
Staffordshire .64 .74
Suffolk .43 .56
Surrey .42 .63
Sussex .53 .75
Thames Valley .57 .82
Warwickshire .54 .54
West Mercia .55 .98
West Midlands .16 .91
West Yorkshire .46 .68
Wiltshire 1.21 .93
Mean - All Police Force Areas .52 .84
Female Labour Supply
The female labour supply variable is taken from the NES as the total number o f females in work 
over everyone in work.
Changes in Female Labour Supply bv Police Force Area 1975-1997
Police Force Area 1975 1997
Avon and Somerset 34.8 46.5
Bedfordshire 34.0 43.7
Cambridgeshire 32.4 46.4
Cheshire 32.9 46.3
Cleveland 32.5 43.9
Cumbria 34.4 49.3
Derbyshire 33.3 40.7
Devon and Cornwall 35.5 50.8
Dorset 37.6 49.8
Durham 34.9 45.6
Dyfed-Powys 34.1 45.1
Essex 36.2 48.2
Gloucester 33.8 46.5
Greater Manchester 39.1 48.2
Gwent and South Wales 34.0 46.8
Hampshire 37.2 47.1
Hertfordshire 38.2 48.2
Humberside 31.7 45.2
Kent 36.9 49.2
Lancashire 36.2 44.2
Leicestershire 34.4 44.5
Lincolnshire 34.0 48.7
London 38.3 45.8
Merseyside 37.7 51.5
Norfolk 34.2 45.5
North Wales 29.3 44.0
North Yorkshire 36.3 46.1
Northamptonshire 35.7 45.0
Northumbria 37.6 48.4
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Nottinghamshire 35.9 46.1
South Yorkshire 32.9 47.2
Staffordshire 37.7 45.6
Suffolk 33.4 45.5
Surrey 39.4 49.1
Sussex 40.2 49.8
Thames Valley 36.8 47.1
Warwickshire 35.0 43.8
West Mercia 37.9 47.6
West Midlands 35.0 45.9
West Yorkshire 38.2 47.7
Wiltshire 34.4 46.2
Mean - All Police Force Areas 35.5 46.7
Female Labour Supply in Low Skilled Occupations
Low skilled occupations were defined as (1) those occupations where the average male wage was 
beneath the 25th percentile of the male wage distribution for all occupations in the year 1975; and, (2) 
occupations where the average male wage in beneath the 50th percentile of the male wage distribution for 
all occupations in 1975 and where at least 50% of the workforce were male in the initial period.
These measures were calculated using occupation and earnings data from the NES. The share of  
females in these occupations was calculated simply as the number of women in these occupations over the 
all people in the occupations. Due to changes in the way occupations were recorded in the NES from 1991 
onwards it was not possible to exactly match the occupations identified as the low skilled in 1975 all the 
way through to 1997. Where exact matches were not possible low skilled occupations were matched with 
similar occupations in later years to make consistent comparisons possible, where this was not possible 
occupations identified as low skilled in the initial period, which could not be matched to the same or similar 
occupations in the later periods were dropped from the initial low skilled group.
Changes in the share of Females in Low Skilled Occupations -  25th Percentile
Police Force Area 1975 1997
Avon and Somerset 65.8 70.1
Bedfordshire 64.4 73.3
Cambridgeshire 59.4 67.2
Cheshire 62.1 74.6
Cleveland 71.0 76.7
Cumbria 65.6 74.9
Derbyshire 69.0 69.4
Devon and Cornwall 57.2 69.5
Dorset 63.8 67.8
Durham 74.2 71.4
Dyfed-Powys 60.1 67.9
Essex 63.3 70.2
Gloucester 62.7 66.3
Greater Manchester 69.8 69.3
Gwent and South Wales 68.4 69.8
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Hampshire 69.3 72.7
Hertfordshire 66.3 71.0
Humberside 61.1 68.5
Kent 67.8 69.6
Lancashire 66.7 69.9
Leicestershire 64.8 70.6
Lincolnshire 54.6 64.9
London 58.1 59.8
Merseyside 67.8 69.9
Norfolk 54.6 68.0
North Wales 58.4 70.0
North Yorkshire 62.3 66.1
Northamptonshire 67.5 71.3
Northumbria 70.6 66.8
Nottinghamshire 68.1 72.2
South Yorkshire 73.8 75.6
Staffordshire 70.0 75.3
Suffolk 57.6 66.1
Surrey 62.2 66.7
Sussex 62.4 65.3
Thames Valley 66.7 71.9
Warwickshire 67.4 69.5
West Mercia 64.0 70.8
West Midlands 70.0 73.2
West Yorkshire 68.8 70.1
Wiltshire 62.5 70.1
Mean - All Police Force Areas 64.9 69.9
Changes in the share of Females in Low Skilled Occupations — 50th Percentile
Police Force Area 1975 1997
Avon and Somerset 12.1 14.6
Bedfordshire 8.8 12.7
Cambridgeshire 10.6 13.3
Cheshire 8.8 14.3
Cleveland 9.4 14.8
Cumbria 9.5 15.8
Derbyshire 9.6 10.8
Devon and Cornwall 11.5 15.6
Dorset 12.6 18.8
Durham 10.5 12.1
Dyfed-Powys 10.3 14.9
Essex 10.4 16.4
Gloucester 11.4 15.2
Greater Manchester 11.8 13.4
Gwent and South Wales 11.1 15.1
Hampshire 12.5 15.1
Hertfordshire 11.3 16.4
Humberside 9.6 13.9
Kent 12.0 15.4
Lancashire 13.8 14.0
Leicestershire 10.5 12.9
Lincolnshire 9.7 15.0
London 11.9 12.0
Merseyside 11.7 14.4
Norfolk 9.9 14.8
North Wales 10.6 12.4
North Yorkshire 12.9 14.8
Northamptonshire 9.4 13.4
Northumbria 12.9 12.7
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Nottinghamshire 10.7 13.9
South Yorkshire 9.6 15.8
Staffordshire 10.1 12.8
Suffolk 12.6 16.2
Surrey 13.9 15.6
Sussex 13.1 15.4
Thames Valley 12.2 12.7
Warwickshire 11.4 12.2
West Mercia 12.7 13.8
West Midlands 11.9 15.1
West Yorkshire 12.4 17.2
Wiltshire 11.2 12.4
AH Police Force Areas 11.2 14.3
Population
The population data used in Chapter 5 come from the Home Office.
Population Chan2e across Police Force Area between 1975-1997
Police Force Area 1975 1997
Avon and Somerset 1319700 1478300
Bedfordshire 487900 552300
Cambridgeshire 553000 712200
Cheshire 911900 982100
Cleveland 65600 555800
Cumbria 474600 492100
Derbyshire 889500 965500
Devon and Cornwall 1340400 1551500
Dorset 571700 687500
Durham 610900 608300
Dyfed-Powys 423700 477900
Essex 1415500 1595300
Gloucester 487700 559300
Greater Manchester 2700200 2571900
Gwent and South Wales 870450 896500
Hampshire 1558100 1762500
Hertfordshire 937300 1024800
Humberside 847900 884700
Kent 1443800 1566000
Lancashire 1373700 1425100
Leicestershire 835100 929000
Lincolnshire 521900 619400
London 3554500 3561000
Merseyside 1588900 1413400
Norfolk 657400 783000
North Wales 599700 656000
North Yorkshire 652000 737700
Northamptonshire 501100 610300
Northumbria 1473300 1430100
Nottinghamshire 980400 1032200
South Yorkshire 1317800 1304500
Staffordshire 992800 1060300
Suffolk 571000 666600
Surrey 1001600 1057100
Sussex 1277100 1487300
Thames Valley 1697100 2085800
Warwickshire 470400 503600
West Mercia 945000 1147700
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West Midlands 2767700 2630600
West Yorkshire 2082100 2110100
Wiltshire 509900 599400
Age
The age variable in Chapter 5 was constructed from the NES and defined as the number of 
individuals in the area under the age of 25 over all individuals in the area.
Changes in the Proportion of Young People across Police Force Areas between 1975 and 1997
Police Force Area 1975 1997
Avon and Somerset 18.7 11.4
Bedfordshire 16.9 12.0
Cambridgeshire 20.0 13.5
Cheshire 19.5 12.3
Cleveland 19.9 13.2
Cumbria 19.5 13.7
Derbyshire 18.1 11.4
Devon and Cornwall 19.4 12.0
Dorset 17.1 15.6
Durham 20.5 11.0
Dyfed-Powys 17.2 15.0
Essex 18.1 14.6
Gloucester 18.8 11.9
Greater Manchester 19.6 12.6
Gwent and South Wales 19.6 14.1
Hampshire 19.0 13.0
Hertfordshire 17.9 13.1
Humberside 19.7 12.5
Kent 19.9 13.4
Lancashire 18.9 12.6
Leicestershire 20.7 12.7
Lincolnshire 21.2 12.6
London 18.2 14.0
Merseyside 19.9 11.5
Norfolk 20.6 12.3
North Wales 16.3 13.0
North Yorkshire 19.5 12.8
Northamptonshire 19.7 13.3
Northumbria 21.2 11.9
Nottinghamshire 18.9 11.0
South Yorkshire 20.1 12.9
Staffordshire 18.3 12.5
Suffolk 21.0 14.3
Surrey 17.3 13.8
Sussex 18.0 13.7
Thames Valley 18.6 13.5
Warwickshire 19.6 12.1
West Mercia 20.1 12.6
West Midlands 18.5 13.0
West Yorkshire 19.2 14.7
Wiltshire 22.0 13.9
Mean - All Police Force Areas 19.2 12.9
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Chapter 6: Age Differences in Crime: Are they Explained by Education?
Property Crimes:
• Damaging or destroying, on purpose or recklessly, something belonging to somebody else.
• Writing or spraying graffiti on walls, buses, train seats, shelters etc.
• Stolen money from a gas or electricity meter, public telephone box, vending machine, video game, or 
fruit machine.
• Stealing from a shop, supermarket or department store.
• Stolen anything in school worth more than £5.
• Stolen anything from the place where you work worth more than £5.
• Taken a bicycle with out the owner’s permission.
• Taken a motorcycle or moped with out the owner’s permission.
• Taken away a car with out the owner’s permission.
• Stealing something out of or from a car.
• Pick pocketing something from somebody.
• Snatching (from a person) a purse, bag or something else.
• Sneaken or broken into a private garden, a house or building intending to steal something (not 
abandoned or ruined buildings).
• Stolen anything worth more than £5, not already mentioned (e.g. Hospital, youth club, sports centre, 
pub etc).
• Buying, selling or holding onto something you know or believe at the time has been stolen.
• Selling a cheque book, credit card, cash point card belonging to you or someone else so that they can
steal money from a bank account.
• Using a cheque book, credit card, cash point card which you know or believe at the time has been 
stolen to get money out of a bank account.
• Claiming on an insurance policy, an expenses form, a tax return or social security benefit form that you 
know to be incorrect in order to make money.
Handling Crimes:
• Buying, selling or holding onto something you know or believe at the time has been stolen.
•  Selling a cheque book, credit card, cash point card belonging to you or someone else so that they can 
steal money from a bank account.
•  Using a cheque book, credit card, cash point card which you know or believe at the time has been 
stolen to get money out of a bank account.
•  Claiming on an insurance policy, an expenses form, a tax return or social security benefit form that you 
know to be incorrect in order to make money.
Violent Crimes:
•  Carrying a weapon, such as a knife, stick etc, to defend yourself or attack other people.
•  Threatening somebody with a weapon or beating them up, in order to get money or other valuables 
from them.
• Participating in fighting or disorder in a group in a public place (e.g. Football ground, railway station, 
riot, demonstration or in the streets).
• Beating up somebody not belonging to your immediate family, to such an extent that you think or 
know that medical help or a doctor is needed.
• Beating up somebody belonging to your immediate family, to such an extent that you think or know 
that medical help or a doctor is needed.
• Hurting someone with a knife, stick or other weapon.
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Percentage of Males who committed an offence in the last 12 months
Property Offences Handling Offences Violent Offences
Stayed on 
post 16
Left School Stayed on 
post 16
Left School Stayed on 
post 16
Left School
All Ages 13.4 18.0 8.5 14.8 1 0 . 0 18.0
(.385) (.341) (.279) (.355) (.300) (.384)
16-17 1 2 . 1 2 2 . 2 4.1 19.4 14.7 23.4
(.327) (.418) (.199) (.398) (.355) (.427)
18-21 19.3 22.7 14.8 18.3 1 1 . 1 2 2 . 0
(.396) (.421) (.356) (.388) (.315) (.416)
22-25 5.4 9.5 3.2 7.5 2 . 2 9.6
(.226) (.294) (.177) (.265) (.146) (.296)
Education Variable
This was a dummy variable coded 0 if  the young person had stayed on at school after the 
compulsory school leaving age of 16 and 1 if  they had left aged 16 or earlier.
Neighbourhood/area variables
The ACORN Group was a set of dummy variables coded 1 for the particular ACORN group the 
property belonged in, 0 otherwise. This was constructed from the interviewer’s assessment o f the house and 
local area the house was located in. The ACORN codes were: Affluent/prosperous; Affluent professional 
metropolitan; Middle class comfortable; Skilled working class; New home, material comfort; White collar, 
working affluent ethnic; Older people; Council better off; Council high unemployment, poorest; Multi­
ethnic low income.
The social housing variable was a dummy variable coded 1 if  the property was rented from the 
council or Housing Association, 0 otherwise. The question that identifies this is: Does this household own 
this accommodation or is it rented? The options given are: owned or mortgage, owned by parents, owned 
by spouse/partner, rented from private landlord, rented form council, rented from housing association, 
other, don’t know.
School Variables
The measure of truancy was constructed as a dummy variable from two questions. The first: Have 
you ever played truant from school for a whole day without permission? Those that responded yes were 
additionally asked: About how often do you play truant from school? The tmancy dummy is coded 1 for 
those whose responded ‘ 1 week a term or more’, 0  otherwise.
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The exclusion variable was a dummy variable coded 1 if  the respondent said they had ever been 
suspended or excluded, 0 otherwise. The questions asked were: Have you ever been temporarily suspended 
from school or not? Have you ever been expelled from school or not?
Individual Variables
The variable measuring whether a young person is white or not came from a question: How would 
you describe your race or ethnic origin? It was constructed as a dummy variable 0 if  the respondent was 
white, 1 otherwise.
Whether a young person had any children was measured by a dummy variable coded 1 if  the 
respondent had children, 0 otherwise. The question asked was: Do you have any children, or are you 
responsible as a parent for any children?
A measure of religiosity was constructed as a 0, 1 dummy coded 1 if  the young person identified 
themselves as having a religion when asked: What, if  any, is your religion or church? 0 otherwise.
Whether a respondent is living with their parents came from the question: I would now like to ask 
you some questions about members of your household, that is people who normally live here and with 
whom you share a living room or normally share at least one meal a day. How many are there and what 
relationship to the respondent?
Family Variables
The variable measuring father’s class was constructed from the following question: What is the 
Government Class of your father’s job (last job)? The options were: I Higher managerial, administrative or 
professional; II Intermediate managerial, administrative or professional; III NM Supervisory or clerical, 
junior managerial, administrative or professional; III M Skilled manual worker; IV Semi and unskilled 
worker; V State pensioners or widows (no other earners), casual or lowest grade workers, or long term 
unemployed. From these options a dummy variable was constructed with a value of 1 for group V and 0 
otherwise.
Family contact with the police was measured with a dummy variable which took the value of 1 if  
the respondent’s family (i.e. parent or sibling) had previous contact with the police, 0 otherwise. The 
question posed is: Has anyone you know ever been in trouble with the police for committing a criminal 
offence? Who? Who else?
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Labour Market Variables
The employment variables measuring unemployment and full employment are both dummy 
variables coded 1 if  the respondent identifies themselves as either o f these (0 if  not) when asked: Which of 
these things on this card best describe what you are currently doing? The options are: at school, at sixth 
form college, at university, on a youth training scheme, working full time, working part time, unemployed, 
doing something else, don’t know.
Weekly income is a banded measure constructed from answers to the question: how much money, 
after tax and national insurance, do you receive each week? The bands are: £1-10, £11-20, £21-30, £31-40, 
£41-50, £51-70,£71-90, £91-110, £111-130, £131-150, £151-200. Dummy variables were coded such that 
they took the value o f 1 if  the weekly earning fell within that particular bracket, 0  otherwise.
Appendix B: Methodology Appendix
Why Logs rather than Levels?
Because areas vary greatly in size and the amount of crime they experience if  we were just looking 
at changes across areas in levels we would see the largest increase in the biggest areas. So that London 
would always have a much larger rise than Surrey for example. Instead we look at the proportionate 
change, by taking the natural log of variables. Taking the log o f a variable means that the coefficient can be 
read as a percentage effect, for example in a very simple model where log(crime)= f t  log(wages) a 
coefficient of P  is produced. This can be interpreted as the percentage effect on crime produced by a 1% 
increase in wages.
Omitted Variable Bias
Omitted variable bias results from excluding a variable from a model that actually belongs in it 
(i.e. one that has an effect on crime). For example, in the following model:
y  — Ot + X  i + P 2  X  2  + £
If X 2 is left out of the model for any reason, the model will be under specified. And we will end 
up with a model that looks like this:
y  = a  + PiXy + s
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In this case X 2 , because it is not included explicitly in the model, but nevertheless is associated
with y, is included in the error term £  . If Xj  and X 2 are correlated the error term is now correlated with 
the right hand side of the model and this causes the model to be biased. The direction of the bias depends 
on: two things. Firstly, how correlated X ] and X 2 are. And secondly, on the effect X 2 has on y 
(measured by / ? 2 ). This is shown in the table below:
Correlation between X l and X 2 > 0 Correlation between Xj  and X 2 < 0
f t > 0 Positive bias Negative bias
/?2<o Negative bias Positive bias
(Source: Wooldridge, 1999, page 90)
Controlling fo r cluster samples
The data used in this Chapter is aggregated to police force level. If we think that anything that has 
been omitted from the model, for example, things we think may be related to crime but cannot measure 
(such as peer group effects) the model may suffer from heteroskedasticity if  these variables vary across 
areas (i.e. the variance of the error term (where the omitted variable will appear in the model) will not be 
constant but will vary across areas).
This will result in the models producing incorrect test statistics. To try to correct for this potential 
problem the regressions analyses are all carried out with robust test statistics which means the test statistics 
produced by this method are valid even if  the model suffers from heteroskedasticity.
Measurement Error
It is not always possible to collect all the data we would like. For example, most surveys do not 
interview everyone, they interview a sample of people. Where people are asked their wages the data 
contains what they report their wages as which may be different from their actual wages. Another example, 
already discussed with the crime data is that it only contains crime reported to and recorded by the police, 
this will not cover all crimes. In these cases our variable is an imprecise measure and the model will suffer 
from measurement error.
Measurement error then is the difference between the measured value and the true value of a 
variable. In the dependent variable e=y-y* , where y* is the true value ofy. The model we want to estimate 
is:
y* = a  + fiX + s  
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But instead we have to estimate:
y  = a  + pX + 8 + e
So now the error term in the model contains two components, £  the normal error term and e the 
measurement error. When the measurement error is in the dependent variable y  replaces y*  and as long as 
the measurement error in y  is not systematically related to any of the independent variables (for example, in 
a model of crime on wages if  low wage people are less likely to report crime the error term will be 
correlated with the wages measure on the right hand side of the equation) the model will not be biased.
Measurement error in the independent variables is much more a cause for concern. Here e=X-X* 
where X* is the true value of X. In this case (with no measurement error in the dependent variable) the 
equation becomes:
y  = a  + [5X + ( s -  pe)
Here the X  which is contaminated with measurement error must be correlated with the error term 
because it becomes part of it. The covariance between X  and e is no longer 0 , but depends on the 
measurement error in X. This leads to inconsistent estimates. In particular this produces attenuation bias 
where the estimate of p  will always be closer to 0  than the true P  .
Measurement error, even in an independent variable, need not be too much o f a problem. It
X T *depends on the size of the measurement error. This in turn depends on the variance of X  relative to the
variance of the measurement error. When the variance of X  is large relative to the variance o f the 
measurement error any inconsistency in the results will be small.
What is a Quasi-Natural Experiment?
One way to determine the causal effect that something has on something else is to carry out an 
experiment. These are more often seen in the natural sciences. For example, when a dmg company tests a 
new medicine a number of people take part in the experiment. Allocated randomly into two groups, people 
in group A (the treatment group) receive the new drug, while group B (the control group) are given a 
placebo. This allows the scientists to do a before and after study o f the effect o f the new drug, comparing 
the treatment to the control group. Such experiments rarely take place in the realm of social science (largely 
because of cost and ethical concerns over why one group should benefit from a particular treatment and not 
another group).
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Studying the impact of the Minimum Wage across areas offers a quasi-natural experiment. 
Although, not a perfect natural experiment, the fact that areas differ in the proportion of their population 
paid less than the Minimum Wage means that when the Minimum Wage is introduced it will have a larger 
effect in some areas than others. This offers a quasi-treatment group (areas where the Minimum Wage has a 
greater effect) and control group (areas with fewer low paid workers where the Minimum Wage has less of 
an impact). This allows a before and after analysis with comparisons across the differentially effected areas.
One o f the huge advantages of data such as these is that it facilitates clarification of the issue of 
causality. Many researchers (who do not specialize in quantitative methods) often have a problem 
understanding causality with non-experimental data analysed using regression techniques to establish 
ceteris paribus (see discussion below). The quasi-experimental nature of this data, using before and after 
analysis with differentially effected groups helps to show the causal effect o f the Minimum Wage on crime. 
The Minimum Wage as an Exogenous Variable
Although Chapter 4 focuses on the Minimum Wage, this is really just a different way of looking at 
the relationship between crime and low wages. A problem with examining low wages in relation to crime is 
that wages are an endogenous measure. That is, the relationship can work either way round. While low 
wages are likely to have an effect on crime, it is also true that those who commit crime are likely to receive 
lower wages. However, Chapter 4 attempts to overcome this problem by using the Minimum Wage as a 
type of instrumental variable for low wages.
Probit Regression
When the dependent variable can only take on two values (either a young person commits a crime 
or they do not), it is known as a limited dependent variable. While an ordinary least squares model can deal 
with these type o f dependent variables by using linear probabilities models, there are a number o f problems 
associated with this methodology. Firstly, they sometimes give probabilities less than 0 or greater than 1. 
Secondly, a probability cannot be linearly related to the independent variables at all given values (i.e. the 
partial effect o f an independent variable (measured in levels) is constant). Thirdly, linear probability 
models necessarily contains heteroskedasticity, which although does not cause bias, does lead to incorrect 
standard errors. Instead, Chapter 6  uses a maximum likelihood estimation probit model. This model is 
based on the assumption that the probability distribution in question (i.e. the probability of committing an
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offence) is normal and predicts probability Y=1 (i.e. a youth who left school at 16 [stayed on] committing 
an offence) compared to Y=0 (not committing an offence).
Nonlinear Functional Forms -  the Quadratic
The evidence presented in Chapter 6  suggests crime rises with age, peaking in the mid to late teens 
and then subsequently declining. This suggests that there exists a nonlinear relationship between the 
dependent variable (crime) and independent variable (age). To capture this quadratics are added to the age 
variable so that the model includes both age and age2. When age and age2 are both included in the model 
we need to examine both to find the effect o f age on crime (as you cannot examine the effect o f one while 
holding the other constant). Thus, the effect of age on crime is measured by:
Plage + P2age2
In most of the specifications in this Chapter the coefficient on age is positive, while the coefficient 
on age2 is negative. As has been shown, this produces a parabolic shape and implies that age has a 
diminishing effect on crime. Prior to and including the point where the effect o f age on crime is zero age 
has a positive effect on crime, after this, age has a negative effect on crime. The turning point is given by:
Turning point= — /?, age/{2 P2age2 )
Poisson Regressions
Where the dependent variable is a count variable (i.e. when the variable o f interest is not just 
whether an individual has committed a crime or not, but how many times he or she has done so) Chapter 6  
uses a poisson maximum likelihood model (Greene 2000). A count variable cannot be normally distributed. 
Instead the count variable forms a poisson distribution, which is determined by the mean of the variable. 
Based on this distribution the poisson regression makes in possible to find probabilities at any given value 
of the independent variables.
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Appendix C: Regression Results Appendix
Chapter 3: Spatial Patterns o f  Crime: Can Labour Market Variables Account fo r
Them?
Property crime regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Basic Model 
(with 
Demographics)
Labour Market 
Variables
Labour
Market
(inequality)
Clear Up 
Rate
Full Model
Proportion Male .033***
(.033)
[.0021
.027***
(.007)
[.00 1 ]
Proportion under 
25
9 7 9 ***
(.326)
[.052]
.834***
(.289)
r.0441
Proportion of 16-19 
year olds in Full 
Time Education
_130***
(.053)
[-.0071
-  131*** 
(.051) 
[-.0071
Proportion non­
white
.163
(.106)
[.0091
.146
(.118)
[.0081
Proportion Social 
Housing
.398***
(.092)
[.02 1 ]
.095
(.112)
[.0051
Proportion Lone 
Parents
1.90***
(.324)
[.101]
.992***
(.423)
[.052]
Population .000***
(.000)
[-0001
.000**
(.000)
[-0001
Area Size -.000***
(.000)
[-0001
-.000***
(.000)
[.0001
Lone Parent 
Income Support
14 73*** 
(1.87) 
[.813]
14.72***
( 1.8 6 )
[812]
8.39***
(2.27)
r.4401
ILO
Unemployment
-.325
(.495)
[-.018]
-.343
(.484)
[-019]
-.940**
(.440)
[-.0491
Bottom End of the
Income
Distribution
-.417***
(.122)
[-023]
Top End of the
Income
Distribution
.439***
(.143)
[.024]
Income Inequality .412***
( .122)
[.0231
.283**
(.120)
[.015]
Property Crime 
Clear up Rate
2.18**
(.889)
[.137]
.354
(.566)
[019]
Obs 374 374 374 374 374
R-squared .565 .484 .483 .587 .611
With robust standard errors 
[ ] Marginal Effects
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Violent crime regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Basic Model 
(with 
Demographics)
Labour
Market
Variables
Labour
Market
(inequality)
Clear Up 
Rate
Full Model
Proportion Male .045***
(.009)
[.001]
.058**
(.027)
[.0021
Proportion under 25 .603*
(.602)
r-ois]
.379
(.283)
[O il]
Proportion of 16-19 year 
olds in Full Time 
Education
.021
(067)
[.0011
.023
(.060)
[.001]
Proportion non-white .875***
(.128)
[.026]
.802***
(.138)
[.024]
Proportion Social 
Housing
.567***
(.115)
[017]
.163
(.133)
[.0051
Proportion Lone Parents 1.32***
(.431)
[.040]
.042
(.373)
[.001]
Population .000
(.000)
[-0001
(.000)
[.000]
Area Size .000
(.000)
[.0001
.000
(.000)
Lone Parent Income 
Support
19.05***
(2.40)
[-5771
19.09***
(2.67)
[.5821
11.37***
(2.80)
[.335]
ILO Unemployment .938**
(.452)
[.0281
.706
(.458)
T.0221
-.585
(.439)
[-017]
Bottom End o f the 
Income Distribution
-.208
(.168)
[-.006]
Top End o f the Income 
Distribution
.541**
(.241)
[.016]
Income Inequality .149
(.182)
[.005]
.261
(.175)
[.008]
Violent Crime Clear Up 
Rate
1.70
(1.10)
[.065]
-.100
(.136)
r-.003]
Obs 374 374 374 374 374
R-squared .660 .635 .601 .014 .713
With robust standard errors 
[ ] Marginal Effects
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Chapter 4: Crime and the Minimum Wage: A Quasi-Natural Experiment
Regressions of Changes in LogfCrime Rateslon the Initial Low Pay Proportion Across Police Force 
Areas in the Years Before and After Minimum Wage Introduction
( 1 ) (2 ) (3)
Change in Log(Total Crime Rate)
Proportion Paid Beneath Minimum Wage in Year Before 
Introduction
-1.235***
(.268)
-.961***
(.223)
- 987*** 
(.235)
Change in Clear Up Rate -.140*
(.071)
-.145*
(.074)
Change in Log(Unemployment Rate) .073
(.076)
Change in Average Age . 0 2 0
(.024)
.029
(.027)
Proportion of Young Males -.977
(1.62)
-.961
(1.67)
Proportion with no Qualifications .271
(.643)
.205
(.629)
Proportion Female . 0 0 2
(1.18)
-.187
(1.26)
Proportion Public Sector Jobs .011
(.583)
-.088
(.604)
Detnographifc Controls ' No' ' ' Yes' ' ' Yes
R-Squared .400 .520 .535
Change in Log(Property Crime Rate)
Proportion Paid Beneath Minimum Wage in Year Before 
Introduction
-1.236***
(.337)
- 894 *** 
(-235)
-.910***
(.239)
Change in Clear Up Rate -.257***
(.076)
-.260***
(.078)
Change in Log(Unemployment Rate) .045
(.071)
Change in Average Age . 0 1 2
(.0 2 2 )
.017
(.024)
Proportion of Young Males -.387
(1.27)
-.381
(1.31)
Proportion with no Qualifications .370
(.649)
.331
(.641)
Proportion Female .192
(1.09)
.074
(.573)
Proportion Public Sector Jobs -.643
(.561)
-.707
(.573)
Demographic Controls No Yes Yes
R-Squared .400 .572 .578
Change in Log(Vehicle Crime Rate)
Proportion Paid Beneath Minimum Wage in Year Before 
Introduction
-1.166***
(.253)
- 1 .0 1 2 ***
(.282)
- 1 .0 0 2 ***
(.283)
Change in Clear Up Rate -.157*
(.091)
-.156*
(.092)
Change in Log(Unemployment Rate) -.029
(.1 0 1 )
Change in Average Age .017
(.029)
.014
(.030)
Proportion of Young Males -.289
(1.73)
-.293
(1.72)
Proportion with no Qualifications -.006 . 0 2 0
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(1.05) (1.04)
Proportion Female 1 . 1 0
(1.47)
1.18
(1.53)
Proportion Public Sector Jobs -.947
(.667)
-.905
(.6 6 8 )
Demographic Controls No Yes Yes
R-Squared .292 .378 .380
Change in Log(Violent Crime Rate)
Proportion Paid Beneath Minimum Wage in Year Before 
Introduction
-1 079*** 
(.281)
-1.005**
(.471)
-1.053**
(.520)
Change in Clear Up Rate -.003
(.126)
- . 0 1 2
(.133)
Change in Log(Unemployment Rate) .141
(.064)
Change in Average Age .085
(.051)
.103
(.064)
Proportion o f Young Males -2 . 6 8
(3.49)
-2.67
(3.78)
Proportion with no Qualifications -.502
(1.49)
-.624
(1.54)
Proportion Female -1.26
(2.81)
-1.64
(3.22)
Proportion Public Sector Jobs 1.31
(1.25)
1 . 1 1
(1.36)
Demographic Controls No Yes Yes
R-Squared . 1 2 1 .261 .285
Notes: Coefficients (heteroskedastic consistent standard errors) reported. The sample size in all regressions 
is 41 police force areas. All regressions weighted by area population. The demographic controls entered 
were -  change in average age, change in the population share of young (<25) men, change in population 
share with no educational qualifications, change in proportion female, change in share of public sector jobs.
Using Other Measures of Low Pay
( 1 ) (2 ) (3)
Low Skill Young Males Wage Bill
Males Low Low Pay Share
Pay Measure Measure Measure
Change in Log(Total Crime Rate)
Proportion Paid Beneath Minimum Wage in Year Before -.882*** -.387** -6.660
Introduction in Period Surrounding Introduction (.315) (.179) (2.291)
Change in Clear Up Rate .195*** -.217*** -.2 0 2 ***
(.056) (.055) (.056)
Change in Log(Unemployment Rate) . 1 0 2 .106** .103
(.053) (.054) (.054)
Change in Average Age .032 .032 .032*
(.017) (.018) (.017)
Proportion o f Young Males -.354 -.231 -.397
(1.25) (1.28) (1.25)
Proportion with no Qualifications -.107 -.297 -.188
(.401) (.423) (.407)
Proportion Female -.029 .239 .007
(.750) (.761) (.748)
Proportion Public Sector Jobs .193 -.005 .152
(.554) (.624) (.561)
R-Squared .432 .423 .431
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Change in Log(Property Crime Rate)
Proportion Paid Beneath Minimum Wage in Year Before - 969*** - 4 3 9 *** -6.920
Introduction in Period Surrounding Introduction (.301) (.142) (2.267)
Change in Clear Up Rate -.205*** - 234*** _ 2 1 7 ***
(.040) (.046) (-042)
Change in Log(Unemployment Rate) .037 .040 .035
(.036) (-035) (.036)
Change in Average Age .034** .034** .033**
(.013) (.014) (.014)
Proportion of Young Males .630 .777 .592
(.760) (.764) (.765)
Proportion with no Qualifications .226 .051 .159
(.343) (.353) (.350)
Proportion Female .228 .548 .276
(.633) (.642) (.641)
Proportion Public Sector Jobs -.312 -.511 -.365
(.362) (.385) (.368)
R-Squared .592 .571 .578
Change in Log(Vehicle Crime Rate)
Proportion Paid Beneath Minimum Wage in Year Before -.798** -.311* -5.941**
Introduction in Period Surrounding Introduction (.367) (.177) (2.683)
Change in Clear Up Rate -282*** -.302*** -.293***
(.060) (.058) (.059)
Change in Log(Unemployment Rate) . 0 1 2 .015 . 0 1 0
(-054) (.053) (.054)
Change in Average Age .026 .027 .026
(.019) (.019) (.019)
Proportion of Young Males .266 .351 .243
( 1 .0 0 ) ( 1 .0 0 ) ( 1 .0 0 )
Proportion with no Qualifications -.027 -.162 -.084
(.495) (.504) (.500)
Proportion Female .944 1.15 .995
(.962) (.997) (.970)
Proportion Public Sector Jobs -.350 -.481 -.412
(.527) (.541) (.538)
R-Squared .556 .547 .550
Change in Log(Violent Rate)
Proportion Paid Beneath Minimum Wage in Year Before -1.292* -.813** -9.071*
Introduction in Period Surrounding Introduction (.776) (.313) (5.062)
Change in Clear Up Rate .164 .123 .157
(.113) (•1 1 1 ) ( .1 1 2 )
Change in Log(Unemployment Rate) .104 . 1 1 0 .107
(.093) (.092) (.093)
Change in Average Age .077* .079* .076**
(-041) (.041) (-042)
Proportion of Young Males -.365 -.014 -.435
( 1 .8 6 ) (1.87) ( 1 .8 8 )
Proportion with no Qualifications -.160 -.498 -.260
(.763) (.777) (.773)
Proportion Female -.243 .376 - . 2 1 2
(.1.67) (1.65) (1.65)
Proportion Public Sector Jobs .058 .344 .037
(.780) (.857) (.797)
R-Squared .240 .248 .239
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Benchmarking Against Earlier Time Periods
[Change in financial year 1998/99 to 1999/2000 benchmarked against change in financial year 1996/97 to 
1997/98 and change in financial year 1995/6 to 1996/7 in (1), (2), (3) and (5);
Change in financial year 1998/99 to 1999/2000 benchmarked against change in financial year 1997/98 to 
1998/99 (scaled by Home Office factors for reporting changes), change in financial year 1996/97 to 
1997/98 and change in financial year 1995/6 to 1996/7 in (4)]
( 1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) (5)
Basic
Specification
(1) + Clear Up 
and
Demographics
(2 ) + 
Unemployment
(3) + Add 
Definition 
Change 
Year
(3) +
Area
Trends
Change in Log (Total Crime Rate)
Proportion Paid Beneath 
Minimum Wage in Year 
Before Introduction in Period 
Surrounding Introduction
-.963***
(.317)
- 770*** 
’(.255)
- 764***
(.257)
_  qj7***
(.270)
-.479
(.298)
Change in Clear Up Rate
(.053)
- 1 9 3 *** 
(.056)
-.1 2 1 *
(.072)
-.166**
(.082)
Change in
Log(Unemployment Rate)
.103
(.053)
.131*
(.049)
.135*
(.073)
Change in Average Age .026
(.017)
.032*
(.017)
.005
(.025)
.035
(.028)
Proportion o f Young Males -.085
(1.17)
-.366
(1.24)
-.485
(.978)
-.735
(1.23)
Proportion with no 
Qualifications
-.061
(.416)
-.137
(.398)
-.228
(.378)
-.169
(.428)
Proportion Female .362
(.730)
.053
(.744)
.068
(.617)
.260
(1.16)
Proportion Public Sector Jobs .283
(.556)
.182
(.552)
.153
(.492)
.116
(.639)
R-Squared .372 .421 .437 .284 .615
Change in Log (Property Crime Rate)
Proportion Paid Beneath 
Minimum Wage in Year 
Before Introduction in Period 
Surrounding Introduction
-.962***
(.359)
-.806***
(.250)
-.804***
(.249)
-1.209***
(.388)
-.667***
(.214)
Change in Clear Up Rate -.2 0 1 ***
(.039)
-.204***
(.040)
-.088
(.082)
_ 1 5 8 *** 
(.042)
Change in
Log(Unemployment Rate)
.038
(.035)
.068*
(.036)
.049
(.034)
Change in Average Age .032**
(.014)
.034**
(.014)
. 0 2 1
(.014)
.024
(.017)
Proportion o f Young Males .713
(.710)
.611
(.754)
- . 0 2 0
(.822)
.379
(.827)
Proportion with no 
Qualifications
.228
(.352)
. 2 0 0
(.343)
.025
(.341)
.198
(.352)
Proportion Female .412
(.617)
.300
(.630)
-.146
(.704)
-.099
(.802)
Proportion Public Sector Jobs -.282
(.360)
-.319
(.362)
-.051
(.410)
-.282
(.393)
R-Squared .488 .591 .595 .540 .763
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Change in Log (Vehicle Crime Rate)
Proportion Paid Beneath 
Minimum Wage in Year 
Before Introduction in Period 
Surrounding Introduction
-.850
(.331)
-.657**
(.300)
-.656**
(.302)
-.853***
(.287)
-.596*
(.355)
Change in Clear Up Rate -.278***
(.059)
-.280***
(.059)
- 241*** 
(.060)
-.246**
(.061)
Change in
Log(Unemployment Rate)
.013
(.054)
.046
(.050)
.135*
(.073)
Change in Average Age .026
(.018)
.026
(.019)
.013
(.018)
.026
(-061)
Proportion of Young Males .284
(.951)
.248
(.991)
.402
(.917)
.008
(.025)
Proportion with no 
Qualifications
-.039
(.503)
-.049
(.498)
-.018
(.447)
-.238
(1.17)
Proportion Female 1.04
(.940)
1 . 0 0
(.959)
.808
(.773)
.258
(.577)
Proportion Public Sector Jobs -.333
(.523)
-.346
(.528)
-.374
(.497)
.495
(1.29)
R-Squared .461 .558 .558 .782 . 6 8 6
Change in Log (Violent Crime Rate)
Proportion Paid Beneath 
Minimum Wage in Year 
Before Introduction in Period 
Surrounding Introduction
-.962*
(.581)
-1.104*
(.645)
-1.098*
(.645)
-1.155*
(.599)
- 1 . 1 2 1
(.720)
Change in Clear Up Rate .179
(•1 1 1 )
.168
(.1 1 2 )
.289**
(.113)
.237*
(.140)
Change in
Log(Unemployment Rate)
.106
(.092)
. 1 2 0
(.085)
.069
(.097)
Change in Average Age .072*
(.040)
.077*
(.041)
/■“V
lo 
r- 
<No 
o .067
(.052)
Proportion o f Young Males -.098
(1.78)
-.387
(1.87)
-2.05
(2.04)
-.577
(1.94)
Proportion with no 
Qualifications
-.123
(.768)
- . 2 0 1
(.769)
-.992
(.860)
-.305
(.932)
Proportion Female .170
(1.61)
-.148
( 1 .6 6 )
-2.03
(1.75)
-.456
(2.19)
Proportion Public Sector Jobs .157
(.786)
.053
(.792)
-.046
(.838)
-.028
(.796)
R-Squared .186 .235 .245 .319 .480
Notes: Coefficients (heteroskedastic consistent standard errors) reported. Sample sizes are 123 for columns (1), 
(2), (3) and (5) and 164 for column (4). All regressions weighted by population. The demographic controls entered 
were -  change in average age, change in the population share of young (<25) men, change in population share 
with no educational qualifications, change in proportion female, change in share of public sector job. All 
equations include dummy variables for time period and the proportion low paid variable.
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Chapter 5: Rising Crime and Improvements in the Socio-Economic Position o f
Women: Are they Related?
Property Crim e Rates on Fem ale Em ployment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female
Employment
.287**
(.136)
.242**
(.135)
.242*
(-135)
.256*
(-134)
.255*
(.134)
No. of Police 
Officers
-.056***
(.018)
-.055***
(.019)
Proportion Found 
Guilty
-.057
(.063)
-.039
(.072)
Proportion under 
twenty-five
-.231**
(.094)
-.225**
(-095)
-.233**
(.094
-.229**
(.095)
Controls for 
Demographics
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Area Fixed 
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R Squared .958 .958 .959 .959 .959
Observations 943 943 943 943 943
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, *** significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%
Male Property Crim e Rates on Fem ale Em ployment
(1) (2) (3)
Female Employment .331**
(.108)
.361**
(.107)
.369*
(107)
No. of Police Officers -.029**
(.014)
Proportion under twenty- 
five
.174***
(.051)
.116
(.073)
Controls for Demographics No Yes Yes
Time Controls Yes Yes Yes
Area Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
R Squared .987 .987 .987
Observations 943 943 943
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, *** significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%
M ale M ean W ages on Fem ale Em ployment
(1) (2)
Female Employment -.405***
(.079)
-.368***
(.072)
Proportion of males under 
twenty-five
.156***
(.046)
Controls for Demographics No Yes
Time Controls Yes Yes
Area Fixed Effects Yes Yes
R Squared .996 .996
Observations 943 943
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, *** significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%
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Property Crime and Female Employment in Low Wage Occupations -  25th. Percentile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female
Employment in 
Low Skill 
Occupations
.333**
(.137)
.353**
(.137)
366***
(.138)
.317**
(.135)
.328***
(.136)
No. of Police 
Officers
- 051*** 
(.018)
-.050***
(.018)
Proportion Found 
Guilty
-.066
(.063)
-.048
(.063)
Proportion under 
twenty-five
-.260***
(.093)
-.253***
(.093)
-.261***
(.092)
-.257***
(.093)
Controls for 
Demographics
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Area Fixed 
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R Squared .958 .959 .959 .959 .959
Observations 943 943 943 943 943
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, *** significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%
Property Crim e and Fem ale Em ploym ent in Low Wage Occupations -  50th. Percentile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female
Employment in 
Low Skill 
Occupations
.382***
(.067)
.415***
(.066)
.419***
(.066)
.402***
(.065)
.406***
(.065)
No. of Police 
Officers
_ 046*** 
(.018)
-.044**
(.018)
Proportion Found 
Guilty
-.074
(.061)
-.058
(.061)
Proportion under 
twenty-five
-.335***
(.090)
-.328***
(.091)
-.334***
(.090)
-.329***
(.091)
Controls for 
Demographics
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Area Fixed 
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R Squared .960 .961 .961 .962 .962
Observations 943 943 943 943 943
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, *** significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%
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Chapter 6: Age Differences in Crime: Are they Explained by Education?
Probit Model for Property Offences for Males aged 16-25
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Basic
specification
Add 
Neighbour­
hood Variables
Add school 
Variables
Add family 
Variables
Add individual 
Variables
Add Labour 
Market 
Variables
Add All 
Variables
Age ns -0.383 -0.332 -0.300 0.896 -0.245 -0.576 1.580*
(0.528)
r-0.0841
(0.556)
[-0.7011
(0.543)
[-0.0621
(0.705)
[0.2011
(0.558)
[-0.0511
(0.569)
[-0.1101
(0.852)
[0.2381
Age2 ns 0.008 0.006 0.005 -0.025 0.004 0.012 -0.044**
(0.013)
[0.0021
(0.014)
[0.0011
(0.013)
[0.0011
(0.018)
[-0.0061
(0.014)
[0.0011
(0.014)
[0.0021
(0.021)
r-0.0071
Age s 1.156*** 1.222*** 1.220*** 1.503*** 1.502*** 0.593 1.331**
(0.417)
ro.2551
(0.430)
[0.2601
(0.444)
ro.2531
(0.463)
[0.3381
(0.433)
[0.3101
(0.466)
[0.1131
(0.662)
[0.201]
Age2 s -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.018 -0.037**
(0.011)
[-0.006]
(0.011)
[-0.0011
(0.011)
[-0.0071
(0.012)
r-0.0081
(0.011) 
r-0.0081
(0.012)
r-0.0031
(0.017)
[0.0481
Unemployed 0.418 -0.385
(0.259)
[0.0931
(0.336)
[-0.0491
Employed FT 0.096 -0.442
(0.273)
[0.0191
(0.364)
r-0.0591
£1-10 (wk inc) -0.104 -0.371
(0.235)
[-0.0191
1.241**
[-0.0471
£11-20 -1.568** -1.565**
(0.674)
[-0.1281
(0.741)
[-0.0941
£21-30 0.030 0.179
(0.266)
[0.0061
(0.376)
[0.0301
£31-40 0.092 0.236
(0.229)
[0.0181
(0.290)
[0.0401
£41-50 0.404* 0.409
(0.240)
[0.0941
(0.314)
[0.0781
£51-70 0.753*** 0.706**
(0.239)
[0.2031
(0.346)
[0.1591
£71-90 0.111 -0.386
(0.281)
[0.0221
(0.423)
r-0.0451
£91-110 0.630*** 0.365
(0.232)
[0.160]
(0.304)
[0.0681
£111-130 -0.208 -0.295
(0.391)
[-0.0351
(0.474)
[-0.037]
£131-150 0.523* 0.211
(0.306)
[0.1291
(0.405)
[0.0361
£151-200 1.275*** (0.333)
(0.291)
[0.3961
(0.359)
[0.3371
Black -0.490** -0.410
(0.242)
[-0.0791
(0.374)
[-0.0481
Religious -0.152 0.030
(0.135)
[-0.0331
(0.181)
[0.004]
Children 0.355 0.326
(0.233)
[0.0861
(0.333)
[0.0591
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Live with parents -0.487*** -0.591***
(0.129)
[-0.0921
(0.170)
[-0.0821
Father SES V 0.088 -0.078
(0.231)
[0.0211
(0.304)
[-0.0111
Family in trouble 
with police
0.577*** 0.816***
(0.217)
[0.1631
(0.267)
[0.1891
Excluded -0.009 -0.162
(0.170)
[-0.0021
(0.256)
[-0.0221
Truanted 0.682*** 0.766***
(0.116)
[0.1561
(0.158)
ro.1351
Affluent / 
prosperous
0.409* 0.278
(0.233)
ro .io n
(0.322)
[0.0481
Aff. Prof. met 0.623** 0.303
(0.287)
ro.1741
(0.390)
[0.0551
Middle class / 
comfort
0.060 0.019
(0.270)
ro .o m
(0.365)
[0.0031
Skilled working 
class
0.645** 0.543
(0.266)
T0.1801
(0.346)
[0.1101
New home material 
comfort
-0.550 -1.456**
(0.377)
r-0.0871
(0.639)
[-0.093]
White collar 
working affluent 
eth.
-0.256 0.070
(0.307)
r-0.0481
(0.409)
[0.0111
Older people 0.262 0.002
(0.467)
ro.o64i
(0.599)
[0.000]
Council, better off 0.123 0.003
(0.249)
[0.0271
(0.351)
ro.oooi
Council high 
unemployment
0.367 -0.297
(0.374)
ro.0941
(0.454)
r-0.0371
Council poorest 0.251 0.172
(0.437)
[0.061]
(0.559)
[0.0291
Multi-ethnic low 
income
-0.025 -0.505
(0.235)
[-0.0011
(0.342)
[-0.0621
Social housing 0.271* 0.040
(0.153)
[0.0631
(0.233)
[0.0061
Obs 867 845 858 681 840 866 640
Test: age_ns=age_s, 
age2 ns=age2 s
5.63 4.94 5.15 3.32 7.11 2.68 0.06
P-value 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.19 0.03 0.26 0.97
Test: neighbourhood 
variables
29.43 23.53
P-value 0.00 0.02
Test: school 
variables
34.75 23.69
P-value 0.00 0.01
Test: family 
variables
7.59 9.52
P-value 0.02 0.01
Test: individual 
variables
21.24 14.35
P-value 0.00 0.01
Test: labour market 43.71 32.92
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variables
P-value 0.00 0.00
Test: all variables 27.18
P-value 0.00
Standard errors in parentheses 
Marginal in [ ]
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Controls included for still being in full time education, leaving school at 16 and missing information on education.
Probit Model for Handling Offences for Males aged 16-25
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Basic specific­
ation
Add Neighbour­
hood Variables
Add school 
Variables
Add family 
Variables
Add individual 
Variables
Add Labour 
Market 
Variables
Add All 
Variables
Age ns -0.567 -0.677 -0.532 0.674 -0.436 -0.901 0.456
(0.552)
r-0.0931
(0.584)
[-0.1041
(0.565)
[-0.0831
(0.753)
[0.1101
(0.591)
[-0.0621
(0.607)
r-0.1221
(0.924)
ro.0391
Age2 ns 0.012 0.015 0.011 -0.020 0.008 0.020 -0.017
(0.014)
[0.0021
(0.014)
ro.0021
(0.014)
[0.0021
(0.019)
[-0.0031
(0.015)
[0.0011
(0.015)
[0.0031
(0.023)
[-0.0011
Age s 1.697*** 1.554*** 1.750*** 1.978*** 2.235*** 0.957* 1.515*
(0.497)
[0.2791
(0.504)
[0.2391
(0.521)
[0.2731
(0.557)
[0.3221
(0.537)
[0.3161
(0.547)
[0.1301
(0.789)
ro.1311
Age2 s -0.042*** -0.039*** -0.044*** -0.049*** -0.056*** -0.026* -0.042**
(0.012)
[-0.0071
(0.013)
[-0.0061
(0.013)
[-0.007]
(0.014)
r-0.0081
(0.013)
r-o.oo8i
(0.014)
r-0.0041
(0.020)
[-0.0041
Unemployed 0.403 -0.485
(0.287)
[0.0661
(0.389)
[-0.033]
Employed FT 0.206 -0.230
(0.297)
[0.0301
(0.399)
[-0.0181
£l-10(wk inc) -0.116 -0.520
(0.301)
[-0.0151
1.327***
[-0.0331
£11-20 -1.016 -0.923
(0.714)
r-0.0721
(0.782)
[-0.041]
£21-30 0.397 0.565
(0.302)
[0.0691
(0.421)
[0.0751
£31-40 0.169 0.523
(0.278)
[0.0251
(0.355)
[0.0631
£41-50 0.827*** 1.109***
(0.266)
[0.1781
(0.348)
[0.2011
£51-70 0.809*** 0.824**
(0.276)
ro.1751
(0.403)
[0.1301
£71-90 0.383 -0.193
(0.316)
[0.0661
(0.498)
[-0.0141
£91-110 0.938*** 0.827**
(0.261)
[0.210]
(0.333)
[0.1271
£111-130 0.032 0.158
(0.417)
[0.0041
(0.519)
[0.0161
£131-150 0.799** 0.410
(0.326)
[0.1731
(0.427)
[0.0481
£151-200 1.287*** (0.463)
(0.319)
[0.3381
(0.387)
[0.2721
Black -0.429 -0.149
(0.270) (0.403)
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[-0.047] [-0.0111
Religious -0.256* -0.172
(0.148)
[-0.0401
(0.198)
[-0.0161
Children 0.422* 0.392
(0.248)
[0.0761
(0.369)
[0.0451
Live with parents -0.569*** -0.691***
(0.154)
[-0.0721
(0.207)
r-0.0541
Father SES V -0.102 -0.785*
(0.271)
[-0.016]
(0.431)
r-0.0381
Family in trouble 
with police
0.762*** 1.118***
(0.224)
[0.1821
(0.285)
[0.204]
Excluded 0.016 -0.452
(0.187)
[0.0031
(0.317)
r-0.0291
Tru anted 0.514*** 0.539***
(0.128)
[0.0881
(0.181)
[0.204]
Affluent / 
prosperous
0.575** 0.828**
(0.280) 
ro.i i4 i
(0.356)
[0.1171
Aff. Prof. met 1.078*** 1.271***
(0.325)
[0.284]
(0.416)
[0.2561
Middle class / 
comfort
0.425 0.843**
(0.310)
r0.082]
(0.392)
[0.1281
Skilled working 
class
0.524 0.790**
(0.322)
[0.108]
(0.400)
[0.1181
New home 
material comfort
-.361 Dropped
(.438)
r-0.0441
White collar 
working affluent 
eth.
-0.083 0.586
(0.372)
r-0.0121
(0.482)
[0.078]
Older people 0.616 0.766
(0.492)
[0.137]
(0.622)
[0.1201
Council, better off 0.341 0.845**
(0.297)
[0.0621
(0.370)
[0.1261
Council high 
unemployment
0.820** 0.653
(0.407)
[0.200]
(0.485)
[0.0941
Council poorest 0.160 0.455
(0.526)
[0.027]
(0.646)
[0.0571
Multi-ethnic low 
income
0.128 0.254
(0.286)
[0.021]
(0.379)
[0.0251
Housing tenure 0.306* 0.076
(0.168)
ro.054]
(0.256)
[0.0071
Observations 864 842 855 678 837 863 637
Test:
age_ns=age_s, 
age2 ns=age2 s
10.55 8.80 10.06 5.49 13.59 5.43 0.68
P-value 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.71
Test:
neighbourhood
variables
29.74 12.20
P-value 0.00 0.35
Test: school 16.53 11.46
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variables
P-value 0.00 0.00
Test: family 
variables
11.56 14.98
P-value 0.00 0.00
Test: individual 
variables
21.15 15.68
P-value 0.00 0.00
Test: labour 
market variables
41.59 35.5
P-value 0.00 0.00
Test: all variables 27.18
P-value 0.00
Standard errors in parentheses 
Marginals in [ ]
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Controls included for still being in full time education, leaving school at 16 and missing information on education.
Probit Model for Violent Offences for Males aged 16-25
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Basic
specific­
ation
Add Neighbour­
hood Variables
Add school 
Variables
Add family 
Variables
Add individual 
Variables
Add Labour 
Market 
Variables
Add All 
Variables
Age ns -0.146 -0.015 0.016 -0.400 -0.216 -0.362 -0.347
(0.545)
r-0.0271
(0.565)
r-0.0031
(0.566)
ro.oo3i
(0.658)
r-0.071]
(0.574)
r-0.0381
(0.579)
[-0.0621
(0.827)
r-0.0041
Age2 ns 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.004
(0.013)
[0.000]
(0.014)
ro.oooi
(0.014)
[-0.0001
(0.016)
ro.oon
(0.014)
[0.001]
(0.014)
ro.oon
(0.020)
[0.0001
Age s 0.159 0.240 0.363 0.263 0.315 -0.263 0.878
(0.539)
[0.0291
(0.542)
[0.0431
(0.584)
[0.061]
(0.585)
[0.0471
(0.562)
ro.0551
(0.570)
[0.0441
(0.763)
[0.1021
Age2 s -0.009 -0.010 -0.014 -0.011 -0.012 0.000 -0.029
(0.014)
r-0.0521
(0.014)
r-0.0191
(0.015)
r-0.0021
(0.015)
[-0.0021
(0.014)
r-0.0021
(0.015)
ro.oooi
(0.019)
[-0.0031
Unemployed 0.378 -0.037
(0.274)
ro.0741
(0.343)
[-0.0041
Employed FT 0.241 -0.176
(0.283)
[0.0441
(0.365)
r-0.0201
£1-10 (wk inc) -0.587** -0.607*
(0.260)
[-0.0751
1.098***
[-0.0511
£11-20 -0.134 0.069
(0.282)
[-0.0211
(0.377)
[0.0081
£21-30 0.079 0.185
(0.286)
[0.0141
(0.374)
[0.0251
£21-30 0.003 -0.443
(0.246)
ro.oooi
(0.314)
[-0.0401
£31-40 0.218 -0.054
(0.270)
[0.0411
(0.364)
[-0.0061
£41-50 0.214 -0.402
(0.285)
[0.0401
(0.453)
[-0.0351
£51-70 0.083 -0.426
(0.310)
[0.0141
(0.429)
[-0.0371
£71-90 0.337 0.164
(0.272)
[0.0681
(0.359)
[0.0211
£91-110 0.081 -0.934
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(0.335)
[0.0141
(0.702)
[-0.057]
£111-130 -0.052 -0.619
(0.359)
[-0.0091
(0.499)
[-0.0471
£131-150 1.030*** (0.346)
(0.312)
[0.2801
(0.376)
[0.2431
Black -0.312 -0.272
(0.262)
[-0.046]
(0.385)
[-0.0261
Religious 0.000 0.286
(0.147)
[0.000]
(0.213)
ro.0301
Children -0.037 -0.301
(0.281)
[-0.0061
(0.404)
[-0.0291
Live with parents -0.140 -0.510***
(0.130)
[-0.0241
(0.185)
[-0.055]
Father SES V 0.453* 0.612**
(0.237)
[0.101]
(0.308)
[0.1061
Family in trouble 
with police
0.659*** 0.838***
(0.232)
ro.i6ii
(0.270)
[0.1631
Excluded 0.179 0.000
(0.171)
[0.0331
(0.262)
ro.oooi
Truanted 0.584*** 0.755***
(0.130)
[0.109]
(0.180)
[0.1061
Affluent / 
prosperous
-0.078 -0.235
(0.255)
[-0.0141
(0.367)
[-0.0241
Aff. Prof. Met 0.016 -0.535
(0.345)
[0.0031
(0.546)
[-0.0431
Middle class / 
comfort
0.016 -0.260
(0.271)
ro.0031
(0.390)
[-0.0261
Skilled working 
class
0.237 0.339
(0.275)
[0.0491
(0.377)
[0.0491
New home material 
comfort
-0.045 -0.201
(0.311)
r-0.0081
(0.429)
r-0.0201
White collar 
working affluent 
eth.
-0.233 -0.371
(0.349)
[-0.0371
(0.590)
[-0.0331
Older people 0.326 0.247
(0.507)
[0.0711
(0.709)
[0,0351
Council, better off -0.156 -0.350
(0.261)
[-0.0261
(0.384)
r-0.0331
Council high unemp 
/ poorest
-0.317 -0.486
(0.370)
[-0.0471
(0.470)
r-0.0401
Multi-ethnic low 
income
-0.026 0.026
(0.234)
[-0.0051
(0.350)
[-0.0031
Housing tenure 0.392** 0.461**
(0.154)
[0.0821
(0.221)
[0.0691
Observations 814 793 806 638 790 813 602
Test: age_ns=age_s, 
age2_ns=age2_s
3.12 3.11 3.31 1.02 3.22 4.24 2.31
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P-value 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.60 0.20 0.12 0.32
Test: neighbourhood 
variables
10.35 12.06
P-value 0.50 0.36
Test: school 
variables
23.44 17.95
P-value 0.00 0.00
Test: family 
variables
12.97 15.68
P-value 0.00 0.00
Test: individual 
variables
2.44 9.85
P-value 0.66 0.04
Test: labour market 
variables
26.66 28.02
P-value 0.01 0,01
Test: all variables 67.94
P-value 0.00
Standard errors in parentheses, Marginals in [ ]
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Controls included for still being in full time education, leaving school at 16 and missing information on education.
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